11/05/2026
Even these names wont suffice when it comes to calling by names pandristan
Sunday Guardian
Pakistan Thinks It’s Outsmarting Trump, But the Truth Could Be the Opposite
By: Michael Rubin
May 10, 2026
Indians are furious that President Donald Trump is treating Pakistan with such leniency and respect. The U.S. president has systematically dismantled 25 years of effort to build a partnership between the United States and India. Instead of holding Pakistan accountable for sheltering Osama bin Laden, supporting the Taliban, and humiliating the United States through its duplicitous policies, Trump is honoring Field Marshal Asim Munir, a shameless backer of terrorism whose hands are stained with American and Indian blood.
Trump’s turn toward Islamabad as a mediator in war and peace issues gives Pakistan extraordinary importance. Where in his first term he had criticized Pakistan’s “lies and deceit,” now he calls Pakistanis “extremely smart people.” After sidelining Oman and Qatar as mediators, Trump has described Pakistan as “magnificent.”
Pakistani officials likely believe they can turn the mediator role into a strategic advantage. Perhaps they think Trump will sell them military technology that could erode India’s qualitative and quantitative military superiority, or maybe Munir believes he can persuade Trump to “mediate” in Pakistan’s favor on the Kashmir issue. Trump’s previous reference to the India-Pakistan “thousand-year conflict” over Kashmir confirms that the U.S. president is no student of history. While Pakistani officials think they can exploit the president’s ignorance, it seems Munir is just as ignorant of history as the American president. As Munir celebrates outmaneuvering Trump, he forgets the bitter history of U.S.-Pakistan relations.
Pakistanis have long complained that America is a friend of convenience. When Washington needs Pakistani help, American leaders treat Islamabad with kid gloves, but the White House shows no loyalty to Pakistan. The fact is that as soon as U.S. presidents get what they need, they turn away from Pakistan. It’s true that the United States and Pakistan were Cold War allies, but for Washington, Pakistan was always a second choice. President Harry S. Truman wanted an alliance with India. Right after independence, Truman invited Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to Washington; it was nearly a year before Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan received such an invitation. Pakistani leaders demanded that America treat India and Pakistan equally, but to Washington’s realist circles, it was as if a cockroach were demanding to be treated like a lion. India was four times larger than Pakistan in both land area and population. Militarily, it was far more powerful, having defeated Pakistan in the 1947-1948 war. In short, in the Cold War context, Truman wanted India to join the American camp. U.S. officials turned to Pakistan only when Nehru adopted a policy of nonalignment.
Though the United States and Pakistan verbally claimed their Cold War alliance status, most Americans and Pakistanis knew the relationship was always a facade. The United States and Pakistan never shared a common goal: America wanted to halt or push back Soviet expansionism, while Pakistan’s entire focus was on India. Pakistani officials not only had a unique knack for starting every war with India but also for convincing themselves and Pakistani society afterward that Pakistan had been the victim from the start. Neither President Lyndon Johnson nor Richard Nixon bought the Pakistani narrative, which is why the United States never seriously considered mobilizing to aid Pakistan against India, as Pakistani officials demanded. This dynamic persisted even when Henry Kissinger was national security advisor, though he harbored a deep bias against Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
Viewed objectively, Pakistan is a rogue state. Though it has outwardly been an American ally, the United States has imposed sanctions on Pakistan multiple times over the past fifty years. In 1976, under the Symington Amendment, most military sales to Pakistan were banned due to its covert nuclear program, and in 1977, Senator John Glenn proposed an amendment to sanction non-nuclear states that conducted nuclear tests. President Ronald Reagan waived the Symington sanctions and similar restrictions under the 1985 Pressler Amendment so Pakistan could arm the Afghan mujahideen. However, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s importance waned, and sanctions began to be reimposed. After Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests, the Glenn Amendment sanctions took effect. They remained in place until 2001, when President George W. Bush waived them again for Pakistan’s cooperation on Afghanistan. Now, with U.S. forces no longer in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s strategic importance has once again evaporated.
This is the lesson Munir has failed to remember. He may think he can prolong Pakistan’s strategic importance by deceiving Trump, but he forgets that whatever benefit Pakistan gains from America is meaningless for a simple reason: America uses Pakistan and turns away from it as soon as Washington no longer needs its help. From Washington’s perspective, Pakistan isn’t a woman you marry but a courtesan you use and discard. Munir is merely the latest in a line of such figures. Trump’s presidency is winding down, and whoever comes after him—Republican or Democrat—will likely agree on one thing: Pakistan cannot be trusted, and America won’t feel bound by Trump’s promises to Munir. Pakistan may think it’s fooling Trump, but the truth could be the opposite. Pakistan will never reap the benefits of Trump’s promises.
