12/09/2026
Three high-level the National-Executive-Advisory committees formed on CHT Affairs without three Cycle Chief
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The current BNP government, led by Tarique Rahman, has formed three high-level committees regarding the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT): the National Committee on CHT Affairs, the Executive Committee on CHT Affairs, and the Advisory Committee on CHT Affairs.
The formation of these three committees was published in the Bangladesh Gazette last Thursday (September 10) by Md. Humayun Kabir, Additional Secretary (Committees and Economic) of the Committee Section under the Cabinet Division.
Among the three committees, a 19-member National Committee on CHT Affairs was formed with the Prime Minister as its Chairperson. This committee comprises the ministers of Finance and Planning, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Land, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, and CHT Affairs Ministries.
Also included are the State Ministers for Foreign Affairs and CHT Affairs, as well as the Adviser to the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Furthermore, the committee includes the Cabinet Secretary, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, Members of Parliament from the three Hill Tracts districts, the Principal Staff Officer of the Armed Forces Division, and the Director Generals of the NSI and DGFI.
The mandate of the National Committee entails prioritizing key issues related to the CHT and overseeing inter-agency implementation; defining the scope of operations and areas of jurisdiction for the various security forces, law enforcement agencies, and organizations operating in the region; and finalizing the national strategy for the CHT and taking measures for its implementation.
On the other hand, a 15-member Executive Committee on CHT Affairs has been formed, chaired by the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This committee includes the Secretaries of the Ministries of Land; Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs; and CHT Affairs. Also included are the Inspector General of Police and the Director Generals of the NSI, DGFI, BGB, and Ansar & VDP. Furthermore, the committee comprises the GOC of the 24th Infantry Division, the Divisional Commissioner of Chittagong, and the Director Generals or Directors of the Armed Forces Division, SB, NSI, and SSIB.
One of the key functions of the Executive Committee is to formulate a national action strategy regarding the CHT. This strategy aims to address issues such as curbing terrorism and separatism, ensuring border security, fostering communal harmony, and improving the living standards of all communities residing in the region. Additionally, the committee is tasked with recommending necessary amendments, reforms, and the formulation of new laws and regulations—based on a review of existing laws, terms of the Accord, and rules—to ensure sustainable security in the CHT. The Executive Committee must formulate this national action strategy and submit it to the National Committee within three months.
A nine-member advisory committee on CHT affairs has been formed, with the Chairman of the CHT Accord Implementation and Monitoring Committee as the chairperson. The committee includes the Chairman of the Task Force on the Rehabilitation of Tribal Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, the Secretary of the Ministry of CHT Affairs, the Chairman of the CHT Development Board, a representative of the Regional Council Chairman, and the chairmen of the three Hill District Councils as members.
The mandate of the advisory committee is to submit recommendations to the Executive Committee on CHT Affairs within the next two months regarding the development of the region, ensuring security, combating terrorism, and maintaining communal harmony.
Among these three committees, the National Committee is responsible for making decisions regarding the CHT, the Executive Committee is tasked with formulating national strategies, and the Advisory Committee is responsible for providing recommendations. Notably, the Regional Council and the three Hill District Councils—established under the special administrative system of the CHT—have been shrewdly excluded from any decision-making role; instead, they have been relegated to secondary roles limited to consultation and making recommendations.
It is also worth mentioning that while the chairmen of the three Hill District Councils and the CHT Development Board have been included in the Advisory Committee, the Chairman of the Regional Council has been deliberately bypassed; instead of the Chairman himself, a representative of the Chairman has been included. Furthermore, following the formation of the BNP government, the CHT Accord Implementation and Monitoring Committee, the Task Force, and the Land Commission have not yet been reconstituted, yet the chairmen of those committees have been included as members.
On the other hand, the responsibility for formulating strategies and making decisions has been vested in the National Committee and the Executive Committee. Almost all key Cabinet members, as well as officials from administrative divisions and various intelligence agencies, have been included in the national committee responsible for formulating strategies and making decisions regarding the three hill districts. The government has deployed approximately two-thirds of its administrative machinery to formulate a strategy regarding the CHT. Even, officials from the NSI and DGFI have been included in both the National and Executive Committees.
What is most surprising is that officials from the armed forces and intelligence agencies are not typically included in committees formed to devise national strategies for the country. Yet, in the case of the CHT, officials from the armed forces and intelligence agencies have been accorded prominence and significant importance. It is worth noting that after assuming power in 1991, the BNP formed a Parliamentary Committee on CHT Affairs, and following its 2001 election victory, it established a Cabinet Committee to oversee the implementation of the CHT Accord—initiatives that were essentially political in nature.
The prioritization of officials from armed forces and intelligence agencies in the formation of the committee reflects the BNP government’s perspective of viewing the CHT issue as a military or security matter rather than a political one. Instead of seeking a political resolution to the political issues in the region, priority was given to suppressing so-called terrorism and separatism, ensuring border security, and other concerns regarding CHT.
Of even deeper concern is the provision included in the Executive Committee’s terms of reference to “review existing laws, the terms of the Accord, and regulations—and subsequently enact necessary amendments and reforms as well as formulate new laws and regulations—to ensure sustainable security in the CHT.” If any terms of the Accord, regulations, or existing laws be amended or reformed without the consent of the signatory party of the Accord- Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), the CHT Regional Council, Cycle Chief and the Jumma people, the situation in the region would inevitably become complex and unstable, placing the human rights and the right to self-determination of the local Jumma people at risk.
In fact, this initiative demonstrates that the current BNP government—much like its predecessors—is moving towards a policy of resolving the CHT issue through massive militarization and fascist methods, rather than through the political and peaceful resolution envisioned by the Accord. Yet, the CHT issue is fundamentally political in nature, and it is imperative to adopt a policy of resolving it through political means.
The government’s sudden decision to form such three committees, without taking steps to implement the CHT Accord, has raised widespread questions among the public. Many are wondering what the government intends to do regarding the region. Opinions have been expressed that forming such three committees—and viewing the regional crisis primarily through the lenses of terrorism, separatism, and security—will complicate the issue rather than resolve it. Consequently, it is unlikely to yield any positive results; instead, it may well lead to negative outcomes.
It goes without saying that there is no alternative to implementing the CHT Accord if the region’s problems are to be resolved through political and peaceful means. Although this accord was signed in 1997 under the Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina, it was the culmination of a process involving thirteen rounds of formal talks held between the PCJSS and the BNP government led by Khaleda Zia (1991–1995).
On the other hand, following the signing of the Accord, the second BNP government led by Khaleda Zia (2001–2006)—formed after the 8th Parliamentary Election—did not annul the Accord but instead took steps toward its implementation. During that period, the BNP government maintained the momentum of implementation by forming a ‘Cabinet Committee on the Implementation of the CHT Accord’ and transferring the functions of ‘District and Upazila Youth Development Offices’ and the ‘Rangamati Textile Vocational Institute’ to the Hill District Councils in 2006. Amidst the changed circumstances following the anti-discrimination movement, and with the current BNP government—led by Tarique Rahman, who has assumed power championing a ‘Rainbow Nation’ policy—there is a widespread expectation that the government will move forward with the implementation of the CHT Accord while adopting a more democratic and sensitive approach toward the Jumma people.
Source: Hill Voice
