20/10/2025
Rising Tensions on the Arakan Frontier: Rohingya Militancy, Arms Smuggling, and Shifting Power on the Bangladesh–Myanmar Border
By ABN | October 14, 2025
A new phase of tension is unfolding along the Bangladesh–Myanmar border, as multiple Rohingya Islamist Terrorists groups — including the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), and Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM) — expand their operations amid changing territorial control in northern Rakhine State.
According to investigations by Bangla Press and regional security analysts, these groups have been smuggling weapons across the 271-kilometer frontier and building structured networks inside Rohingya refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar and Bandarban districts.
While the available evidence mainly documents smuggling activities, analysts believe it is possible that some of the weapons in circulation originated from Myanmar junta stockpiles — either through battlefield leakage or informal transfers during periods of heavy fighting between the junta and the Arakan Army (AA) in northern Rakhine.
Smuggling Routes and Expanding Networks
Bangla Press identified seven main trafficking corridors connecting Rakhine State and Bangladesh: Baichphari, Ghundum (Balukhali checkpoint), Palongkhali, Whykong, Nayapara, Boro Dale, and the Ruma–Nakkhyangchhari hill tracks.
These routes facilitate the movement of small arms, ammunition, and explosives, often concealed among goods transported through informal river crossings or forest paths.
Once inside Bangladesh, weapons are distributed through clandestine depots and networks within the refugee camps. Armed factions reportedly engage in recruitment, extortion, and logistical coordination, using the camps as operational cover.
Cox’s Bazar Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) commander Lt. Col. Mohiuddin Ahmed confirmed that authorities are monitoring “illegal arms storage and distribution inside the camps” and are intensifying patrols along the frontier.
Militant Presence Inside Refugee Camps
Independent organizations have repeatedly documented militant control and coercion inside refugee settlements:
“Members of Rohingya militant groups in Bangladesh have killed, abducted, tortured, and threatened Rohingya refugees in refugee camps.”
— Fortify Rights, “I May Be Killed Any Moment,” March 2025
“Militants have abducted refugees for refusing to join or collaborate with them … using torture and extortion to fund their operations.”
— Radio Free Asia, March 2025
UN Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews likewise stated he had received “credible information about Rohingya militants being involved in kidnapping, abusing, and even killing fellow Rohingya at refugee camps in southeastern Bangladesh.” (BenarNews, Dec 2021)
Reuters reported that “a series of murders of Rohingya men, including community leaders, have sparked fear about militant groups gaining power inside the camps.” (Jan 2023)
In camps such as Kutupalong, Balukhali, Thaingkhali, and Leda, armed operatives reportedly run night patrols, taxation systems, and underground shelters, some situated within visible distance of BGB observation posts.
Possible Junta Linkages and Arms Leakage
Though no direct evidence confirms organized cooperation, regional analysts suggest that some of the weapons used by these militants may have been sourced indirectly from Myanmar’s military stockpiles.
During the height of fighting in 2024–2025, State Administration Council (SAC) troops and Border Guard Police (BGP) units lost several bases in Maungdaw and Buthidaung to the Arakan Army.
These losses led to large-scale weapons abandonment — rifles, grenades, and ammunition — which may have entered black-market circulation.
A Bangla Press report noted that the Rohingya Islami Mahaz (RIM), led by Abdul Halim, was believed to have acquired modern rifles and ammunition from border areas previously under BGP control. While the details remain unverified, the pattern is consistent with broader concerns about arms leakage from collapsing military positions.
AA’s Allegations Toward Bangladesh’s Security Forces
In late September 2025, the Arakan Army (AA) and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), publicly alleged that certain Bangladeshi border security personnel may have tolerated or indirectly supported Rohingya militant groups operating near the frontier.
AA Commander-in-Chief Major General Twan Mrat Naing told The Irrawaddy that “Bangladeshi military officers who support militants on the other side of the border told them to attack us.”
The ULA called on Dhaka to investigate BGB officers allegedly connected to militants, warning that such involvement, if true, could undermine bilateral trust.
The AA also reported that since mid-September, ARSA and RSO elements had increased drone surveillance and attempted attacks on AA positions in northern Maungdaw.
Bangladesh’s authorities denied the accusations as “baseless and politically motivated”, emphasizing that BGB and RAB units remain fully committed to preventing extremism and securing the frontier.
Implications & Regional Risks
The situation along the border now blends arms trafficking, militant mobility, and competing narratives, presenting a complex challenge for both governments and humanitarian actors.
Sovereign Sensitivities:
The AA’s public statements have placed Dhaka in a delicate diplomatic position. Managing border integrity while hosting more than a million Rohingya refugees requires transparency and careful engagement with regional partners.
Escalation Spillover:
If concerns about cross-border involvement persist, they could strain relations between the AA and Bangladesh, heightening tensions and increasing the risk of unintended incidents rather than deliberate confrontation.
Militarization of Refugee Zones:
The continuing presence of armed elements within refugee settlements undermines civilian protection, complicates aid delivery, and risks fostering further radicalization.
Regional Stability:
The intersection of arms leakage, militant resurgence, and strategic mistrust threatens to turn the Cox’s Bazar–Maungdaw corridor into a prolonged zone of insecurity. Enhanced cooperation, intelligence exchange, and third-party monitoring could help de-escalate the situation.
Looking Ahead
With the Arakan Army now controlling nearly the entire Bangladesh–Myanmar border, the Myanmar junta’s presence in the frontier region has become largely nominal.
Most former Border Guard Police outposts have either fallen or been abandoned, leaving the AA as the de facto authority across Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung.
This shift means that the junta’s ability to influence events along the border is now minimal, while the AA’s governance and military structures determine daily realities on the ground.
Consequently, the continued cross-border movement of militants and weapons can no longer be viewed solely through the lens of Myanmar’s central military—it now primarily concerns unregulated non-state networks operating from Bangladesh’s side.
For Bangladesh, this evolving landscape implies that future stability and border management efforts will likely require direct coordination with the AA, rather than with Myanmar’s junta authorities, whose relevance has sharply declined.
Analysts note that both sides face a pivotal moment:
For the AA, consolidating border control will test its capacity to balance security enforcement with regional diplomacy.
For Dhaka, engaging pragmatically with the AA while maintaining state-to-state protocol with Naypyidaw will be critical to avoiding misunderstandings and ensuring long-term calm.
The border’s future will hinge not on the Myanmar junta’s fading command, but on how the AA and Bangladesh manage coexistence — between security cooperation, humanitarian obligations, and the lingering volatility of refugee-linked militancy.
Sources: Bangla Press (Oct 2025); Fortify Rights (Mar 2025); Radio Free Asia (Mar 2025); BenarNews (Dec 2021); Reuters (Jan 2023); The Irrawaddy (Sep 2025); Narinjara (Oct 2025).
