Thejubamirror

22/07/2025

A statesman’s mandate: President Salva Kiir’s call for national renewal

By Dr. Sunday de John

Four days ago, I authored an open letter in response to President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s powerful peace message, particularly on a paragraph that called upon the holdout groups to embrace peace. My motivation for authoring that open letter stemmed purely from a sense of patriotism, not from flattery of the president or solicitation for any favors.
At a time when peace is South Sudan’s most pressing need, I felt that it was essential to engage with his speech in a manner that reflects honesty and hope because true peace serves as the foundation for political stability, economic revival, justice, and reconciliation.
I understand too that some individuals in the opposition, whose hardline positions stem from ego, tribalism, and a misguided sense of land dispossession, and who fears are further strengthened and inflamed by foreign jingoism against our beloved country, may find this piece unpalatable. However, it is important to convey the truth without giving a damn to all the ungrateful lots.
Exactly, on July 16, 2025, President Salva Kiir Mayardit addressed the Revitalized Transitional National Legislature. In his address, he did not sound like a politician seeking applause and popularity. He expressed himself as a statesman committed to the pursuit of peace and national progress for his people.
His speech was not an empty ceremonial opening of Parliament. It was a reaffirmation of a vision formed during the struggles for liberation and that was later honed through the challenges of statehood.
With calm authority and conviction, President Salva Kiir Mayardit reminded the nation that “South Sudan will not go back to war.” This is the phrase I loved most. It is an assurance that calms the nerves. War victims appreciate this assurance, and they hope it will be translated into action by all the warring factions.
A sensible South Sudanese deciphering this speech from a patriotic perspective will conclude that his statement was not mere rhetoric. Those who know President Salva have already stressed that his speech was well thought of and could be the reincarnation of the resolute voice he is known for, standing for the truth and as a man who has experienced the horrors of war too intimately to romanticize them and who now longs for peace too deeply to postpone it.
In his speech, the president did not just chant peace; he redefined peace as not merely the absence of conflict but as “the presence of justice, healing, and unity.” This redefinition of peace is significantly weighty; it accentuates the fact that reconciliation is not a passive venture; it is an active endeavor that is essential to the nation-building.
His call for all parties to the peace agreement and those outside it to recommit without preconditions was a bold declaration that the time for excuses has come to an end. Our people are demanding tangible results, and tangible results do not necessarily come from endless negotiations. They come from a true conviction premised on forgiveness and lowering of egos.
Looking at his speech intently, President Salva has underscored that peace requires more than just a structural framework; it requires a deep, active individual commitment to the oneness of humanity.
He even went further to elicit the truth that for peace to reign, it demands a spirit of sympathy, empathy, and understanding. This is why, drawing on the same wisdom that guided him from war to independence, it would greatly enhance his message of reconciliation if he were to contemplate the release of political prisoners that are now languishing behind bars or in confinement in their homes and those convicted of minor offenses. Releasing the political prisoners is a vital ingredient for peace and reconciliation.
I am stressing this point not as a contradiction of justice but to bring forth one of the necessary pinnacles of reconciliation. The pot of forgiveness cannot overflow; it deepens the well from which national healing is drawn.
By taking such a step, the president would convey a powerful message to both the nation and the world: South Sudan does not imprison its future but actively works to repair it. We are well aware that there is a time for everything, including a time to let go, even when we feel wronged for the greater good of the nation.
In spite of the country’s desperate need for peace, we must also reject falsehood. Those who respond to the president’s outstretched hand with bullets and ambushes, those who choose to kill innocent citizens along the roads, and those who fail to pursue peace through dialogue cannot claim to be fighting for the rights of the people. They are not liberators; they are spoilers. Their act of terror, which includes targeting travelers, looting civilians, and hiding behind intercommunal conflicts, does not promote justice. It undermines it. It does not protect our people. It betrays them.
The country, region, and international community must now act decisively on these actors; they must condemn and identify these people for what they truly are, “spoilers of peace,” and then confront them directly. The prolonged silence from the international community has, in many ways, allowed these crimes to persist. The silence must end.
We have learned from President Salva Kiir that peace cannot be achieved through reckless use of force. The pursuit of peace is tortuous, and it requires restraint and a sense of reason.
Since the time of Nasir annihilation of the army, the president has persisted that there must be no return to war. Based on this spirit and the reiteration through his recent address, I still implore him to call off the air bombardments that happened in areas where armed groups conceal themselves among peaceful civilians. I am aware that the government has the capability to teach any element that survives on armed conflict a lesson, but if that destroys the innocent communities that are being used as human shields, then it should stop.
Restraint has been one of the greatest attributes of President Salva Kiir Mayardit, always reflected in his merciful actions informed by the many amnesties he issued to even the worst murderers.
I believe President Salva understands that innocent communities should not bear the consequences of criminal actions perpetrated by seasoned criminals known to the public and that the state must not mirror the violence it aims to eradicate. This distinction is what sets statesmen apart from strongmen.
The president did not make excuses despite facing an economic meltdown caused by the temporary shutdown of oil production. While the majority of the revenue comes from oil proceeds, and that was halted by the unforeseen circumstances, and in the face of these bottlenecks, he still took a decisive action. He instructed the Economic Cluster to prioritize salaries and restore essential services. This event has strengthened the emphasis that true leadership involves confronting challenges with solutions rather than silence.
His renewed foreign policy, reflected in his speech, is commendable. His emphasis on peaceful coexistence and regional cooperation, along with his principled call for lifting sanctions and the arms embargo, is a reflection that the dignity of a sovereign state must be preserved. South Sudan as a sovereign nation must now seek partnerships on equal terms.
His message to Parliament was equally clear: Let this session count—for every South Sudanese child, mother, soldier, farmer, and citizen who looks to us with hope. With this statement, he transformed Parliament from merely a legislative body into a moral institution. He urged lawmakers to rise above party affiliations and individual positions and instead to serve a greater purpose.
His speech should not be regarded as a routine address. It represents a declaration, a clear signal that South Sudan is poised on the brink of its future, with the president prepared to guide the nation forward, not through force, but through faith and determination.
The liberation struggle did not conclude with independence. It metamorphosed into a different challenge. Our struggle today is to free our hearts from bitterness, our politics from vengeance, and our streets from violence.

With President Salva Kiir Mayardit’s steady hand and a spirit of forgiveness grounded in justice, South Sudan has the potential to emerge as a nation that can actively shape its history.

Till then, yours truly, Mr. Teetotaler!

22/07/2025

19/07/2025

SSPDF clash with armed youth in Pacong soon SSPDF. will coduct airstrikes in Pacong and its environs

17/07/2025

Media personality Lindah Oguttu is going through a difficult moment after the devastating news about her mum 💔. Details in the comment section.

Photo: lindahoguttu (X).

17/07/2025

Egypt is on the verge of completing the construction of its new Capital city in the middle of the desert. The $58 Billion Project started in 2016 and is now 95% Complete

17/07/2025

Nigeria’s former president Muhammadu Buhari was buried Tuesday in his hometown of Daura in northwest
➡️ https://l.africanews.com/NIz

17/07/2025

𝗗𝗲𝗮𝗿 𝗣𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝗰, 𝗳𝗿𝗶𝗲𝗻𝗱𝘀, 𝗳𝗮𝗺𝗶𝗹𝘆, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗶𝗻-𝗹𝗮𝘄𝘀,

We would like to inform you about the burial arrangements for our beloved Mother, Maj. Gen. Mary Akuch Panyang Jot, spouse of Hon. Michael Makuei Lueth. The funeral service will take place tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 16th July, 2025. The deceased will be transported from the mortuary to Bor Town for burial.

Four buses will be available to transport mourners from Juba to Bor, two buses (a Rosa and a Bonga) will be located at Mapaw Roundabout, and another two (a Rosa and a Bonga) will be stationed at the Gumbo Cattle Market roundabout. For those using personal vehicles, please gather at Mapaw Roundabout by 6:00 AM, as the convoy to Bor will depart at 7:00 AM.

Additionally, the family of Hon. Michael Makuei Lueth kindly requests those with private cars to assist by offering rides to individuals who may not secure a seat on the buses.
It's important to mention that everyone who is far away and unable to attend the funeral service in person will be able to follow the event through the live coverage provided by media outlets.

𝐁𝐔𝐑𝐈𝐀𝐋 𝐏𝐑𝐎𝐆𝐑𝐀𝐌

𝗗𝗮𝘁𝗲: 𝗪𝗲𝗱𝗻𝗲𝘀𝗱𝗮𝘆, 𝟭𝟲𝘁𝗵 𝗝𝘂𝗹𝘆, 𝟮𝟬𝟮𝟱.

𝗧𝗶𝗺𝗲: 𝟱:𝟬𝟬 𝗔𝗠 𝘁𝗼 𝟲:𝟬𝟬 𝗔𝗠
The body will be transported from the mortuary to the house of Hon. Michael Makuei Lueth in Hai Tijaaria, near Aaron Hotel. A small group of attendees will gather there before proceeding to Gumbo Cattle Market Roundabout and Mapaw Roundabout, where other mourners will also gather. The procession will then continue to Bor Town for the burial.

𝗧𝗶𝗺𝗲: 𝟳:𝟬𝟬 𝗔𝗠 𝘁𝗼 𝟭𝟭:𝟬𝟬 𝗔𝗠
The procession will continue with the transportation of the body from Juba to Bor town for the burial service.

𝗧𝗶𝗺𝗲:𝟭𝟭:𝟬𝟬 𝗔𝗠 𝘁𝗼 𝟭𝟭:𝟯𝟬 𝗔𝗠
Prayers for our beloved mother, Mary Akuch Panyang Jot, will take place at St. Andrew Cathedral in Bor Town.

𝗧𝗶𝗺𝗲:𝟭𝟮:𝟬𝟬 𝗣𝗠 𝘁𝗼 𝟭:𝟬𝟬 𝗣𝗠
The burial will be conducted in the Ha

17/07/2025

South Sudan remains on the U.S. Department of State’s Level 4 “Do Not Travel” advisory as of March 8, 2025. The advisory warns against visiting due to serious dangers such as armed conflict, violent crime, and kidnapping

17/07/2025

Rediscovering Emmanuel Jal’s True Identity

By Chol Michael Maker
Wednesday, 16 July 2025

I am absolutely certain, beyond the certainty of a DNA test, that Emmanuel Jal hails from a Dinka family. All the childhood songs he sang were originally from the Dinka Agar tradition. According to a story shared by his alleged sister, Aköl, Jal was shot in Tonj and later evacuated to Wau by a relief worker. The relative who accompanied him returned to Tonj and informed the family that Jal had disappeared with the “white people” who had rescued him after the incident. Interestingly, this same relative later gave Aköl away in marriage during a ceremony held in Tonj.

If one considers the timeline and connects the dots, it is reasonable to believe that Jal was taken around 1988 or 1989, when he was approximately seven or eight years old. This would place his birth year around 1980 or 1981, making him about 45 years old today, an estimate that aligns with Jal’s publicly stated age. Another compelling piece of evidence is that Jal left his parents behind at the age of seven, yet still remembers his birthplace as Tonj. He references this in his well-known song War Child, a detail further supported in his TED Talk. Additionally, he was originally named James Jal, but Emma McCune—his foster mother and the late wife of Dr Riek Machar, who tragically died in a car accident in Nairobi—encouraged him to change “James” to “Emmanuel” to more closely match her own name, Emma.

Jal has never publicly mentioned the names of his biological parents, only referring to Emma McCune as his foster mother. Childhood photographs of him can be found in the book Emma’s War, which provide visual confirmation of his age at the time. To this day, two of his early childhood friends, Lam Tungguar and Manasseh Mathiang, could share further insights into Jal’s early life. Both began their musical journey with him in the early 2000s in Nairobi. I recall seeing them together often, and I personally attended

15/07/2025

Date: 15/07/2025

White Army Position on AU and IGAD Ceasefire and call for Dialogue amongst warring parties.

The recent statemDefenceent by the African Union (AU) and the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) calling for warring parties to the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan to resumes talks and dialogue amongst themselves isn't a bad stand but in honest and trustful respond. We would like to emphasize the factors that are preventing the peace and genuine dialogue to be accomplish, we would like to categorically state the factors that have been the obstacles to any peace and dialogue in South Sudan since the breakout of war in December 2013.

Whenever people resorted to burry truth beneath, peace can't be attended nor a genuine dialogue could be possible. The AU and IGAD must accept the reality of the factors that led to the chronics turmoil in South Sudan from 2013 to dates, to begin with, when the country attend its independent from Sudan on July 9, 2011, the country was supposed to go for election 16 or 18 months after independent because the 2010 election of Sudan was anulls by the independent of South from Sudan. This is a legal fact that couldn't be argue in any legal ground.

Instead of the country to go to poll after independent, the country ruling, SPLM chairman Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit plunged the country into abyss by December 2013 where he categorically and illegally dismantle his party organs by literally making himself as the alpha and omega after he resorted to rule through decrees that are illegally contrary to the laws of his party and that of the country constitutions such as making himself to be the laws which was the genesis of chaos. Due to his constant opposing to the rule of laws from his party and the country, this actions of Gen. Kiir didn't only transpired into breakdown of laws and orders, his actions proven fatal in December 2013 when he orchestrated and instigated state coup a strategy to get rid of his rival from

13/07/2025

Sudan and South Sudan: A Worse Variant in the Region Five Years Post-Independence.

By Dr Ayine Nigo (PhD/FHEA).

The attainment of sovereignty in Africa was a staggered and diverse process, with each new nation inheriting a unique set of political, economic, and social conditions from its colonial past. An examination of the initial state of Sudan, South Sudan, and their nine neighbours reveals that independence was rarely a "clean slate". Instead, it was a transfer of power over colonial-era structures fraught with unresolved issues, setting the stage for the turmoil that would often continue post the initial five years of state transition. The premise of this paper is that the regimes in Juba and Khartoum have directly employed tactics that are powerful manifestations of a regional pathology in post-colonial administration, affecting both Sudan and South Sudan. Sudan's initial crisis exemplified its failure to integrate diverse populations under a dominant post-colonial project rooted in an Arab identity. In contrast, South Sudan's crisis is a more contemporary and destructive variation, characterised by the troubled legacy of the National Congress Party (NCP) regime and the persistent, disastrous repercussions of its failure to achieve a functioning state.
Understanding the Initial Conditions across the region
: Egypt's independence in 1922 was nominal. The unilateral declaration by the United Kingdom ended the formal protectorate but left Britain with four reserved points that guaranteed its continued control over the security of the Suez Canal, the defence of Egypt, the protection of foreign interests, and the administration of Sudan. This arrangement established a veiled protectorate, ensuring the struggle for full sovereignty would dominate Egyptian politics for decades. Similarly, Ethiopia regained independence in 1941 after a five-year Italian occupation. Still, the restoration of Emperor Haile Selassie was achieved with significant British military assistance, translating into a period of heavy British influence over the nation's affairs. While its ancient history sets it apart from its colonised neighbours, Ethiopia faced immense challenges of reconstruction and modernisation within a feudal system.
Libya's path to independence on December 24, 1951, was unique, as it was the first nation to achieve sovereignty through the United Nations. Formerly an Italian colony administered by Britain and France post-World War II, it was forged into a federal constitutional monarchy under King Idris I, uniting the three historically distinct and disparate regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. This UN-led state-building exercise created a nation with a strong tribal structure but exceptionally weak national cohesion. Sudan’s independence from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium on January 1, 1956, was granted to a state already on the brink of war. The 1955 Torit Mutiny, an uprising of southern soldiers against their northern officers, was a clear harbinger of the civil conflict that would define the country's existence. Colonial policies had deliberately administered the Arab-Muslim North separately from the African, Christian, and Animist South, fostering deep-seated mistrust and inequality that post-independence "Sudanization" policies only exacerbated.
The "Class of 1960" saw Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) gain independence in a great wave of decolonisation. Chad (August 11) and CAR (August 13) emerged from French Equatorial Africa with weak state institutions and severe ethnic and regional cleavages, most notably the north-south, Muslim-Christian/African divide in Chad. The DRC's independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, was exceptionally chaotic. Minimal preparations had been made for the handover, resulting in an immediate mutiny of the army, the secession of its most prosperous province, and the collapse of central authority.
In East Africa, Uganda (October 9, 1962) and Kenya (December 12, 1963) achieved independence from Britain. Uganda was born from a fragile political coalition attempting to balance the power of its traditional kingdoms, especially the powerful Buganda, with the authority of a modern centralist state, an inherently unstable compromise. Kenya inherited the legacy of a settler-colonial economy. It was immediately plunged into a secessionist conflict in its northeastern region, the Shifta War, as ethnic Somalis sought to join a Greater Somalia. Two nations followed distinct paths shaped by protracted warfare. Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia on May 24, 1993, after a thirty-year liberation war. This was a rare case of secession from another African state. The victorious Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) had defeated the Ethiopian army and its internal Eritrean rivals, allowing it to form a highly disciplined, deeply authoritarian, provisional government with no tolerance for opposition. Finally, South Sudan achieved independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, through a referendum mandated by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It was born as one of the world's least developed nations, almost entirely dependent on oil revenues and foreign aid, and scarred by decades of war that had fostered deep-seated ethnic divisions within the liberation movement itself.
The nature of the liberation struggle profoundly shaped the initial post-independence regime. Where disciplined, ideologically cohesive military fronts like Eritrea's EPLF achieved victory, the transition was in a highly centralised, single-party state that suppressed all dissent. In contrast, where independence was negotiated among competing nationalist parties, as in Kenya with the Kenya African National Union (KANU) versus the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), a brief and volatile period of multi-party politics ensued before one faction aggressively consolidated power. South Sudan’s Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), a broad but ethnically and factionally divided military front, attempted to follow the Eritrean model of single-front rule, but lacked the EPLF's internal discipline. This weakness would lead to its catastrophic implosion two years after achieving its goal.
The Fragility of Imported Transitional Constitutions

: Upon gaining sovereignty, most of the nations in the region adopted constitutional frameworks modelled on those of their former European colonies. These documents, often embodying liberal democratic principles, proved universally fragile and were rapidly subverted, amended, or discarded entirely within the first five years of independence. This pattern reveals that constitutions were not sacrosanct social contracts for the first generation of post-colonial leaders but malleable instruments to be used in the raw pursuit and consolidation of power. Many states began with systems that mirrored those in Europe. Kenya’s 1963 constitution established a parliamentary system with Queen Elizabeth II as head of state, represented by a governor-general. Chad’s 1960 constitution was modelled on the French Fifth Republic, establishing a parliamentary system, while Egypt’s 1923 constitution drew inspiration from Belgium’s. Sudan began its independent existence with a Transitional Constitution that created a parliamentary regime with a five-member Supreme Commission as head of state. The speed with which these frameworks were dismantled is striking. In Sudan, the parliamentary system was paralysed by factionalism, corruption, and economic crises, creating the pretext for Lt. General Ibrahim Abboud’s military coup on November 17, 1958. Abboud promptly suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, and banned all political parties. Uganda provides one of the most flagrant examples of constitutional subversion. The 1962 independence constitution was a compromise designed to accommodate the country's powerful traditional kingdoms within a federal structure. By 1966, facing a political crisis, Prime Minister Milton Obote unilaterally abrogated it, introducing a new constitution to a parliament surrounded by troops. This act earned it the name "pigeonhole constitution", as members were told to find copies in their mail slots after the fact. This was followed by the 1967 republican constitution, which abolished the kingdoms and cemented Obote’s absolute presidential power.
This trend was repeated across the region. In Chad, the parliamentary system lasted only two years before President François Tombalbaye pushed through a new constitution in 1962 that created a powerful presidency and established a one-party state under his Chadian Progressive Party (PPT). President David Dacko followed a similar playbook in the Central African Republic, amending to transform his regime into a one-party state before being overthrown in a 1965 coup by Jean-Bédel Bokassa, who abolished the constitution entirely. Kenya's transition was more gradual but equally effective. The 1963 regionalist constitution, the Majimbo system, was systematically dismantled. In 1964, Kenya became a republic, and by 1966, a series of amendments had merged the bicameral legislature, stripped the regions of their power, and concentrated authority in the executive, creating a de facto one-party state. In Eritrea, the process was more straightforward: the constitution ratified in 1997 was never implemented. The government cited the 1998 border war with Ethiopia as the reason. Still, the result was suspending the indefinite constitutional rule and the PFDJ's entrenchment as the sole power.
A common thread in this political evolution was the swift dismantling of federal or quasi-federal arrangements. These systems, designed to manage ethnic and regional diversity, were viewed by the new ruling elites not as tools for unity but as threats to their control over the state and its resources. Libya’s federal monarchy, which balanced the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, was abolished by King Idris I in 1963 in favour of a unitary state. Obote’s destruction of Uganda’s kingdoms in 1966-67 and Kenyatta’s neutering of Kenya’s regional assemblies served the same purpose: the absolute centralisation of power. This universal drive to centralise, often concentrating power in the hands of a dominant ethnic or regional group, became a primary cause of the very secessionist movements and civil wars it was intended to prevent. South Sudan presents a unique case. The president holds absolute power, with all institutions serving his will. A self-proclaimed tribalist, he has led the nation into war within just two years of independence.
Pathways to Dictatorship, Coups and One-Party States:

The rapid decay of nascent democratic institutions across the region created a power vacuum that authoritarian rulers invariably occupied. This consolidation of power followed two primary pathways: the direct military coup d'état and the more gradual, quasi-legal political process of creating a one-party state. In both scenarios, weak state institutions proved incapable of managing the intense political competition of the post-independence era, making them vulnerable to capture by a single "strongman" leader or a dominant faction. This process was not merely about individual ambition but a structural failure of the post-colonial state, often sustained by the deliberate promotion of ethnic or regional hegemony.
In Sudan, less than three years after independence, the parliamentary government, paralysed by factionalism and an economic crisis stemming from poor cotton sales, was overthrown in a bloodless coup in November 1958. Lt. General Ibrahim Abboud, the army chief, suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and established the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to rule, setting a durable precedent for military intervention in Sudanese politics. The Congo Crisis provided the stage for two coups by Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu. In September 1960, he intervened to neutralise the deadlocked President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba. After a chaotic interim period, Mobutu seized power definitively in November 1965, establishing a kleptocratic military dictatorship that would last for over 30 years. In the Central African Republic, the pattern was repeated on New Year's Eve 1965, when Colonel Jean-Bédel Bokassa, the army chief and cousin of President Dacko, overthrew the government, abolished the constitution, and later proclaimed himself emperor.
An alternative approach involved the political and legislative suppression and co-option or neutralisation of the opposition. President Tombalbaye moved swiftly in Chad, banning all opposition parties in January 1962, and using a new constitution to create a one-party state under his PPT. His authoritarian rule was built on a foundation of ethnic hegemony, explicitly favouring his own southern Sara ethnic group in the civil service and military, which directly alienated the Muslim north and ignited the civil war. In Uganda, Prime Minister Obote used the 1966 crisis to crush his political rivals, arresting five cabinet ministers and deposing President Mutesa. Through the "pigeonhole" and 1967 constitutions, he abolished the powerful kingdoms, centralised all power, and by 1969 banned opposition parties from formalising his one-party state. Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta achieved a similar result through co-optation and coercion. After the main opposition party, KADU, voluntarily dissolved and merged with KANU, Kenyatta faced a new challenge from the leftist Kenya People's Union (KPU), formed by his former Vice President Oginga Odinga in 1966. The KPU was systematically harassed, and its leaders were detained before it was ultimately banned in 1969. Still, the groundwork for a de facto one-party state was firmly laid within the first five years of independence. While rhetorically promoting national unity, Kenyatta's rule widely favoured his Kikuyu ethnic group, especially in the highly sensitive area of land redistribution following the colonial era. In Libya, King Idris I banned all political parties after riots followed the 1952 elections, establishing an absolute monarchy decades before the more infamous 1969 coup by Muammar Gaddafi.
Finally,
the new autocrats in South Sudan did not govern in isolation; they derived their power from neighbouring countries and catered to a specific constituency often defined by ethnicity or region. In Sudan, the state represented the hegemony of the northern Arab-Islamic elite. This situation made the Southern rebellion inevitable, rooted in structural factors rather than a political dispute. The authoritarian state served as a tool for maintaining and enforcing this dominance. Sudan's crisis arose from the hegemonic project of the northern Arab-Islamic elite, which sought to impose its identity on the entire nation, thus marginalising the southern populations. This mirrors a form of ethnic favouritism seen in countries like Chad and Kenya. In contrast, South Sudan's situation is more dire. It represents a violent struggle to control the state and its oil revenues using the ruling party, characterised by acute ethnic hegemony, kleptocracy, and deception.
The post-colonial project, marked by a dominant Arab identity in the North since 1956 and Dinka nationalism in South Sudan from 2011, has proven to be a particularly damaging variant of state su***de. Compared to their neighbours, the experiences of Sudan and South Sudan provide a powerful and sobering lesson regarding the immense challenges of nation-building, especially given the troubled legacy of the National Congress Party (NCP) regime and the lasting catastrophic consequences of its failure. Sudan's war continued a pre-independence conflict created by colonial policy. It was a struggle over the very definition and identity of the Sudanese nation. While many neighbouring states experienced civil wars, none suffered the unique pathology of South Sudan turning against itself with such speed and ferocity, destroying the very nation it had fought to establish.
Dr Ayine Nigo is an author and lecturer at the University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom. He can be reached via [email protected]

The views expressed in ‘opinion’ articles published by ThejubaMirror News are solely those of the writer. The veracity of any claims made is the responsibility of the author, not ThejubaMirror News .