Tumaini Media

Tumaini Media Contact information, map and directions, contact form, opening hours, services, ratings, photos, videos and announcements from Tumaini Media, Media/News Company, Juba.

A Comprehensive Analytical Reading of the African Union Peace and Security Council Statement on South SudanElections, Pe...
06/09/2026

A Comprehensive Analytical Reading of the African Union Peace and Security Council Statement on South Sudan

Elections, Peace Agreement Implementation, Political Dialogue, Security Reform, and the Humanitarian Crisis in the African Union’s Assessment

Edited by Freedom Platform
5 September 2026

The statement issued by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) on the latest developments in South Sudan, adopted at its 1364th meeting held on 26 August 2026, is a highly significant political document for understanding the direction of the African position towards South Sudan’s transitional period and the elections scheduled for December 2026.

The statement does not treat the elections as an isolated event. Instead, it places them within an integrated political, security, institutional, and humanitarian framework. A paragraph-by-paragraph reading of the statement shows that the African Union is attempting to strike a delicate balance between ending the transitional period on the one hand and ensuring that the elections do not become merely a symbolic exercise on the other.

The main pillars of this approach include the full implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement, the resumption of political dialogue, the preparation of a suitable electoral environment, the unification of forces and security sector reform, transitional justice, adequate financing, addressing the humanitarian crisis, and supporting the voluntary, safe, and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

The Council also emphasizes its desire to develop a more coordinated African, regional, and international approach, with measurable priorities and a regular mechanism for monitoring and reporting.

First: The Statement Is Part of an Accumulated African Process

The Peace and Security Council begins by recalling its previous decisions and statements on South Sudan, particularly those issued in April and January 2026.

This reference is not merely procedural. It means that the Council views the current situation as part of a longer process of decisions and commitments whose implementation has already been requested.

The new statement, therefore, does not begin from zero. Rather, it indirectly measures the progress achieved since previous decisions.

The Council also recalls the decisions of the Summit of the AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan, known as the C5 Plus, held in February 2026, which called for:

* The full implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement.
* The urgent resumption of inclusive dialogue.
* The holding of credible elections by December 2026.
* No further extension of the transitional period.

Here, the first major message of the African Union becomes clear: the transitional period must come to an end, but its conclusion must be achieved through a credible political and electoral process.

Second: The African Union Wants a Unified Political Approach

The statement emphasizes the need for sustained coordination among:

* The African Union.
* IGAD.
* The C5.
* R-JMEC.
* The United Nations.

It requests the African Union Commission, in consultation with these institutions, to develop a coordinated political strategy for South Sudan, including measurable priorities and a regular reporting mechanism to the Peace and Security Council.

Political Significance

This is one of the most important messages contained in the statement.

The African Union appears to be seeking a transition from multiple initiatives and fragmented approaches towards a more coordinated strategy among African, regional, and international institutions.

More importantly, the requested strategy must include measurable priorities.

This means that progress in implementing the Peace Agreement and managing the transitional process should not be assessed solely through political statements. There should instead be clear objectives against which progress can be measured.

Regular reporting to the Peace and Security Council also means that the South Sudan file will remain under active scrutiny, and that failures to implement commitments may become the subject of future Council discussions.

Third: Elections Between Political Commitment and a Test of Readiness

The Council takes note of the commitment of the South Sudanese authorities to hold general elections on 22 December 2026 and commends the initial progress made in preparations, including the registration of 39 political parties as of July 2026.

However, the Council does not stop there.

It stresses that credible elections require:

* Sufficient political consensus.
* Political and social inclusivity.
* An open civic space.
* Citizen security.
* Effective dispute-resolution mechanisms.
* Full participation of women.
* Participation of young people.
* Participation of displaced populations.

What Does This Mean?

The message is clear:

Having an election date and registering political parties does not necessarily mean that the country is ready for elections.

In the view of the Peace and Security Council, elections are an integrated political, institutional, and security process.

Readiness, therefore, does not concern voting alone. It also concerns the political environment before the vote and the conditions that enable citizens and political parties to participate freely and safely.

Fourth: October 2026 Is the Main Point of Assessment

In a separate decision, the Council decides to hold a dedicated session on electoral preparedness in October 2026.

It also requests the African Union Commission to submit a detailed fact sheet on election readiness before the meeting.

The assessment will be based on findings from:

* Missions of the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
* C5 missions.
* The African Union Assessment Mission to South Sudan.

Significance

This means that October will be an extremely important month.

The Council does not want to assess elections simply on the basis of whether an election date exists. It wants a realistic assessment of actual readiness.

The central question will be:

Is South Sudan genuinely prepared to conduct peaceful, transparent, inclusive, and credible elections?

Not merely:

Is the 22 December election date still in place?

It is important to emphasize that the decision neither announces the postponement of the elections nor guarantees that they will automatically take place.

Rather, it establishes an assessment process before the scheduled election date.

Fifth: Ending the Transitional Period Without Further Extension

The Council reiterates that the transitional mandate must conclusively end in February 2027 without any further extension.

This is a strong political formulation.

The message is that the transitional period cannot remain open indefinitely.

At the same time, the Council subjects the elections to a test of readiness and credibility.

The African Union’s position therefore rests on a delicate balance:

No open-ended extension of the transitional period, while at the same time the essential requirements for credible elections cannot be ignored.

This issue may become particularly sensitive if major gaps in electoral readiness emerge in the coming months.

Sixth: Political Dialogue Is the Path to Resolving the Crisis

The Council calls upon the leadership of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity and all signatories to the Revitalized Peace Agreement to immediately resume direct political dialogue in good faith and without preconditions.

It further calls for this dialogue to be supported by:

* The AU High Representative.
* The C5.
* IGAD.

The objective is to address the implementation deficits related to key transitional benchmarks.

Political Significance

This formulation is directed at all parties.

The decision does not place responsibility for the crisis solely on the government, nor does it exempt other parties from their responsibilities.

The phrase “without preconditions” is particularly important because it means that the parties are expected to return to dialogue rather than use preconditions as a means of delaying or preventing dialogue.

The reference to “implementation deficits” also reflects a clear recognition that there is a gap between what the Peace Agreement requires and what has actually been implemented on the ground.

Seventh: The Failure of Inter-Party Dialogue Is a Source of Concern

The Council expresses deep concern over the failure to convene the inter-party dialogue that had been scheduled for 12 August 2026.

It considers this failure part of the broader deterioration of the political situation.

This means that the African Union considers internal political dialogue to be an essential component of the transitional process.

The inability of political forces to meet, negotiate, and reach consensus may directly affect the political environment in which elections are expected to take place.

Eighth: There Is No Military Solution to the Political Crisis

The Council reaffirms that:

There is no military solution to any political impasse.

It calls for the immediate and unconditional cessation of:

* Hostilities.
* Military mobilization.
* Inflammatory rhetoric.

It also calls upon the leadership, with respect to national law, to release political detainees and engage in inclusive, consensus-driven dialogue as the path towards national reconciliation.

Significance

This is a direct message to all parties that political disagreements must not be transformed into armed conflict.

The call to stop military mobilization also demonstrates that the Council does not intend to wait until full-scale conflict breaks out. It seeks to prevent the actions and preparations that could lead to renewed violence.

The reference to political detainees is linked to the political environment required for dialogue and reconciliation, while maintaining reference to national law.

Ninth: Continued Security Tensions Threaten the Transition

The Council expresses grave concern over security fragility and refers to armed confrontations in:

* Jonglei.
* Upper Nile.
* Other areas.

Significance

Armed confrontation at a time when the country is preparing for elections represents a direct challenge.

Security is essential for enabling citizens to participate, allowing electoral institutions to function, and preventing political disagreements over elections from escalating into armed violence.

The security situation, therefore, cannot be separated from the electoral process.

Tenth: The Attack on UN Peacekeepers

The Council strongly condemns the ambush in Jonglei on 24 August 2026, which resulted in the deaths of two Ethiopian UN peacekeepers and injuries to seven others.

It calls upon the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity to conduct a swift investigation and hold those responsible accountable.

Political Significance

An attack on peacekeepers represents a challenge not only to local security but also to the international presence supporting the peace process.

The demand for investigation and accountability reflects the Council’s commitment to the principle of accountability and opposition to impunity.

Eleventh: Unification of Forces as a Requirement for Lasting Peace

The Council calls upon all parties to urgently complete:

The unification, training, and deployment of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF).

It considers this a critical prerequisite for a permanent ceasefire.

The Council also calls for accelerated:

* Security Sector Reform (SSR).
* Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR).

Significance

The security challenge in South Sudan is not simply about the presence of weapons. It is also about the existence of multiple armed forces linked to different political actors.

The unification of forces is therefore intended to contribute to the development of a more unified national security structure.

Security Sector Reform is broader and concerns the establishment of professional security institutions operating under the rule of law.

DDR focuses on combatants who will not be absorbed into regular security institutions.

The African Union therefore considers security reform an essential component of peacebuilding rather than a separate issue from politics and elections.

Twelfth: Transitional Justice and Accountability

The Council emphasizes that sustainable peace requires accountability and calls for the acceleration of the formal establishment of:

* The Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS).
* The Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH).

These institutions are provided for under Chapter V of the Revitalized Peace Agreement.

Significance

This paragraph demonstrates that the African Union does not view peace simply as the absence of fighting.

Sustainable peace requires:

Truth + Justice + Accountability + Reconciliation.

The Hybrid Court is connected to accountability for serious crimes and violations, while the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing is intended to address the legacy of conflict and contribute to social reconciliation.

Thirteenth: The Funding Crisis Facing Electoral Institutions

The Council expresses concern over significant funding and administrative shortfalls facing electoral bodies.

It calls upon the government to urgently provide predictable domestic funding to:

* The National Elections Commission (NEC).
* The National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC).
* The Political Parties Council (PPC).

Significance

This is a highly practical issue.

Elections do not depend on political decisions alone. They require institutions with the financial resources and capacity to carry out their responsibilities.

Predictable funding means that institutions should not operate under uncertain, irregular, or interrupted financial arrangements.

Financing therefore becomes part of the overall assessment of electoral readiness.

Fourteenth: A Realistic and Consensual Electoral Roadmap

The Council requests the government to publish:

A realistic and consensual electoral roadmap.

It also appeals to AU Member States, international partners, and donors to help close the election funding gap and submit concrete contributions to the African Union Commission by October 2026.

What Does “Realistic” Mean?

It means that the roadmap must be achievable in terms of:

* Time.
* Financing.
* Institutional capacity.
* Political conditions.
* Security conditions.
* Logistical capabilities.

What Does “Consensual” Mean?

It means that the roadmap should not simply be imposed by one political actor but should enjoy an appropriate degree of agreement among relevant political stakeholders.

Once again, this directly links political dialogue with the electoral process.

Fifteenth: The Humanitarian Crisis Is Part of the Peace Equation

The Council expresses concern over the worsening humanitarian crisis caused by:

* Localized insecurity.
* Economic instability.
* Climate shocks.
* Obstacles to humanitarian access.

It demands an end to attacks on civilians and humanitarian personnel and calls for safe and unhindered humanitarian access.

Significance

The African Union recognizes that peace cannot be sustainable while citizens continue to live under severe humanitarian conditions.

Humanitarian response has therefore become part of the broader agenda for peace and stability.

Sixteenth: The Voluntary, Safe, and Dignified Return of Displaced Persons and Refugees

The Council appeals to African states and the international community to increase financial, technical, and material support, including support for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees that is:

Voluntary, Safe, and Dignified.

These three principles carry significant meaning.

Voluntary

People should not be forced to return.

Safe

Security conditions in areas of return must allow people to return without being exposed to danger.

Dignified

Return must take place under conditions that respect human dignity and allow people to rebuild their lives and livelihoods.

Sustainable return, therefore, does not simply mean moving people from one location to another. It requires security, access to services, stability, reconstruction, and livelihood opportunities.

Seventeenth: The Role of Jakaya Kikwete

The Council commends the efforts of Jakaya Kikwete, the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, including his visit to South Sudan in June 2026.

It encourages his continued engagement in support of the full implementation of the Peace Agreement.

Significance

This confirms that the African Union wants continued direct political mediation.

Mediation is not viewed as a process that has ended but as an ongoing instrument for addressing disagreements and supporting the implementation of the agreement.

Eighteenth: The Role of the C5

The Council welcomes the C5 mission to Juba in July 2026 and commends its engagement with the government and key stakeholders.

The objective was to:

* Accelerate the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
* Support a peaceful political transition.

This reflects the growing importance of collective regional engagement in addressing South Sudan’s crisis.

Nineteenth: The Electoral Assessment Mission Led by Geoffrey Onyeama

The Council commends the African Union Assessment Mission led by Geoffrey Onyeama, describing its evaluation as comprehensive and objective.

The assessment focused on:

* Political requirements.
* Technical requirements.
* Operational requirements.
* Security requirements.

Significance

This mission represents one of the main instruments the African Union will use to determine the country’s actual level of electoral preparedness.

The assessment of elections will therefore not be based solely on political declarations but on a multidimensional field-based evaluation.

Twentieth: The C5 Summit in December 2026

The Council looks forward to the C5 Summit, expected to be held online by December 2026.

This is significant because December is also the month scheduled for the general elections.

At the same time, the Council decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Significance

This diplomatic language means that the South Sudan situation will remain an active item before the Peace and Security Council.

The Council may therefore continue to:

* Convene further meetings.
* Request additional reports.
* Assess developments.
* Monitor the implementation of commitments.
* Adopt additional positions or recommendations.

The Political Outcome of the Statement

When all the provisions are considered together, it becomes clear that the African Union is placing South Sudan before several simultaneous tests.

The Political Test

Can the parties return to dialogue and reach a sufficient level of consensus?

The Security Test

Can armed confrontations be reduced and eventually ended while completing the unification of forces and security sector reform?

The Institutional Test

Are electoral institutions capable of carrying out their responsibilities?

The Financial Test

Are the necessary domestic and international resources available?

The Electoral Test

Can the elections be peaceful, transparent, inclusive, and credible?

The Humanitarian Test

Can conditions be created to protect civilians and allow displaced persons and refugees to return voluntarily, safely, and with dignity?

The Justice Test

Will transitional justice, accountability, and reconciliation processes finally move forward?

October and December 2026: Where Is the Turning Point?

October 2026 can be regarded as the moment of assessment, while December 2026 represents the announced electoral deadline.

In October, the Peace and Security Council is expected to assess the broader picture of electoral preparedness.

In December, the process is expected to culminate in the elections.

Between these two dates lies a very short period in which any major deficiencies identified by the assessment would need to be addressed.

This makes the coming months particularly critical for the government and all political parties.

Final Conclusion

The statement cannot simply be reduced to the phrase:

“The African Union supports elections in December.”

Nor can it be interpreted as saying:

“The African Union has decided to postpone the elections.”

The position is more complex.

The central message is:

The African Union wants South Sudan to bring the transitional period to an end, but at the same time it wants the country to hold credible elections, and it does not consider the mere announcement of an election date sufficient evidence of readiness.

The Council therefore establishes a series of political, security, institutional, financial, and humanitarian requirements.

In the vision reflected in the statement, elections should be the outcome of an integrated process involving:

Political Dialogue → Implementation of the Peace Agreement → End to Violence → Unification of Forces and Security Sector Reform → Preparation of Political and Civic Space → Financing of Institutions → A Consensual Electoral Roadmap → Assessment of Readiness → Elections.

At the same time, the continuing humanitarian crisis, displacement, and security instability represent direct threats to this entire process.

It can therefore be concluded that:

October 2026 is the moment of assessment.
December 2026 is the announced electoral deadline.
February 2027 is the date by which the African Union expects the transitional period to have conclusively ended.

The broader message to all parties is that the political future of South Sudan should neither be determined by the gun nor reduced to the mere holding of an election. It must instead be built on inclusive dialogue, genuine implementation of the Peace Agreement, security reform, capable institutions, justice and reconciliation, and an environment that enables citizens to participate freely, supported by continued regional and international engagement and active monitoring by the African Union.

12/12/2025

الشاهد الثاني: الأمم المتحدة طلبت مشاركة وزيرة الداخلية في عملية الإجلاء.. و د. ريك مشار يرفض ذلك.

جوبا | الحرية – 12 ديسمبر 2025

استأنفت المحكمة الخاصة بالنظر في أحداث ناصر، صباح اليوم، جلستها الثلاثين التي يحاكم فيها النائب الأول لرئيس الجمهورية المُوقوف وعدد من قادة الحركة الشعبية في المعارضة، وذلك وسط حضور مكتمل لفريقي الاتهام والدفاع والمتهمين، باستثناء المتهم السادس الذي يواصل غيابه لأسباب صحية.

استجواب الشاهد الأول: ضابط رفيع يكشف تفاصيل تحقيقات ميدانية وإدارية

بدأت الجلسة بتسجيل الحضور، لتباشر بعدها هيئة المحكمة برئاسة القاضي جيمس ألالا دينق استجواب الشاهد الأول، وهو رائد بقوات دفاع جنوب السودان.
وأكد الشاهد أن لجنة التحقيق بدأت عملها عبر تحقيق إداري في 15 مارس 2025 قبل أن تتلقى توجيهات بالشروع في تحقيق جنائي.

وعن تحركات القوات، أوضح الشاهد أن الإجراءات اللوجستية والإدارية تخضع لبنود اتفاقية السلام، وأن تبديل القوات في منطقة ناصر “ليس الأول من نوعه”، وأنه يحدث بشكل منتظم منذ سنوات.

وفي ما يتعلق بالمتهم الرابع الفريق قابريل دوب لام، قال الشاهد إنه جرى استيعابه في قوات الدفاع رفقة ضباط آخرين من المعارضة، إلا أن عملية دمج قوات المعارضة لم تكتمل بعد. وأشار إلى أن الفريق دوب كان يشغل منصبين في ذات الوقت:

نائب رئيس هيئة الأركان

رئيس هيئة أركان الجيش الشعبي بالمعارضة

كما حضر اجتماعات القيادة العليا في بيلفام، وأبدى اعتراضًا على نقل قوات الدفاع إلى ناصر، معتبرًا أنها تضم “مليشيات”.

أما بخصوص المتهم الأول وزير البترول الموقوف بوت كانق، فقال الشاهد إنه قيادي سياسي في المعارضة ولم يرد اسمه كثيرًا في ملف التحقيق العسكري.

وأوضح الشاهد أن اجتماعًا لعملية الإجلاء، ضم الأمم المتحدة والإيقاد وآلية الحدود المشتركة، شارك فيه النائب الأول لرئيس الجمهورية المُوقوف د. ريك مشار ود. بنجامين بول ميل ممثلين لمؤسسة الرئاسة. وأكد أن المتهم الثاني لم يرد اسمه في التحقيق العسكري، بينما ورد اسم المتهم الثالث بسبب اعتراضه العلني عبر الإعلام على نقل القوات إلى ناصر ووصفه لها بالمليشيات.

وأضاف أن اللجنة التي شكلها رئيس هيئة الأركان لم تتمكن من زيارة ناصر لأسباب أمنية ولوجستية، واعتمدت على تقارير استخباراتية ميدانية.

الشاهد الثاني: مدير العمليات بالحدود المشتركة يروي تفاصيل دقيقة لفشل عملية إجلاء اللواء مجور داك

انتقلت المحكمة لسماع أقوال الشاهد الثاني، وهو عميد بقوات دفاع جنوب السودان ومدير العمليات والشؤون الإنسانية بلجنة الحدود المشتركة المكلفة بالتنسيق مع الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات الدولية.

وقال الشاهد إنه كُلِّف من رئيس الأركان بالتنسيق مع الأمم المتحدة والصليب الأحمر لإجلاء اللواء الراحل ديفيد مجور داك من ناصر. وطلبت الأمم المتحدة عقد اجتماع مع القيادة السياسية للحصول على ضمانات أمنية لطاقم الإجلاء.

محاولة الإجلاء الأولى – 5 مارس 2025

وفرت الأمم المتحدة طائرتين مروحيتين، بينما وفّر الصليب الأحمر طائرة واحدة.

انسحبت طائرة الصليب الأحمر من ملكال إلى جوبا لغياب الضمانات الأمنية.

هبطت إحدى طائرات الأمم المتحدة بالفعل داخل حامية الجيش في ناصر، بينما بقيت الأخرى تحلّق.

لم تتمكن الطائرة من تحديد موقع اللواء مجور بسبب ضعف التنسيق وشح الوقود، فعادت الطائرات إلى ملكال.

وأكد الشاهد أن النائب الأول لرئيس الجمهورية تعهّد بالتنسيق مع السلطات المحلية في ناصر ووجه بإشعال النار قرب الحامية لتحديد مكان الهبوط.

محاولة الإجلاء الثانية – 6 مارس 2025

قال الشاهد إنه بذل جهودًا لإشراك الصليب الأحمر مرة أخرى، لكنهم طلبوا ضمانات إضافية من رئاسة المنظمة في جنيف.

أقلعت طائرات الأمم المتحدة من ملكال الساعة العاشرة صباحًا بعد تنسيق مباشر مع د. ريك مشار.

هبطت الطائرة في الجهة الشمالية للحامية حيث كان يتواجد نقيب بقوات الدفاع، بينما كان اللواء مجور في الجهة الجنوبية.

اقترب عشرة جنود من الدبابات نحو الطائرة، لكن اشتباكًا وقع مع الجيش الأبيض، مما أدى إلى عودة الطائرات بعد نقل عشرة جنود فقط.

وأفاد الشاهد بأن الأمم المتحدة أبلغت د. مشار بأن الطيارين يرفضون العودة دون ضمانات إضافية، فقدم مشار تعهدات بأن يوجه الجيش الأبيض وقوات المعارضة بالانسحاب 500 متر من موقع الإجلاء. لكن مندوب الأمم المتحدة أبدى شكوكًا حول تنفيذ المحافظ لهذه التوجيهات.

الأمم المتحدة تطلب إشراك وزيرة الداخلية… ورفض من مشار

طلبت البعثة الأممية تفويض وزيرة الداخلية أنجلينا تينج للسفر والإشراف على العملية لقدرتها على إقناع الجيش الأبيض بالانسحاب، لكن د. مشار رفض ذلك مؤكدًا أن الحكومة سترفض هذا الطلب.

وبناء على توجيهاته، رشّح حاكم أعالي النيل عضوين من المعارضة لمرافقة فريق الإجلاء.

الفيديو الحاسم: القوات لم تنسحب

قال الشاهد إنه عند وصول الطائرات رُصدت مقاطع فيديو تُظهر عدم انسحاب الجيش الأبيض وقوات المعارضة من المنطقة، وأن الموقع كان محاصرًا بالكامل.

ورغم ذلك هبطت إحدى الطائرات، ونزل منها مندوبو حكومة الولاية وبعض أفراد الطاقم الأوكراني، بينما بقيت الطائرة الثانية تحلّق.

وطلب مندوب الولاية من الجنود الخروج دون أسلحتهم، فخرج ستة منهم. لكن بعد لحظات تلقى الطيارون إطلاق نار كثيف، مما أدى إلى مقتل أحد أفراد الطاقم وإصابة آخرين، وتضرر خزانات الوقود.

وأفاد الشاهد أنه تلقى اتصالًا من جنود في الميدان أخبروه بأن القائد مجور قد قُتل، وأنهم تحصنوا داخل مدرعة بينما كانت قوات الجيش الأبيض تتقدم.

ورغم الأضرار الكبيرة، تمكنت الطائرات من العودة إلى ملكال.

خسائر بشرية كبيرة

قال الشاهد إنه شاهد في الفيديو ستة جنود من قوات الدفاع يُسحبون نحو الطائرة تحت النار.
وأوضح أن جنديًا توفي أثناء الرحلة إلى ملكال، ليصل فقط ستة جنود من أصل 55 كانوا محاصرين في الحامية.

الدفاع يطلب رفع الجلسة

بعد انتهاء الاستجواب، طلب فريق الدفاع رفع الجلسة لإتاحة الوقت لمراجعة إفادات الشاهد وتحضير الأسئلة، ورغم اعتراض الاتهام وافق القاضي على الطلب.

ورفعت المحكمة الجلسة إلى يوم الاثنين 15 ديسمبر 2025.

11/12/2025

Will elections be held in December 2026 in South Sudan?

By Dr. Luka Biong

In March this year, conflict erupted in Nasir, Upper Nile state, bringing the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) to a standstill when the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-in-Opposition (SPLA-IO)’s allied White Army engaged in direct military confrontation. This escalation led to the house arrest of Dr. Riek Machar—the First Vice President of the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) and Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO)—as well as the detention of several other senior SPLM/A-IO leaders. Some, including the deputy Chairman, fled abroad seeking safety and protection. Subsequently, the SPLM-IO split, and Dr. Riek, along with some senior SPLM/A-IO leaders, now face trial for charges such as murder, treason, and crimes against humanity.

The spokesperson of the SPLM-IO described these charges as “political witch-hunt,” and “sham trial” by a “kangaroo court.” Many observers have warned that this trial appears politically motivated and signals the unravelling of the R-ARCSS. No matter what influences this trial, its proceedings serve as a crucial test of the rule of law and civic values within the new nation. Many observers are convinced that the final verdict in this trial, whether conviction or acquittal, will be consequential, with far-reaching effects on peace and the fate of the R-ARCSS, unless such disputes are resolved amicably through dialogue and the conflict-resolution mechanisms provided for in the R-ARCSS.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Government (SPLM-IG), the leading political party in the Incumbent 2015 Transitional Government of South Sudan (I-TGoNU) that signed the R-ARCSS, has been affected by a wave of power dynamics, changes, and rifts. This resulted in a drastic change in the leadership of the party, including the relief of senior historical political leaders such as Dr. James Wani Igga, the First Deputy Chairperson of the party and the Second Vice President of the R-TGoNU. This has been followed by a high frequency of changes of ministers, particularly the Minister of Finance, the governor of the Bank of South Sudan, the chief of defense forces of the SSPDF, and undersecretaries of key institutions.

However, some observers see the recent reinstatement of Dr. James Wani Igga as the First Deputy Chairperson of the party and the Second Vice President of the R-TGoNU, reinstatement of Dr. General Paul Nang as the Chief of Defense Forces of the SSPDF, the appointment of the Senior Presidential Envoy for Special Programmes, Hon. Adut Salva Kiir, and the appointment of other senior Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) veterans such as comrades Pieng Deng, Africano Mande, and Mabior John Garang have brought relative stability in the ruling party, the national army and the country.

The other parties to the R-ARCSS, such as the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Other Political Parties (OPP), and the Former Detainees (FFD), have also witnessed sharp divisions, particularly in the SSOA and OPP.

Besides these divisions within the parties to the R-ARCSS, there has been a growing mistrust between and among the parties to the R-ARCSS. This mistrust is largely attributed to a lack of political will to implement the R-ARCSS. All the parties to the R-ARCSS concur that trust deficit and lack of political will are the key factors obstructing the implementation of the R-ARCSS. This is well articulated by a member of one of the parties to the R-ARCSS, that the impasse in the implementation of the R-ARCSS rests in deliberate delay in the implementation of the R-ARCSS and willful violation of the agreement.

This demonstrates that the R-ARCSS is struggling to fulfil its goal of delivering peace and a democratic transition; at best, it could be described as in critical condition or on life support. However, many observers believe that whether the R-ARCSS is in the morgue or the intensive care unit (ICU), it remains the only mechanism available for engaging the parties to the R-ARCSS to commit them to peace rather than violence as the only viable path to democratic transition.

With what is widely considered a deliberate delay in the implementation of the R-ARCSS and a lack of political will to implement the truce, the critical question becomes whether elections could be held in December 2026. In September 2024, the parties to the R-ARCSS agreed to extend the transitional period by two years, scheduling elections for December 2026. They promised that this postponement would be the last and final one. The Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) made the same commitment that this postponement of elections will be the final one. Despite the noted waning of the people’s demand for elections due to repetitive postponements, the recent perception survey reveals strong public support for elections, despite fears of violence.

Besides these commitments to the conduct of elections in 2026, Mr. Edmund Yakani of the Community Empowerment Progress Organization (CEPO) reminded the parties to the R-ARCSS of some pressing deadlines that they have committed to in the National Election Act (NEA) 2012 (amendment 2023).

First, the R-ARCSS requires the National Election Commission (NEC) to organize elections sixty (60) days before the end of the Transitional Period and in accordance with the provisions of the Permanent Constitution. In other words, by December 22, 2026, the NEC shall hold elections on the basis of the new Permanent Constitution. Apparently, the current NEA (amendment) 2023 is not based on the provisions of the Permanent Constitution, which has not yet been promulgated. It is based instead on the provisions of the Transitional Constitution (amendment), 2011 of the Republic of South Sudan (TCSS). This makes the NEA null and void for the conduct of the elections in December 2026. For the elections to be held in December 2026, the only option available to the parties is to amend the R-ARCSS to delink the NEA from the Permanent Constitution.

Second, the NEA requires the National Elections Commission (NEC) to complete the review of the names and boundaries of constituencies at least twelve months before a general election. This means by 22 December 2025, the National Elections Commission (NEC) shall avail by law the names and boundaries of geographical constituencies, including the additional constituencies. Without a population census, the NEC will not be able to delineate and allocate the new additional constituencies (56 new seats from 102 seats in the 2010 elections) as provided for in the NEA. To avoid the challenge of delineating the new constituencies with the population census, the NEC may consider recommending the amendment of the NEA to consider the option for deferring the process of delineation and allocation of new constituencies to future elections, and to stick with the current 102 geographical constituencies as in the 2010 elections.

Third, the NEA requires the NEC to announce the date of elections at least six months before the date of the election. This means the NEC shall announce the holding of elections by June 22, 2026, with names and boundaries of the constituencies, including the additional 56 new constituencies. The NEC will find it almost impossible to conduct elections based on the current NEA, which is not based on the Permanent Constitution, and to provide the names and boundaries of the new constituencies without the national population census.

Lastly, the NEA requires the President of the Republic of South Sudan to dissolve the National Legislature, State Legislative Assemblies, the national government, and state governments within three (3) months of the election date announced by the NEC. This means that the President shall dissolve by law the legislatures and governments at the national and state levels on September 22, 2026. This will mark the end of the power-sharing formula and the beginning of a democratic transition with a government elected by the free will of the people. This sunset clause for ending the power-sharing formula is the most detested clause by the elites who have been enjoying power without the consent of the citizens. Despite the mistrust within and among themselves, the parties to the R-ARCSS are likely to connive again and to resort to Section 8.4 of the R-ARCSS to postpone elections and extend the transitional period of the R-ARCSS, even for a longer period. Some reliable sources seem to suggest that the President is unwilling this time to postpone elections and extend the transitional period.

The deadlines, challenges, and the absence of political will to finance elections and the elections-related institutions, such as the NEC, the Political Parties Council, National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and the National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC), clearly suggest that elections are unlikely to be held in 2026. However, the parties are aware that any postponement of elections this time will not be received well by citizens and the international community and will likely deepen citizens’ anger against the government and erode the confidence of the international community in the government.

Despite the short supply of political will and the growing mistrust between the parties, it is in the best political interest of the parties to come together in a genuine dialogue to agree on a credible national agenda for holding elections. The recent initiative by the South Sudanese Women Mediators (SSWM) to create a trusted platform for genuine consultative dialogues of the stakeholders and parties to the R-ARCSS is timely, providing the right path for chartering a more credible roadmap for democratic transition in South Sudan. During their consultative dialogues, the stakeholders and parties to the R-ARCSS may consider the following options for holding the scheduled national elections.

First, the parties should consider the conduct of elections in December 2026 only in the 102 geographical constituencies, as in the 2010 general elections, and defer the new geographical constituencies (56) to future elections to avoid the challenge of delineating and allocating the new constituencies. This option will require the amendment of the NEA and the R-ARCSS to delink the NEA from the Permanent Constitution.

Second, the parties should consider holding partial elections in December 2026 for the executive branch, the President, State Governors, Chief Administrators, and, if possible, the county commissioners. This option does not require delineation of the boundaries for geographical constituencies. The elections of the legislatures are to be deferred to a later stage after the conduct of the population census and the passing of the Permanent Constitution. This will require necessary amendments of the NEA and the R-ARCSS to delink the NEA from the Permanent Constitution.

Third, the parties should candidly accept that the current political infrastructure of the R-TGoNU is inept to create conducive conditions for holding elections. This will necessitate the parties to agree on a new hybrid political infrastructure (i.e., declaration) consisting of the President or the current presidency and cabinet of technocrats, preferably consisting of the current undersecretaries, to be headed by a prime minister, preferably the secretary general of the government and technocrat state and special administration cabinet, preferably consisting of the most senior civil servants in various state ministries and to be headed by the state and special administration secretary general as state governor or chief administrator. The current county commissioners are to be replaced by the most senior civil servants in the county. The main task of this new government is to create conducive conditions for holding elections in addition to performing other core functions of the state. If this new infrastructure is agreed, then the President will dissolve on September 22, 2026, the R-TGoNU, state and special administration government, state legislatures, except national legislatures, to continue for a limited period to pass the permanent constitution, amend the NEA, and pass the budget with a focus on elections. However, the operationalization of this option will require major changes in the R-ARCSS, propelled by robust political will.

Fourth, the parties should agree on supporting the resumption of the initiative of President Salva Kiir to engage the holdout groups in the peace process through the Kenyan-led Tumaini Initiative. This initiative has concluded major protocols and remains with only one protocol on the responsibility sharing, establishing a credible roadmap for resuscitating the implementation of the R-ARCSS. To ensure inclusivity in the process, the other holdout groups that did not join the Tumaini Peace Talks, such as Gen. Thomas Cirilo, to be encouraged to participate during the resumption of the Tumaini Initiative. With this option, the parties to the R-ARCSS will be able to postpone elections for the new date to be agreed upon in the Tumaini Initiative. This option will provide a credible justification for the postponement of elections, and it will be received well by the region, particularly Kenya, the international community, and, importantly, the citizens of South Sudan.

The four options are not mutually exclusive. In particular, the fourth option can complement and synergize with the other three options. The choice of any of these options rests with true consensus through a genuine, candid, and inclusive dialogue process that will involve all the stakeholders and parties to the R-ARCSS and the holdout groups. As Dr. Francis Deng said, whenever there is a crisis, there is an opportunity, and the initiative of the South Sudanese Women Mediators is that opportunity that rightly emerged in the midst of despair and hopelessness.

Despite the recent positive statement by the new SPLM Secretary General, Akol Paul, to amend key provisions of the R-ARCSS, such amendments will require consensus through genuine and inclusive dialogue processes. The initiative by the South Sudanese Women Mediators will be the right platform to build consensus on any amendment to the R-ARCSS and the NEA.

Address

Juba

Website

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when Tumaini Media posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Shortcuts

Share