07/06/2026
The Militias Versus the National Army: The South Sudan’s Experience
By: Abraham Majak Makur Ichiengdau
Introduction
In many conflict-affected states, the temptation to create or tolerate militias arises from a belief that they can “fill security gaps” or increase manpower in areas where the National Army or other national security institutions appear weak. However, the South Sudan experience demonstrates that militia-building—especially when militias operate alongside, in parallel with, or as proxies to national forces—often produces the opposite effect. Instead of strengthening national defense, militias can weaken national unity, undermine the legitimacy of state security, and multiply insecurity.
South Sudan’s national constitutional framework (the Transitional Constitution, 2011, as amended) recognizes specific armed institutions tasked with defending sovereignty, protecting citizens, maintaining correctional services, and safeguarding public safety. This includes other special security units such as internal and external Security bureaus of the National Security Service (NSS). The central question therefore becomes: what is the purpose of the other armed militias appearing across the Republic, operating outside clear national command structures and accountability?
This article examines the disadvantages of militia presence beside the National Army/Armed Forces, using South Sudan’s lived realities as the guiding case.
The Constitutional Role of National Armed Institutions
South Sudan’s constitutional design establishes five armed forces/institutions responsible for key security and public-protection functions: the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) for protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity; the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) for protecting lives and property; the National Prison Services of South Sudan (NPSSS) for lawful correctional services; the National Civil Defense Services (previously the Fire Brigade); and the National Wildlife Service of South Sudan for safeguarding wildlife and game reserves.
These institutions are intended to operate within the confines of law and national duty. Yet across the country, the existence of numerous militias—often linked to local power holders, governors, or armed political actors—has continued to deepen insecurity. The effect is not only military but also social, political, moral, and constitutional.
Disadvantages of Militias Operating alongside the National Army
1) Militia-building destroys national defense spirit and unity
When militias are created or tolerated, the guiding principle of national defense—one army for one nation under one authority —is replaced by fragmented loyalties. Fighters and communities begin to view protection as belonging to a tribe, faction, state governor, or armed leader rather than the Republic of South Sudan.
Over time, this erodes the morale and cohesion of even formal forces. The perception becomes that insecurity can be managed selectively, while armed actors controlling local power are insulated from national discipline.
2) Militias weaken the chain of command and create a “security maze”
National forces operate through structured doctrine, training, and a unified command. Militias often do not follow the same rules, operational procedures, or accountability mechanisms. This produces: confusion in battlefield control, mixed objectives (security vs revenge vs political bargaining), unsafe coordination between national forces and militia elements, and increased risk of clashes among armed groups. Instead of deterring violence, militias may create a security maze where no actor fully answers to the state.
3) Loss of legitimacy: communities may trust militias more than the state
A state’s security effectiveness depends heavily on public trust. When militias commit abuses with little consequence, citizens may conclude that the official security institutions are incapable or unwilling to protect them. This undermines social cohesion in two directions: (1) civilians may cooperate with militias for survival or protection; and (2) civilians may withdraw cooperation from the state by hiding suspects, resisting operations, or refusing to provide information.
When this happens, the relationship between the state and its citizens weakens—making national defense harder, not easier.
4) Increased human rights abuses and impunity
The most visible harm in the South Sudan context is the consistent record of atrocities linked to militia violence. Militias may be responsible for: war crimes and crimes against humanity, massacres of civilians, displacement, summary killings, and killings driven by revenge rather than security objectives.
Even when atrocities are known, impunity often persists—because militia actors may be protected by political patrons or allowed to operate outside accountability. Impunity then becomes a repeating cycle: perpetrators learn that violence can bring power and resources.
5) Revenge cycles and escalation of inter-communal hatred
Militias do not only fight for immediate security. Frequently, they fight for retaliation. South Sudan’s history—marked by massacres and counter-massacres—shows how quickly conflict becomes identity-based. Once violence becomes “our people must avenge,” agreements fail, peace becomes temporary, and mobilization restarts after every incident. Militias accelerate this transformation from political insecurity into social hatred, making reconciliation much harder.
6) Criminal economy: militias profit from insecurity
When militias control territory or influence local power, they often fund themselves through illegal systems of taxation or “fees” on civilians, extortion at checkpoints, looting of crops, cattle, and markets, illegal trade in weapons, fuel, timber, minerals, and other resources. This turns armed actors into economic beneficiaries of conflict. When insecurity creates revenue for militia groups, disarmament and stabilization become less likely, and peace becomes economically fragile.
7) Weak deterrence due to unpredictable behavior
Formal national defense relies on discipline and predictable conduct. Militias—being locally embedded, diversified in leadership, and sometimes ideology-driven—are often more unpredictable. This can include: sudden offensives without coordination, attacks that harm civilians, failures to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, and opportunistic violence in times of crisis. Instead of improving security, militia behavior can worsen it even where the government is already present.
8) Ethnic and identity manipulation fuels further militarization
Militias commonly recruit along ethnic and local identity narratives. “Tribal protection” branding can turn national defense into ethnicized violence, widening divisions and making coexistence more difficult. The South Sudan example of locally branded militia identity illustrates how militia structures can become instruments of identity politics, transforming community defense into armed communal confrontation.
9) Recruitment of youth militarizes society and destroys long-term development
Militias often normalize violence as a pathway to power and survival. This draws youth away from education and livelihoods, contributing to trauma and long-term social breakdown, risks of child soldier recruitment in some contexts, reduced capacity for community rebuilding and development. Even if militias reduce attacks temporarily, they can destroy the future peace capacity of communities by turning generations into fighters.
10) DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration) becomes extremely difficult
Where militias exist, DDR processes face major obstacles: militia commanders may refuse integration or disarmament, fighters may not trust reintegration promises, political patrons may re-arm militias when it suits them, communities may demand security through arms rather than reconciliation. This slows down national reconciliation and delays sustainable peace.
11) Erosion of constitutional and legal order
National armed institutions are expected to operate within law. Militias often operate outside clear legal frameworks, and their presence blurs responsibility: civilians cannot clearly identify or appeal to lawful authority, courts and oversight bodies are bypassed, the public experiences “law” as selective and inconsistent. Over time, militias weaken rule-of-law institutions—the very foundation that security depends on.
12) Risk of state fragmentation into armed fiefdoms
If different regions are effectively governed by different armed actors, the state risks becoming a collection of armed enclaves rather than a unified Republic. This increases: internal instability, political bargaining supported by weapons, the likelihood of rebellion and proxy alliances. Militias may begin as “temporary security solutions,” but they can mature into structures that drive fragmentation.
13) Reduced international confidence and support
Large-scale militia abuses can damage the government’s international standing. That can lead to: tighter scrutiny of security assistance, reduced trust from partners supporting security reform, reputational damage that slows modernization and training of official forces. Even where support exists, external actors increasingly demand accountability—something militia operations complicate.
South Sudan Examples: The human cost of militia violence in South Sudan
South Sudan has experienced insecurity perpetrated by multiple militias and proxy armies, including forces such as:
1. Agwelek in Shilluk land,
2. White Army in Nasir and Low areas,
3. Arrow Boys in Western Equatoria,
4. Tur Wuge in Unity State,
5. Gelweng in Dinka areas, although it is not fighting the government, it has equally its negative repercussions
6. Abushok in Bailiet and Malakal,
7. SPLA-IO pockets across South Sudan, and
8. Others
These armed actors have caused significant harm to civilians and communities. From atrocities and displacement to humiliation of communities and retaliatory cycles of violence, militia presence has undermined safety and trust in state authority. In the long run, the burden does not fall only on battlefields; it falls on families, livelihoods, and national identity.
Conclusion
South Sudan’s constitution outlines specific armed institutions responsible for protecting sovereignty, safeguarding citizens, and maintaining order through law. When militias and proxy armies operate alongside or outside these structures—whether in Shilluk land, Nasir and Low areas, Western Equatoria, Unity State, Bailiet and Malakal, or SPLA-IO pockets—they undermine the very purpose of national defense.
Militia presence increases human rights violations, fuels revenge killings, entrenches impunity, criminalizes local governance, militarizes youth, and fractures national unity by recruiting communities into armed identity blocs. Therefore, leadership must be proactive: insecurity should be handled through disciplined, lawful national institutions and credible accountability systems—not through parallel armed formations that weaken the state and destroy civilian life.
Abraham Majak Makur is a Former Minister of Physical Infrastructure, Defunct Eastern Lakes State. The views expressed here are solely his and could not be attributed to any party. He can be reached via: [email protected]@gmail.com
