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Connecticut CannaTimes, Hartford, CT (2025)

12/05/2025

Unfortunately every can purchased, ends up sending a dollar to the cannabis enforcement fund in CT.

12/05/2025

Smoke Shop Three-Strike Shutdown vs. “Pay Fines and Keep Selling”: 83% of Busted CT Shops Kept Their Licenses

Connecticut CannaTimes - 12.5.2025

Connecticut lawmakers had two paths in front of them this year.

One path was SB 1208 — a simple three-strike rule:

if a v**e shop, smoke shop, or nicotine-delivery dealer was caught with illegal cannabis three times, the state would permanently revoke their registration and shut the business down. No endless hearings. No creative excuses. Just three documented seizures and the door is locked.

The other path was HB 7181, now Public Act 25-166. Instead of a clean shutdown tool, it built out a larger enforcement bureaucracy: a Cannabis Control Division, new statewide “compliance initiatives,” and expanded powers for civil penalties and licensing actions. It also strengthened daily civil fines and preserved broad discretion for agencies to manage violators rather than mandate closure.

The legislature chose HB 7181.

And the outcome shows exactly what that choice prioritized.

A Revenue Model Disguised as Public Safety

HB 7181 sits on top of an existing enforcement framework that already allows:

• Civil penalties against illegal cannabis sellers under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).

• License suspensions or revocations for v**e/smoke shops selling cannabis under cover of electronic cigarette registrations.

In practice, when you look at the last year of named smoke/v**e shop cases, you see a pattern:

• Only one shop — Planet Zaza in East Haven — drew the record $4.93 million civil judgment for persistent illegal cannabis sales, plus a license suspension.

• The Attorney General’s office also touts $300,000 in prior judgments against nine unnamed retailers and wholesalers.

• A Norwalk shop, R&R Convenience & Smoke, picked up a $250 local ordinance fine as a first offense under a new v**e shop law.

On the licensing side:

• SN Smoke & V**e in Stratford lost its lottery and e-cig licenses after a raid seized about 107 pounds of illegal THC products.

• Planet Zaza’s Electronic Cigarette Dealer license was summarily suspended after the record judgment.

• R&R Convenience & Smoke in Norwalk had its v**e registration suspended following four failed cannabis inspections.

• V**e R Us in New Haven lost its Electronic Cigarette Dealer registration after repeated inspections found hundreds of illegal cannabis products packaged to appeal to children.

So yes, there is enforcement. Yes, there are big numbers in a few headline cases. And yes, HB 7181 reinforces the state’s power to issue more fines and take more licensing actions.

But when you step back and look at the full field of shops that were actually caught, the picture is very different from a “zero tolerance” shutdown system.

What the Bust Data Actually Shows: 83% Kept Their Licenses

Using only publicly named CT smoke/v**e shops involved in cannabis busts from December 2024 through December 2025, we built a chronological list of 24 shops where illegal cannabis activity was documented: raids, seizures, illegal THC inventory, or unlicensed cannabis sales.

From that list:

• 4 shops had their licenses suspended (SN Smoke & V**e, Planet Zaza, R&R Convenience & Smoke, V**e R Us).

• 20 shops had no reported license suspension — despite being involved in illegal cannabis sales or possessing sizeable illegal inventories.

That means:

• 16.7% of busted smoke/v**e shops lost their licenses.

• 83.3% — more than 4 out of 5 — kept their licenses or were hit only with raids, arrests, or stop-work orders.

So when we talk about HB 7181 as an “enforcement” bill, we’re talking about a system where the overwhelming majority of illegal operators remain licensed or quickly return to business, often in the same locations, sometimes after multiple raids.

If SB 1208 had passed, many of these businesses — especially repeat offenders like R&R in Norwalk or Planet Zaza in East Haven — would have been permanently removed from the market on a three-strike rule. Instead, they became examples of how far you can push the line before the state finally suspends your credential — and even then, only in rare cases.

HB 7181’s Cost Structure: Managing Violators, Not Ending Violations

The Office of Fiscal Analysis (OFA) warned lawmakers that fully implementing HB 7181 — including new division staffing and system upgrades — would cost up to $745,000 in FY 2026 and $615,000 in FY 2027, plus fringe benefits and ongoing overhead.

DCP Commissioner Bryan Cafferelli, in his written testimony, pointed out that HB 7181’s enforcement task force would be doing many of the same things his department already does, and that the bill would require “significant additional resources not currently provided” in the Governor’s budget.

In other words:

• The state spends more money to add layers of enforcement.

• But still, in real-world cases, 83% of busted shops keep their licenses, and only a tiny fraction face serious financial penalties.

At the same time, the statutory framework now allows for very high daily penalties and expanded discipline options — fines up to $10,000 per violation against licensees, plus separate civil penalties under CUTPA that can reach $5,000–$25,000 per day in egregious cases like Planet Zaza.

This is exactly the structure you would design if your goal were to repeatedly monetize violations rather than cleanly remove the violators.

SB 1208: The Shutdown Tool Lawmakers Walked Away From

SB 1208 was short, blunt, and effective on its face:

• If a smoke shop, v**e shop, or nicotine-delivery dealer had cannabis seized three times, the Commissioner of Consumer Protection would permanently revoke the registration and order the shop closed.

No need to build new divisions.

No need to chase the same operator over and over.

No need to “manage” them for years while collecting periodic fines.

It would have:

• Protected public safety by removing chronic illegal sellers.

• Protected compliant businesses by taking repeat bad actors off the board.

• Saved money by avoiding large, recurring enforcement and litigation costs.

But SB 1208 never moved. HB 7181 did.

⸻

Why SB 1208 Lost and HB 7181 Won

If you line up the text of the two bills next to the real enforcement patterns, one conclusion is hard to avoid:

• HB 7181 generates revenue; SB 1208 eliminates the revenue source.

• HB 7181 keeps violators in the system as fine-paying, license-discipline targets; SB 1208 kicks them out.

• HB 7181 funds new enforcement infrastructure; SB 1208 requires very little money and delivers final outcomes.

There is no straightforward public-safety argument for rejecting a three-strike shutdown rule and doubling down on a system where most illegal sellers remain licensed, especially when many are caught multiple times. The structure we have now is easier to explain if you assume the priority is revenue, not removal.

The Bottom Line for Connecticut

If the goal was to protect public safety, stabilize the legal cannabis market, and permanently shut down illegal smoke and v**e shops, SB 1208 was the only tool on the table that actually did that.

Instead, Connecticut chose:

• An enforcement framework where 83% of busted shops keep their licenses,

• A fiscal structure that requires more state spending,

• And a penalty system that profits from repeat violations rather than ending them.

That choice deserves a very public conversation — not just about what HB 7181 says, but about what the numbers from these 24 busts actually show.

12/04/2025

Connecticut Taxpayers Are Funding a Private National Cannabis Regulator Network — And CT’s Top Regulator Sits on Its Board

CT CannaTimes - 12.4.2025

How Connecticut quietly pays into a secretive national association that helps write cannabis policy behind closed doors — while one of our own regulators helps lead it.

THE BIG NUMBERS YOU WERE NEVER TOLD

Before anything else, here is what should shock Connecticut taxpayers:

$11,500

The amount Connecticut paid this year alone in membership dues to join CANNRA — taken directly from the Cannabis Regulatory Fund, paid by cannabis consumers and businesses.

$557,374

What CANNRA spent last year — despite reporting zero employees and zero salaries.

$717,761

CANNRA’s revenue last year — almost all of it from state agencies nationwide, including Connecticut.

$0

What CANNRA reports paying its board members, including Connecticut’s own Lila McKinley — even though tax money pays for the membership, the travel, and the influence of that board.

10+ YEARS

How long McKinley has been regulating cannabis in Connecticut — from medical ma*****na’s earliest days, through legal adult-use, and now as Director of the Cannabis Division.

Private 501(c)(4)

The IRS classification of CANNRA — meaning it is a private lobbying-capable organization not subject to FOIA, public meetings, or transparency laws.

These numbers alone show why this story must be told.

WHY THIS IS ALARMING

Connecticut taxpayers — including every cannabis consumer and business — are directly funding a national organization that:

• Writes cannabis policy behind closed doors

• Is legally allowed to lobby Congress

• Does not disclose its contractors or vendors

• Publishes only some of its guidance

• Holds closed-door meetings regulators rely on

• Operates without public oversight

• Has no public accountability mechanisms

• And counts Connecticut’s top cannabis regulator as one of its board members

If this were happening in the alcohol, to***co, or pharmaceutical sector, it would already be a national scandal.

But because cannabis regulation remains obscure, CANNRA has operated almost invisibly.

Until now.

THE LOOP: HOW CONNECTICUT TAX MONEY FEEDS A PRIVATE POLICY NETWORK

Here’s the cycle in plain English:

1. Cannabis consumers pay taxes at dispensaries.

2. That money flows into the Cannabis Regulatory Fund (CRF).

3. DCP uses CRF money to pay CANNRA $11,500 for membership.

4. CANNRA uses that money to run private, members-only policy groups.

5. Lila McKinley — Connecticut’s top cannabis regulator — sits on CANNRA’s Board of Directors, helping create the doctrine.

6. Connecticut then adopts rules shaped inside CANNRA, but those rules come with no public access to the underlying policy discussions.

This is what regulatory experts call a closed-loop governance system.

The public funds the rulemakers, the rulemakers fund the association, the association creates the rules, and the public is barred from seeing how those rules are made.

WHO IS LILA McKINLEY — AND WHY HER ROLE MATTERS

Lila McKinley is Connecticut’s Director of the Cannabis Division — the highest-ranking cannabis regulator in the state.

But she has been involved in cannabis for more than a decade:

• Joined DCP around 2014

• Worked on Connecticut’s medical ma*****na program

• Helped write and enforce adult-use regulations

• Became Supervising Staff Attorney in Drug Control

• Served as Legal Program Director advising on cannabis law

• Helped shape THC beverage rules

• Played a role in the state’s testing and enforcement practices

• Promoted to Director of Cannabis in 2025

But her national role is what few Connecticut residents know:

She is also a CANNRA Board Member.

CANNRA’s leadership listing shows:

• Board Member (2025–2026)

• Co-Chair of Packaging, Labeling & Advertising Committee (since 2021)

• Regular national speaker and regulator liaison

Source:
https://www.cann-ra.org/leadership
https://www.cann-ra.org/news-events/cannra-elects-2025-2026-executive-board-members

In effect:

She is both the architect of Connecticut’s cannabis rules and a national architect helping shape the rules other states adopt.

This dual influence is not inherently wrongdoing, but it is structurally dangerous — especially when the policy work occurs inside a private organization funded by public money.

CANNRA’S SECRETIVE STRUCTURE: WHY IT RAISES RED FLAGS

1. IRS filings show no employees — but over $557,000 in annual expenses.

CANNRA’s 990s, available via ProPublica, show:

• $557,374 in expenses
• $717,761 in revenue
• $0 in salaries
• $0 in wages
• $0 in executive compensation
• $0 in employees

Source:
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/853620943

Most nonprofits spend their largest share on staff.

CANNRA spends nothing on staff and hides where the money goes in broad categories.

This implies:

• Heavy reliance on consultants, event vendors, private contractors, and travel

• No clear public disclosure of who receives taxpayer-funded dollars

• No transparency on policy-development spending

2. Meetings and “best practices” are not open to the public

CANNRA’s website openly states that its substantive guidance is members-only.

The public sees only the tip of the iceberg — short “fact sheets.”

The detailed standards shaping CT’s testing, packaging, THC beverage rules, h**p intoxicant crackdowns, and labeling restrictions are not publicly released.

3. CANNRA lobbies Congress and federal agencies while claiming to be “non-advocacy”

Examples:

• Written testimony to Congress on h**p intoxicants

• Policy letters urging FDA to regulate delta-8 and h**p cannabinoids

• Closed-door regulator summits with federal officials

Source example:
https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/CANNRA-Written-Testimony_07-2023_Final59.pdf

4. CT aligns almost perfectly with CANNRA’s regulatory philosophy

CANNRA promotes:

• Strict licensing
• Strong lab-testing enforcement
• Heavy packaging restrictions
• Crackdowns on h**p intoxicants
• Advertising restrictions
• Tight regulator control

Connecticut’s policies mirror these positions point-for-point.

This raises the question:

Are Connecticut’s policies being shaped by the legislature — or by a private association funded by taxpayer dollars?

THE PROBLEM AT ITS CORE

None of this is illegal.

But legality is not the measure of good governance.

The real issue is that Connecticut residents:

• Are governed by policies shaped in private meetings

• Pay for the organization producing those policies

• Cannot attend the meetings

• Cannot see the documents

• Cannot FOIA CANNRA

• Cannot see how the half-million-dollar annual budget is spent

• Cannot know which contractors or consultants are influencing the rules

• Cannot see what their top regulator argues for behind closed doors

Meanwhile, Connecticut’s cannabis tax dollars continue to flow into CANNRA’s budget.

And McKinley continues to help shape national policy from inside that private structure — then bring that doctrine home to regulate residents and businesses.

CONCLUSION: WHY THIS DEMANDS SCRUTINY

What we have uncovered is not corruption.
It is a structural vulnerability in the way Connecticut regulates cannabis.

It reveals:

• A private association funded by public money

• A closed-door policy engine with no sunlight

• A state regulator who simultaneously writes national doctrine and enforces it locally

• A half-million-dollar annual operation with no employees and no transparency

• A taxpayer-funded membership system that gives regulators power without accountability

This dual role — public regulator + private policy author — deserves public conversation, media examination, and legislative oversight.

Because cannabis regulation should not be shaped in secret rooms funded quietly by the people the rules restrict.

And yet, in Connecticut today, that is exactly what is happening.

12/04/2025

Connecticut’s AG Just Launched the Most Extreme Anti-Transparency Move in America — Here’s Why It Matters

CT CannaTimes Special Report - 12.4.2025

A First-in-the-Nation Push for Secrecy

Connecticut Attorney General William Tong is asking a court to rule that nearly all records created by the General Assembly — emails, drafts, communications, internal discussions — should be exempt from public disclosure, as long as they relate to “legitimate legislative activity.”

If approved, Connecticut would become the first state in the entire nation to use the courts to shut down public access to nearly all legislative records.

No other state has ever gone this far through judicial action. What makes this even more troubling is that the Attorney General’s office has offered no clear explanation for why such a dramatic shift is necessary, leaving transparency officials, lawmakers, and the public confused — and suspicious.

When government pushes for secrecy without a clear public benefit, the question becomes unavoidable: What exactly do they not want people to see?

This has never happened in the 50-year history of our state’s Freedom of Information Act.

And the reaction from FOI officials and even lawmakers themselves has been shock, disbelief, and concern.

The Freedom of Information Commission warned that this argument would “turn everything upside down.”
Legislators from both parties said they were never consulted.
And transparency experts statewide say this move would set a dangerous new standard.

WHAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS REALLY ASKING FOR

The AG’s office is arguing that the state constitution’s “speech or debate” clause allows lawmakers and their staff to keep almost anything secret — even though this has never been used to block FOIA requests before.

Their position is simple and drastic:

If lawmakers say a record relates to their work, the public never gets to see it. Period.

FOI hearing officers reviewed thousands of the documents at issue and found that most were not exempt and should be released.
The AG’s office disagreed and appealed to block disclosure entirely.

The FOI Commission pushed back, saying that Connecticut’s transparency rules have existed for half a century and lawmakers knowingly chose to include themselves when FOIA was created.

This appeal tries to undo all of that.

WHY THIS IS BAD FOR EVERYONE — NOT JUST JOURNALISTS

1. It is bad for CT citizens.

If the public cannot see how laws are drafted, discussed, and influenced:

• you cannot know if special interests shaped your laws

• you cannot know why certain decisions were made

• you cannot hold your elected officials accountable

• you cannot challenge wrongdoing or backroom deals

Government power without visibility is unhealthy and undemocratic.

2. It is bad for legislators themselves.

Most lawmakers did NOT ask for this.
Many said they were not consulted at all.

If the AG creates this secrecy by court ruling, legislators lose:

• the ability to show they acted ethically

• the ability to respond to bad-faith accusations

• credibility with the public

It helps no one inside the building, either.

3. It is bad for government watchdogs.

FOI is how reporters uncover:

• corruption

• misuse of taxpayer money

• unethical behavior

• failed programs

• secret deals

A government you cannot check is a government you cannot trust.

4. And if there is nothing wrong to see… why hide it?

The public deserves an answer to this question.

WHY THIS IS ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS FOR CANNABIS POLICY

Connecticut’s cannabis system already struggles with:

• accusations of favoritism

• missing documents

• FOIA delays

• questionable licensing practices

• secrecy around testing labs

• inconsistent Social Equity Council decisions

• lobbying influence that is not transparent

Now the Attorney General wants to allow lawmakers to make all cannabis-related internal documents completely secret.

If this happens:

• no journalist could investigate cannabis licensing

• no advocate could see how cannabis bills are drafted

• no one could find out who influenced cannabis rules

• no public records could expose wrongdoing

• no transparency would exist around why certain cannabis businesses win or lose

Cannabis in Connecticut already operates in a shadowy gray zone.
This would turn the lights off completely.

EVEN THE FOI COMMISSION SAYS THIS MAKES NO SENSE

FOI officials warn that this claim:

• has never been used this way

• is not supported by case law

• would eliminate public access to nearly all legislative records

• would reverse decades of open government

• is unnecessary and harmful

One FOI commissioner openly asked the AG’s attorney who decided to assert this extreme privilege and whether there is a hidden motive. No answer was given.

The public still does not know who ordered this or why.

CONNECTICUT HAS A LONG HISTORY OF CORRUPTION. SECRECY MAKES IT WORSE.

CT has dealt with:

• imprisoned local officials

• misuse of grant money

• agency failures

• scandals in quasi-public agencies

• corruption in the cannabis licensing landscape

• a history of backroom deals in Hartford

In a state where trust is already fragile, choosing secrecy is the opposite of what the public needs.

We should be increasing transparency — not killing it.

THIS WOULD MAKE FOIA IN CT ALMOST USELESS

If this appeal succeeds:

• FOIA can no longer access most legislative emails

• Journalists lose the ability to fact-check lawmakers

• Citizens cannot investigate how bills are made

• Public oversight collapses

• The legislature becomes the most secretive branch of CT government

And it would set a legal precedent that could shield other agencies from accountability too.

This is a point of no return.

FINAL WORD: CONNECTICUT CANNOT AFFORD TO BECOME A SECRECY STATE

This appeal is not a “routine interpretation.”
It is not “business as usual.”
It is not “a small question for the courts.”

This is a historic attempt to shut the public out of the legislative process — and it would hit cannabis transparency the hardest, where corruption has already been whispered about for years.

FOIA is the only reason the public can see anything.
If this privilege claim succeeds, FOIA becomes a locked door.

And Connecticut becomes the first state in America to choose secrecy over accountability.

CT CannaTimes will keep tracking this fight — because without transparency, there is no cannabis justice, no government accountability, and no real democracy in Connecticut.

12/01/2025

SoundView Shows - “Social Equity” in Connecticut Is a ZIP Code, Not A Lived Experience, And That’s An Issue

CT CannaTimes – 12.1.2025

How two professionally established applicants became “equity” through census-tract rules—despite no documented War-on-Drugs harm, multiple denials, and a clean licensing record.

I. The Quiet Math Behind “Equity”: Six-Figure Applicants Are Welcome

When most people hear “social equity” in cannabis, they picture people who were actually hit by the War on Drugs:
arrested for small amounts, sitting on old charges, losing jobs, housing, and years of their lives while the state profits off the same plant.

Connecticut’s Social Equity Council (SEC) sells it that way.
But the rules on paper are very different.

To qualify as a social equity applicant in Connecticut, an owner must:

1. Live in a “Disproportionately Impacted Area” (DIA) census tract, and

2. Have an income below 300% of the State Median Income (SMI).

Using recent state median income estimates (around $90,000/year per household), 300% SMI works out to roughly:

• $270,000/year as the ceiling for a household, and

• About $135,000/year as the ceiling for a single individual.

In other words:

You can earn well into the six figures and still be officially “social equity” in Connecticut, as long as your address lands inside a DIA map.

Those ceilings do not describe people pushed into poverty by drug policing.

They describe people who are, at least currently, economically comfortable.

Against that policy backdrop, SoundView’s story makes perfect sense — and makes the program’s failures impossible to ignore.

II. Who SoundView’s Founders Are — and, Just as Important, Who They Aren’t

A public profile of SoundView, reprinted on Dabbin’ Dad from Hartford Business Journal, introduces the two visible founders this way:

• Nicholas Cimadon – Bristol native, registered nurse, U.S. Navy veteran, college educated.

• Kelsey Rivera – marketing and communications professional, working remotely for a medical device company, able to travel with Cimadon to Newport, San Diego, and Guam during his service.

The article spends time on:

• their degrees and professional backgrounds,
• military service,
• their ability to relocate multiple times,
• support from extended family during their build-out,
• and their decision to treat this business as their “baby.”

What the article never mentions:

• any cannabis arrest,
• any conviction,
• any time spent incarcerated,
• probation,
• police harassment,
• criminal-record barriers,
• or a single concrete example of War-on-Drugs harm.

The state licensing records for Cimadon and Rivera line up with that picture:

• Cimadon holds a Department of Public Health Registered Nurse license and active adult-use cannabis backer and key employee credentials, all current and in good standing.

• Rivera holds an active adult-use cannabis employee credential and a closed prior backer license attached to Milford.

None of their state credentials reference any cannabis criminal history; to the contrary, they show clean, professional status.

To be clear: that’s not a criticism of them.
It’s a criticism of the state for calling this “social equity”.

By every public indicator, these are regular, professionally established people with no documented War-on-Drugs impact who were able to access a license that was marketed as repair.

III. What the License Itself Says: Equity Status by Rule, Not by Harm

Look directly at the manufacturer license for SoundView Manufacturing LLC:

• Credential: ACFB.0000681
• Type: Adult-Use Cannabis Food & Beverage Manufacturer
• Status: ACTIVE
• Application Type: SEC Lottery
• Address: 159 E Main St, Bristol, CT 06010-7055

This is not just any manufacturing license.

The “SEC Lottery” tag confirms it was issued through the Social Equity Council process.

Under that process:

• Residence in a DIA +
• Income under the 300% SMI cap +
• Equity ownership percentages

are what matter.

Nowhere in that criteria:

• past cannabis conviction,
• years incarcerated,
• family members jailed,
• stop-and-frisk history,
• or generational damage.

SoundView meets exactly what the program actually measures:

zip code and income, not lived experience of the War on Drugs.

IV. The Corporate Trail: New England Edibles → SoundView Manufacturing

The business filings add another layer of context that matters for an equity conversation.

First, there was New England Edibles LLC:

• Formed February 8, 2023, in Bristol.
• NAICS code: Perishable Prepared Food Manufacturing (311991).
• Principal: Carol Robinson.
• Represented by corporate firm Reid & Riege, P.C. in Hartford.

Then, on April 10, 2023, that entity was dissolved.

On that same date, the state shows a Certificate of Conversion creating:

• SoundView Manufacturing LLC, with principal address 159 E Main St, Bristol, same principal (Robinson), same law firm.

This is a textbook, lawyer-guided conversion.
Again, that’s totally legal.

But it underlines that this is a planned corporate venture, with professional counsel from day one — not a fragile attempt by a formerly criminalized grower to get legal.

If the equity program’s job is supposed to be helping the latter, this paperwork reads like the former.

V. The Reapplication Advantage: Denied, Denied… Approved

The Department of Consumer Protection’s own licensing view for SoundView Manufacturing LLC shows multiple entries for the same adult-use food and beverage license at 159 E Main St, all under the same company name and DBA “Soundview”:

1. ACFB.0000748 – ADULT-USE CANNABIS FOOD AND BEVERAGE MANUFACTURER – Status: DENIED (City: Bristol)

2. ACFB.0000811 – ADULT-USE CANNABIS FOOD AND BEVERAGE MANUFACTURER – Status: DENIED (City: Bristol)

3. ACFB.0000681 – ADULT-USE CANNABIS FOOD AND BEVERAGE MANUFACTURER – Status: ACTIVE (Application Type: SEC Lottery; City: Bristol)

On top of that, the company holds:

• FME.0001205 – FOOD MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENT – Status: ACTIVE

• MMBR (medical ma*****na / adult-use product license) – Status: INACTIVE

This sequence is revealing:

SoundView applied, was denied, applied again, was denied again, and ultimately has an active adult-use manufacturer license under the SEC lottery.

The system allowed them to keep coming back.

That’s a feature of Connecticut’s framework most true equity applicants never truly get to enjoy:

• If you’re juggling low-wage work and childcare, a single denial can be the end.

• If you’re on probation or living with old charges, the stress of another round can be too much.

• If you’re already carrying debt from the underground economy or from legal fees, you may not have the cushion to refile again.

By contrast, SoundView’s path shows how applicants with stability and support can simply keep reapplying under the equity banner until it lands.

Once again: that’s not their personal failing.
It’s a structural advantage baked into the rules—a quiet “second, third, fourth chance” that is functionally inaccessible to many who actually lived through criminalization.

VI. The War on Drugs vs. the SoundView Model

Put bluntly:

• There is no evidence in public coverage or state licensing that Nicholas Cimadon or Kelsey Rivera were ever arrested for cannabis, jailed for cannabis, or had their lives derailed by drug-war policies.

• Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Connecticut residents — disproportionately Black and Latino — do have cannabis or low-level drug histories that still shape their housing, employment, and family stability.

The social equity brand was sold to lawmakers, voters, and communities as a response to that harm.

In practice, the SoundView case shows a very different model:

• Professionally credentialed applicants with clean licensing records.
• Corporate structuring from the beginning.
• Multiple bites at the apple after denials.
• Equity certification through DIA mapping and generous income caps, not through any proven history with the War on Drugs.

If you lined up the lived histories of many legacy growers and criminalized patients against SoundView’s paperwork, the question would be obvious:

Why are the people who never carried the risk being called “equity,” while the people who did carry it are still locked out?

VII. What SoundView Tells Us About the Equity Program’s Design

Taken all together, SoundView’s story makes three things painfully clear:

1. Equity = Census Tract + Income Cap, Not Harm

The SEC’s formula does not ask what happened to you under prohibition.
It only asks where you live and how much you make now.

This allows people with no documented drug-war impact to be labeled “equity,” while many living with old cannabis charges remain ineligible.

2. Those With Resources Can Reapply Until They Succeed

Multiple denied credentials for the same company and address, followed by an active SEC lottery license, show that persistence plus stability wins.

The communities social equity is supposed to serve often have neither.

3. The Program Rewards Stability, Not Repair
Every piece of the SoundView puzzle — the corporate conversion, the law-firm agent, the professional backgrounds, the clean licensing records, the multiple applications — points to a program that funnels opportunity to people already standing in a relatively secure place, so long as their ZIP code qualifies.

No one broke the rules.
The rules simply redefine “social equity” into something that does not match what the War on Drugs actually did to people.

VIII. Conclusion: SoundView as a Case Study in Equity-Washing

SoundView Manufacturing LLC:

• is properly formed,
• is in good standing with the state,
• and, as far as the paperwork shows, followed all the rules given to them.

The problem is that those rules allow SoundView to be called “social equity” without any evidence that its visible principals were ever harmed by the War on Drugs.

That is the definition of equity-washing:

Using the moral language of justice and repair to describe a program that, in practice, mostly measures census tracts, income caps, and application stamina.

SoundView is not the cause of that failure.
SoundView is the proof of it.

Until Connecticut rewrites social equity to center actual criminal-legal impact and to guarantee real access for those who lived it, the state will keep minting new stories like this one:

clean records, clean licenses, corporate structures—and a bright “Social Equity” stamp on top.

Connecticut CannaTimes

12/05/2025

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