09/23/2023
Post 12 (1976), "Save South Vietnam" play-through - FINAL POST - VICTORY!
Early 1976: Victory!
As I predicted, General Giap’s “Spring Offensive” was a disaster for the reds. His efforts to spread me thin merely spread him thin, and I clobbered anything that moved out of the border sanctuaries. In 1976 I’m taking the offensive: note my 5 ARVN regiments going into Kontum, led by the Marines, to clear out 2 NVA regiments of the 304th and 320th Divisions. That’s just a precursor to an offensive by those same regiments plus the other 5 ARVN regiments around Quang Ngai and Danang to retake Hue later this year. Indeed, my 26 ARVN regiments now outnumber the 16 regiments the NVA still has infiltrated in-country, and the upcoming battles around Qui Nhon, Quang Ngai and Kontum will reduce those 16 regiments to only 12.
The game is lost only if Saigon falls to the reds, and it’s quite obvious that not only will that NOT happen, but I’m most likely going to reclaim all of South Vietnam, including Quang Tri, by the end of turn 50. Victory!!
So what did Charlie do wrong, or what did I do right? Teacher’s grades: US/ARVN: B; VC: A; NVA: D-minus.
First of all, the VC played brilliantly, almost without error. Heavy initial concentration on Saigon forced a strong US presence there, guaranteeing that strategic area was a breeding ground for VC battalions for years. Additionally, they wisely tied the Marines down with significant efforts in the north, insuring there were always weak areas somewhere representing opportunities for communist domination. Even their decision to go early with a massive offensive during Tet 1967 ended brilliantly – although their losses were severe, the ARVN were too weak at that point to take advantage and very soon after the VC were dominant again.
Unfortunately for the VC (but fortunately for ME!), their NVA partner failed at every turn, fatally. When the VC were wreaking havoc around Saigon in 1965-66, the NVA offered not an iota of support there. US forces were barely holding on, and my reinforcements seemed to all have to get fed to that meatgrinder, yet no NVA regiments appeared around Saigon until 1967! By then the VC were “in the open” with their Tet Offensive and I could handle them and a couple NVA regiments, but 2 or 3 NVA regiments around Saigon in ’65 and ’66 would have been a very different story indeed. Then, when I crossed into Cambodia in 1970, the NVA were caught flat-footed again and the VC’s sanctuaries located and destroyed. In 1971, when the ARVN pushed into Laos, the NVA were nowhere to be seen, enabling a critical ARVN success clearing VC sanctuaries supporting Quang Ngai leading to its early pacification. Finally, both NVA offensives of 1972 and 1975 were weak and misdirected, allowing me to build an insurmountable force of ARVN regiments during the “Paris Peace Accords” period. All-in-all, a pretty poor showing for the NVA who were a terrible partner for the otherwise very competent VC.
As for me (US/ARVN), I held my own. To my credit I typically exploited the enemy’s mistakes, which were plentiful. However I lost Hue early and was very lucky not to lose Quang Tri equally early (it fell in 1974) and would have paid dearly for those losses had the NVA taken advantage. On the other hand, I deserve credit for a pretty good showing in my Cambodia and Laos incursions – all-in-all a solid “B” performance.
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