12/08/2025
August 12, 2025
Analysis and Insights about the collision of Chinese Coast Guard and PLAN frigate on August 11, 2025 near Scarborough Shoal by Capt. Carl O. Schuster, USN (Retired).
Capt. Schuster is a security and defense consultant for issues related to Indo-Pacific affairs.
He served in the US Navy for 25 years and just retired after 24 years of teaching at Hawaii Pacific University, Honolulu, Hawaii where he taught Diplomacy and Military Science Program. He was the former Director of Operations at US Pacific Command's Joint Intelligence Center near Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
He is a freelance writer with over 700 articles of military history and current events, and three books published, and periodic media analyst on Military and International Security Affairs.
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Based on the two videos that I have watched, it looks like the Chinese Coast Guard vessel is at fault. The naval vessel was approaching the Philippine Coast Guard cutter with its port side towards the Chinese Coast Guard cutter. That means the naval vessel had to maintain course and speed (it had the "right of way" under international rules of navigation). Since the naval vessel was approaching from the Chinese cutter's starboard side and on course to pass ahead of it, the PRC's cutter should have maneuvered to remain clear. Instead, it remained on course and speed to water cannon the Philippine cutter from the Philippine cutter's starboard side.
Cause: I believe the PRC Coast Guard cutter's officer-of-the-deck and captain were fixated on water cannoning the Philippine cutter and not paying attention to the PLAN frigate. Also, the frigate's watch clearly expected to maneuver up the Philippine cutter's port side. The Chinese were trying to sandwich the Philippine cutter between them but did not communicate or coordinate their actions well.
That is the challenge of coordinated "bumper drills,' or "do***ng" as we used to call them. It takes practice and close communications. The PLAN and Coast Guard don't often work together in close quarters. Normally, the PLAN ships remain 2-10nm away in case the Coast Guard vessel needs backup. This change in tactics is ominous in that it ups the power ante in countering the PLAN but at the same time, the Chinese need to practice more if they intend to do such work and avoid further incidents like this.
One other possible issue: Coast Guard and Maritime Safety Administration crews tend to use their local dialect on ship while the PLAN tends to use Mandarin. Mandarin would be the language of coordination in this case and I wonder if the Coast Guard vessel's watch officers poor Mandarin contributed to this. That doesn't excuse the PRC Coast Guard cutter's poor seamanship and sloppy watch standing but it might be a contributing factor.
