
21/07/2025
DefenseNews: A jamming attack in March was triangulated to the harbor town of Baltiysk, which is also home to the Russian Baltic Fleet and its electronic-warfare complex, a military facility packed with antennas and mobile EW units, although the triangulation appeared to resolve to a point southwest of the city, closer to the harbor.
GPS jammers and spoofers can be very small, even those with a large range, and might be easily overlooked in satellite imagery. Ziebold, a German researcher, said his team had purchased jammers the size of a shoe box that had a range of many kilometers.
This also means that they can be mobile. The jammer that has been plaguing Estonia, for example, appears to have moved from southwest of Saint Petersburg to northwest of the city.
This emerges from data shared by open-source intelligence researcher auonsson, who is part of a network of social media activists examining the jamming saga on a technical level. The person behind the social media handle spoke Defense News on the condition of remaining anonymous.
Auonsson used aircraft-transmitted data to create a heatmap of possible jammer locations around Russia’s imperial city. The flight information transmitted by planes and used for live airplane tracker maps also contains information about the quality of GPS data; when an aircraft’s GPS quality suddenly drops, this suggests that a jammer has come up over the plane’s horizon. By plotting the horizons of thousands of flights when they first encountered jamming, a heat map can be created, allowing for an approximate idea of where the offending transmitter might be located. The source code for this experiment is available on GitHub, (github.com/jpajala/GpsJammerLocator) and the data (airplanes.live) on which the investigation is based is publicly available.
“I don’t consider the exact source very relevant for the public discussion,” the person behind the auonsson handle said. “The country is, though,” they added, referring to Russia.
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See infiniteeyesnews.substack.com for full sources and analysis including the scope of GNSS disruptions, how R-Mode is becoming critical to navigational security, and Russia’s Baltic EW capabilities.