Competition Law

12/09/2025

The EU's Digital Markets Act (DMA) and similar competition rules should compel leading video game platforms such as PlayStation and Xbox to share their key user data with developers, according to industry executive Chris Hewish. Hewish argues that console makers like Sony and Microsoft hold a significant advantage by having access to detailed platform and user insights—information that game developers cannot access. This data includes metrics like user search queries, device usage, payment methods, and time-of-play, all of which help platforms optimize marketing and compete with third-party developers.

Currently, major tech companies like Microsoft, Google, and Apple are designated under the DMA, but Sony PlayStation is not. Most enforcement under the DMA has targeted mobile app stores rather than premium gaming consoles. Hewish calls for competition authorities to broaden their focus to include consoles, highlighting Microsoft's vast EU subscriber base as meeting DMA thresholds. Opening up platform data would help "level the playing field" in premium gaming and foster fairer competition between platforms and developers.

Source: Rashid Baxter, 'DMA should target PlayStation and Xbox data advantage, industry executive says', Global Competition Review (11 September 2025) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/dma-should-target-playstation-and-xbox-data-advantage-industry-executive-says

Auto-posted via Comet

The EU's Digital Markets Act and similar ex-ante competition rules in other jurisdictions should force leading video game platforms such as PlayStation and Xbox to remedy their competitive advantage by sharing key data with developers, a video game industry executive has said. 

12/09/2025

[Auto-posted via Comet] Japan's FTC Raids 8 Major Fuel Companies Over Diesel Price-Fixing Cartel

Japan's Fair Trade Commission (FTC) recently raided eight leading fuel suppliers suspected of forming a cartel to fix diesel prices. These companies allegedly coordinated on price increases for years, impacting about half of Japan's diesel fuel market.
This criminal investigation is significant because:
- It's the first major FTC enforcement with possible criminal charges since the 2021 Tokyo Olympic bid-rigging scandal.
- The case affects industries and consumers nationwide, as diesel is essential for trucking, logistics, and construction.
- The FTC is demonstrating a stricter approach toward anti-competitive behavior, especially for vital goods during an era of global fuel price hikes.
This crackdown is expected to bring greater scrutiny and stricter penalties to price-fixing in Japan, aiming to protect consumers and ensure a fair marketplace.

Source: Yosuke Takashima, 'FTC raids 8 firms suspected of fixing diesel prices as a cartel' The Asahi Shimbun (Sep 10, 2025) https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/09/10/japan/crime-legal/firms-raided-over-diesel-fuel-cartel/

The Fair Trade Commission on Sept. 10 searched offices of eight oil sales companies on suspicion of forming a price-fixing cartel on diesel fuel in violation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, sources said.

06/09/2025

Time to study AI governance..

(Source: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/rossoglou-kostas_ai-governance-eastasia-activity-7370123159607480320-GXf5) (retrieved at 8:45, September 7, 2025)

06/09/2025

🇯🇵 Surge in 公正取引委員会 JFTC Enforcement in FY2024: Figures and Context (ChatGPT Summary)

What happened?
On 1 May 2025, the JFTC announced that in FY2024 (April 2024–March 2025) it took 24 legal measures—21 cease-and-desist orders and 3 commitment recognitions. The Japanese press release explicitly states: 「24件の法的措置（排除措置命令21件、確約計画の認定3件）」 (“24 legal measures: 21 cease-and-desist orders; 3 commitment recognitions”)
ENG: https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2025/May/250501.html
JPN: https://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/2025/may/250501_kanki.html

Compared to last year: In FY2023, the JFTC took only 9 legal measures (4 cease-and-desist orders and 5 commitments), as confirmed in the previous year’s enforcement report

Media and commentary: The Asahi Shimbun described the FY2024 numbers as the highest in a decade (“過去10年で最多”), and MLex called it a “record, decade-high”
Anderson Mori & Tomotsune likewise highlighted the sharp increase from 9 cases in FY2023 to 24 cases in FY2024 in its July 31, 2025, commentary

朝日新聞 https://www.asahi.com/articles/AST4Z53B9T4ZUTIL01YM.html
MLex
https://www.mlex.com/mlex/antitrust/articles/2332787/jftc-enforcement-report-reveals-record-decade-high-legal-actions-in-fiscal-2024
AMT https://www.amt-law.com/en/insights/trending-news/trending-news_20250731001_en_001/

Why Matters:
1. Signal of tougher enforcement: The increase from 9 to 24 cases—almost tripling—is a clear sign that the JFTC is stepping up enforcement, relying both on formal cease-and-desist orders and on commitments (media outlets explicitly described this as a “decade-high” surge)
2. Range of cases: According to the JFTC report, the measures included cartels, bid-rigging, collusion in bids, unfair trade practices (UTPs), private monopolization, abuse of superior bargaining position, and tying. See, https://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/2025/may/250501_kanki.html

3. Takeaway:
Companies need to reassess compliance programs (especially around cartels, RPM, and UTPs).
Firms should prepare internal protocols for commitment procedures, including early case assessment, template remedies, and external communication strategies.
Digital and logistics sectors should be prioritized in risk monitoring, as they are frequent JFTC targets.

　公正取引委員会は、迅速かつ実効性のある事件審査を行うとの基本方針の下、国民生活に影響の大きい価格カルテル・入札談合・受注調整、中小事業者等に不当に不利益をもたらす優越的地位の濫用や不当廉売などに厳正...

04/09/2025

Interesting article comparing 🇰🇷Korea and 🇯🇵Japan's situations on platform regulation. It reports on Japan's smooth implementation of the MSCA (Mobile Software Competition Act), free from US pressure, quoting JFTC Japan Fair Trade Commission 公正取引委員会 Chair Chatani’s words that the jurisdiction remains “very friendly with the US platforms, including Google and Apple.” Meanwhile, regarding Korea, the recent pushback from the US and the continuing calls for legislative action from the National Assembly are introduced.

Well, what the report says is somewhat misleading. First, regarding differences: in Korea as well, there is legislation targeted only at app store practices by Apple and Google, which passed even before the DMA without serious resistance. The coverage of the problematic Korean bills at issue now is broader than mobile ecosystems. Second, even before Trump’s return, Korea’s bills had already faced serious criticism from the public, academia, and local businesses. US pressure may be just an added spice.

That said, let’s assume that there are differences. What explains such differences? Apart from the US perspective and legal reasons, which I’ve already discussed (https://lnkd.in/gV_uGgCQ), I think the different cultural settings of the two, which operate as informal institutions, may provide an explanation (hypothesis for my future research).

🇯🇵 In Japan, I personally feel that “you benefit if you blend in.” As the saying goes, a nail that sticks out gets hammered down.

🇰🇷 In Korea, I assure you that “you benefit if you speak up.” Here, the nail that sticks out gets hammered too (as is true in almost all Asian countries...), though, in Korea, the nail that stays down (like me...) gets drilled even more heavily.

(Of course, these are broad-brush impressions, but I think they help capture the cultural differences quite quickly. While I personally feel more comfortable and safe in Japan, if you’re outspoken and don’t shy away from a fight, Korea might suit you better.)

Under these different settings, I was thinking that rational businesses in the two jurisdictions have also been responding to legislative actions differently.

For example, for Google and Apple, it’s better to follow and cooperate with the Japanese government. For the same player, however, in Korea, it’s better to be loud (as long as you can withstand the hammer, for a short time), because then you can gain even greater rewards.

It’s by the way fascinating to try to look into rational actors' choices under various formal and informal institutional constraints.

Charles McConnell, 'JFTC chair downplays US tech concerns as Korea faces pushback' GCR (Sep 3, 2025)

Japan’s top competition official says the country remains on good terms with major US digital platforms ahead of the introduction of a new regulatory regime, even as neighbouring Korea faces mounting trade tensions over proposed platform regulations.

04/09/2025

Thanks to Haeyoon Kim's heads-up, I learned about and read this piece, which reported that Trump’s August 25 post, very provocative and prompted immediate sovereignty backlash from the EU (while Korean politicians mistakenly assumed it was only about the DMA/DSA and irrelevant to them), was actually aimed at Korea, citing sources inside the White House .

It would be quite a nasty surprise for Korean lawmakers ('What? Me?).

Having looked briefly, I learned, it was not only about Korea but also about India, Turkey, and Brazil, all of which are currently considering similar rules modeled on the EU’s framework. Perhaps Korea was seen as a starting point that, if allowed, would trigger domino effects in other jurisdictions (as an example for deterrant?).

Personally, leaving aside the sovereignty issue, I am very frustrated to see the consequences of irresponsible decisions by policy-makers in Korea. As I argued last year, at least in Korea, the regulation initiatives were not well grounded in concerns about market failure or institutional failure (e.g., lack of tools). Instead, they were driven by (i) top-level elites in the presidential office, excessively inspired by the EU's rules, recognizing them as an acceptable norm, and by (ii) politicians captured by specific interest groups, recklessly pursuing their own self-interests. Including diplomatic fallout, the social cost already incurred—and the cost yet to come—is far too great. If regulation is ultimately abandoned, what was the point of all this? And if regulation is adopted, who will bear responsibility for the unnecessary burdens and inefficiencies that stem from government failure?

To repeat, the Korean market is quite competitive, and it has a very strong record of competition law enforcement. The Korea Fair Trade Commission 공정거래위원회 has a wide range of tools, including the prohibition of abuse of superior bargaining position, to sanction anti-competitive practices by global big tech. Unlike its counterparts, the agency has boldly and repeatedly acted against global tech firms, like Qualcomm, Google, and Apple, imposing hefty fines and remedies that reshaped their business models (Kudos!). When seeing the European Commission’s enforcement as appropriate, Korea’s was closer to over-enforcement than under-enforcement.

The question, then, is how to make the government and the legislature—monopoly suppliers of legislative and administrative services—act more responsibly. How to prevent them from abusing their monopoly and harming citizens? Increasingly, this is becoming the central theme of my research...

Ari Hawkins, 'Trump’s warning on digital rules was aimed at this country' Politico (Sep 3, 2025) https://www.politico.com/news/2025/09/03/trumps-digital-regulation-warning-was-aimed-at-this-country-00540363

(Original LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/sangyunl_trumps-warning-on-digital-rules-was-aimed-activity-7369194863403147264-EdvC )

Thanks to Haeyoon Kim's heads-up, I learned about and read this piece, which reported that Trump’s August 25 post, very provocative and prompted immediate sovereignty backlash from the EU (while Korean politicians mistakenly assumed it was only about the DMA/DSA and irrelevant to them, like 🤷),...

30/08/2025

I forgot to share this news here (while did it on LinkedIn only).
---
🇯🇵 For those interested in Japan's Mobile Software Competition Act (I’ve only just learned that the Smartphone Act's official English short name is the Mobile Software Competition Act (MSCA)).

On July 29, Guidelines were published to provide interpretive guidance and clarify details of the MSCA. 公正取引委員会

Here's a direct link to the English guidelines https://www.jftc.go.jp/file/MSCA_Guidelines_tentative_translation.pdf, or see the Japan Fair Trade Commission's press release: https://www.jftc.go.jp/houdou/pressrelease/2025/jul/250729_smartphone.html (JPN) https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2025/July/250729.html (ENG)

The MSCA will come into full effect on December 18, 2025.

See also, Cabinet Order (政令) about the quantitative criteria (Dec 13, 2024): https://www.jftc.go.jp/smartphone_cabinetorder.html
JFTC's Enforcement Rules (施行規則) (Dec 13, 2024): https://www.jftc.go.jp/smartphone_jftc_rules.html

See also, Charles McConnell, 'Japan rejects push to change thresholds in final digital platform rules' GCR (Jul 29, 2025) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/japan-rejects-push-change-thresholds-in-final-digital-platform-rules

Japan’s Fair Trade Commission has rejected calls to lower the monthly active user threshold that determines which companies are subject to its new digital platform regime, finalising a framework that critics say risks disproportionately targeting large US tech companies.

30/08/2025

[DARK PATTERNS]
For consumer protection researchers. On August 29, 2025, the Korea Fair Trade Commission 공정거래위원회 announced an administrative notice of the proposed amendments to the Consumer Protection Guidelines for Electronic Commerce, to clarify rules on dark patterns. This action follows the amendments to the Act (Jan-Feb 2024), the Enforcement Decree and Rules (Feb 2025), for the dark pattern regulations.

For those interested:
In the Act on the Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce (for now, only the Korean version is available), see:
Art. 13(6) (Auto-renewal); Art. 21-2(1)(1) (Drip pricing); Art. 21-2(1)(2) (Pre-ticked boxes), Art. 21-2(1)(3) (False-hierarchy interface); Art. 21-2(1)(4) (Hard-to-cancel); Art. 21-2(1)(5) (Nagging).
In the proposed Guidelines: see Section II, Items 8, 12-14, and Section III, Items 7, A-C.

And press releases (in Korean, though, for NotebookLM users):
Law (Jan 2024): https://lnkd.in/g3hdgiJn
Decree and Rules (Feb 2025): https://lnkd.in/gi4xymed
Q&A (Feb 2025) https://lnkd.in/gjEYVDKN
Guidelines (proposal) (Aug 2025) https://lnkd.in/g4Eb4jY4

As for Japan, the Japan Fair Trade Commission 公正取引委員会's approach, see, Secretariat of CPRC, Introduction of Panel Discussion (Panel Discussion Materials, CPRC Symposium, Japan Fair Trade Commission, 14 March 2025) (in English) https://lnkd.in/gx8MRTjQ
And, here's a full report of the CPRC (in Japanese): https://lnkd.in/g_34epw9

Local news article: https://news.einfomax.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=4372089

공정거래위원회는 온라인 눈속임 상술(다크패턴) 규제에 관한 구체적인 해석기준과 권고사항을 담은 '전자상거래 등에서의 소비자보호 지침' 개정안을 마련했다고 29일 밝혔다.이번 개정안을 마련해 이날부터 내...

27/08/2025

🇧🇷 I feel that, recently, in Brazil, intriguing enforcement activities have been undertaken (like the well-known Ecosystem case*), and those deserve attention. This time, the Brazilian competition authority, CADE - Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, is testing the illegality of the so-called 'sustainable' but 'anti-competitive' agreements (or 'pro-sustainability agreements') under competition law.

* See my previous post on CADE's merger control action based on the ecosystem theory of harm https://www.facebook.com/competlaw/posts/pfbid02wUjw86hRG7DJERLiKXjTMDiJ7AooFxEhaNYnUans4qgkUGKifXWTRQerAaic4E73l

Reportedly, CADE has launched its first investigation (perhaps a more appropriate term than 'probe' in the article, given that it has already imposed interim measures) against a group boycott of soy traders. The traders, under the title of the "Soy Moratorium", agreed not to buy soybeans produced in areas of the Amazon rainforest that were deforested after 2008.

This initiative follows a Greenpeace campaign and, seemingly, it is not a purely private initiative, but appears to be backed by other governmental agencies, such as the Environmental Ministry. The report says [Brazil’s Ministry of Environment and Climate Change and the Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources are also signatories to the agreement]. Of course, after the launch of the investigation, the administrative agencies expressed concerns.

So, how and why did CADE decide to step in? Reportedly, their investigation was triggered by [a complaint from the agriculture committee of Brazil's lower house of Congress in August 2024]. The congressional committee is composed of members from [across Brazil’s political parties, led by its president Rodolfo Nogueira of Brazil’s Liberal Party, affiliated with former president Jair Bolsonaro].

As you can see, there must be political nuances behind this case. I know little about the background and political context of CADE's decision (it is reported that the agreement was very public, and both the government and the market had long been aware of it).

Not only from a competition law perspective but also from organizational and political perspectives, I am genuinely looking forward to seeing how this case develops.

Rebecca Whalley, 'CADE launches novel probe into Amazon rainforest sustainability agreement' GCR (Aug 20, 2025) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/cade-launches-novel-probe-amazon-rainforest-sustainability-agreement

Might be of interest to the KFTC 공정거래위원회 and JFTC 公正取引委員会?

Brazil’s antitrust watchdog has launched its first cartel probe into a sustainability agreement aimed at discouraging soybean exporters from using deforested land in the Amazon – a move which local lawyers say has a “clear political angle”.

26/08/2025

Reportedly, Elon Musk (specifically, X and xAI) has sued Apple and OpenAI over their allegedly exclusive arrangement to integrate ChatGPT into Apple products. It's filed in Texas. It's interesting.

Natalie Sherman, 'Musk firms sue Apple and OpenAI, alleging they hurt competition' BBC (Aug 26, 2025) https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly6xjg9nnyo

From a purely antitrust perspective, in my think, Musk’s key concern appears to be the potential loss of Gro’s access to users—particularly iPhone users in the United States.

Well, his concern at first glance sounds understandable. If ChatGPT were the only GenAI chatbot available on Apple devices (highly sceptical, as a Gemini, Perflexity, and Genspark user-I'm an iPhone user), if users are effectively locked into Apple’s ecosystem (plausible), and if handsets are an essential gateway for AI chatbot developers to reach GenAI service users (questionable), such an 'exclusive' arrangement between two large players could raise competition concerns.

The BBC reports that “OpenAI controls roughly 80% of the generative AI chatbot market in the US, according to the lawsuit, while Apple claims about 65% of the smartphone market.” That said, it remains to be seen whether a court will accept those market definitions and find that such positions really exist and are durable.

There's a side argument that Apple favoured OpenAI in its app store rankings. It may be supposed to complement the main argument, but... it appears very groundless.

Anyways. I've only read one report. So, don't know exactly. And, given the many analytical steps and legal hurdles required for Musk to overcome, it doesn't seem that the arrangement would be found to violate U.S. antitrust law. Still, it will be interesting to see how the case develops, backed by X’s substantial resources. Also, it's always very welcome to see antitrust get more visibility in the media :-)

The lawsuit takes aim at Apple's decision to integrate ChatGPT into the operating systems of its smartphones.

17/08/2025

🇦🇺 Good news from Australia. In Epic Games v. Google and Apple, the plaintiff won the two private suits. This follows the recent win of Epic against Google before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which fully upheld the previous 2023 jury verdict.*

* Here's a detailed summary of the US Google case, made by Perflexity: "Google Loses Epic Games Appeal: Major Victory Opens Android to Competition" https://www.perplexity.ai/page/google-loses-epic-games-appeal-DM3WOlfHSFe9CxD7AR2dHQ

Justice Jonathan Beach of the Federal Court of Australia (not the highest court) ruled on 12 August 2025 that Apple and Google (in separate proceedings-as far as I understnad) misused a substantial degree of market power (a misuse-of-market-power finding under s 46 CCA) in the iOS app distribution and in-app payment processing markets (for Apple), and the Android app distribution, Android in-app payment solutions, and mobile OS licensing markets (for Google), thereby substantially lessening competition. According to Anna Moskal's LinkedIn post, in Google, the firm was accused of engaging in the following practices, specifically: "Google Play billing restrictions and anti-steering provisions, as well as “Project Hug” and related manufacturer incentive programs, which likely lessened competition in Android app distribution."

* See also, Ann Moskal's LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/anna-moskal-digital-platforms_google-apple-epic-activity-7360954709509066752-jtyk
And, Charles McConnell, 'Epic defeats Apple and Google as ACCC pushes for stronger digital platform rules' GCR (Aug 12, 2025) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/epic-defeats-apple-and-google-accc-pushes-stronger-digital-platform-rules

Meanwhile, reportedly, some claims failed: in Apple’s case, the Court rejected Epic’s claims under s 45 (anti-competitive arrangements), s 47 (exclusive dealing), and the unconscionable-conduct claim, under s 21, Australian Consumer Act. (For this part, I've only relied on the above GCR report and AI search results).

In my understanding, other related class actions, launched in June 2022, were also judged in favor of the plaintiffs.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ACCC previously sought leave to appear as amicus in Epic’s 2021 appeal on a procedural stay; I have not seen public confirmation that it filed an amicus brief in the 2025 merits hearing (although it seems so, according to the GCR article on May 12, 2021).

* See, ACCC, 'ACCC seeks leave to appear in Epic v Apple appeal' (Press release 10 May 2021) https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-seeks-leave-to-appear-in-epic-v-apple-appeal; Charles McConnell, 'ACCC allowed to join Epic/Apple battle' GCR (May 12, 2021) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/accc-allowed-join-epicapple-battle

Then, one might question why the jurisdiction needs an ex-ante regulation? I have no clear sense of how effective Australia’s public enforcement system is. Still, enforcers continue to strongly support the need for stricter regulation, even after this win. Reportedly, an ACCC spokesperson stated that [it remains convinced that targeted ex ante rules are needed to address the types of issues central to the dispute, given the time and cost of private litigation.]

As for the regulation initiative: Charles McConnell, 'Australia’s proposed digital competition regime needs clarification on thresholds, experts say' GCR (Dec 3, 2024) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/australias-proposed-digital-competition-regime-needs-clarification-thresholds-experts-say

Link to this post:
https://www.facebook.com/competlaw/posts/pfbid02ViJajVx1hRUCKj623A2x9ZLVGAScwn8oxQ4i9ZBXe3JvQxc8wBt2hsHsWtkbXec9l

Epic Games has won a landmark abuse of dominance case against Apple and Google, prompting Australia’s antitrust watchdog to warn that court proceedings alone are too slow and costly to address entrenched market power in the digital economy.

13/08/2025

Kudos to the KFTC Korea Fair Trade Commission 공정거래위원회! Glad to see they haven’t forgotten that they have a very effective tool at their disposal: the abuse of superior bargaining position (ASBP) provision.

On 12 August 2025, the agency announced that it had sanctioned two major online accommodation booking platforms, Yanolja and Yeogiotte (여기어때), with fines of KRW 540 million (circa EUR 367,000) and KRW 1 billion (circa EUR 680,000), respectively, along with cease-and-desist orders, for abusing their superior bargaining position over motel operators. for abusing their superior bargaining position over motel operators.

Put simply, the platforms were accused of unilaterally expiring unused discount coupons without refunding their value to the operators. According to the KFTC, the funds for these coupons had already been paid by the small lodging operators to the platforms and, if unused by consumers, should have been refunded to the hotels.

Setting aside contractual specifics, the beauty of this enforcement is that dominance—in the Article 102 TFEU sense—did not need to be established. Intuitively, these two platforms are the obvious go-to choices for consumers booking motels, and given the competitive bottlenecks in this market, their relative dominance over small motel operators is self-evident.

That said, it is far from obvious that either holds an absolute dominant position, given their rivalry with each other and the presence of other local and global, active and potential competitors. Without the ASBP provision, establishing such dominance could have been bogged down in counterarguments over horizontal competition and market definition.

I cannot say with certainty whether the abuse finding itself was sound without knowing the full contractual context. But at least when it comes to sanctioning exploitative conduct by powerful platforms, the ASBP is clearly a highly effective tool—regardless of debates over consumer welfare or the protection of rival firms.

I hope the KFTC keeps focusing on leveraging the strengths of the 'enforcement' instruments it already has and elaborating its standards, rather than mirroring regulatory models from other jurisdictions.

Press release: https://www.ftc.go.kr/www/selectBbsNttView.do?pageUnit=10&pageIndex=1&searchCnd=all&key=12&bordCd=3&searchCtgry=01,02&nttSn=46328 (official) orhttps://repokr.github.io/doc/press20250812_OTAs_ASBP.pdf (when the former doesn't work)

MLex, for subscribers: https://www.mlex.com/mlex/antitrust/articles/2375937/south-korea-s-yanolja-yeogieottae-fined-for-abuse-of-superior-bargaining-position

South Korea’s online lodging platforms, Yanolja and YeogiEottae, have been hit with a combined 1.5 billion won (about $1.1 million) fine for abusing their superior bargaining position over small and mid-sized motel operators by voiding unused discount coupons without compensation, the country’s ...