31/05/2025
Dunkirk: May – June 1940: 85th Anniversary Operation Dynamo
Only 10% of the German Army is mechanised. Click Rare film footage.
Bruce Jobson made this post five years ago and dispels some of the myths about Dunkirk and the Battle of France. A story of incompetence - lack of planning - out thought and out flanked.
Invading German forces given Pervitin - a crystal-meth drug to produce feeling of "invincibility" - the crystal-meth drug kept troops awake day and night.
Pervitin-fuelled German army advances 12 straight days without rest covering 22 miles per-day under-fire - previously thought impossible.
• Blitzkrieg: Hi**er occupies France; Belgium, Luxembourg and
Netherlands
• 400,000 British; French and Belgian troops encircled at Dunkirk
Allies have 45% more artillery guns.
1.9 million soldiers captured in Battle of France
• 90% of the German Army is horse-drawn
• Only 10% of the German Army is mechanised
45% of German army average age is 40 years old
The Battle of France and Battle of Dunkirk: Bruce Jobson reports.
Click the video link at the end: horse-drawn German Divisions and captured French and Colonial troops.
On 10th May 1940, Hi**er launched a military offensive to occupy the Low Countries and France. Within 11 days, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) Belgian Army and three French Field Armies (1st; 7th & 9th) were encircled and pushed back to the sea. Hi**er had achieved in 11 days, what could not be achieved in four years of the First World War (1914 – 1918) On 14th June, Paris was declared an “open city” to German forces and within six weeks, France had capitulated (46 days)
We’ve all seen the movies. The German military might with Panzer Divisions smashing across Europe but the truth about the Battle of France and resulting Battle of Dunkirk is somewhat different. We’ve all been brought-up on the familiar events described by Winston Churchill as “The Miracle of Dunkirk.” It’s what happened before Dunkirk that has been ignored – and no doubt for good reason. The history of war is written by the victors and Dunkirk and the Battle of France is the classic case of turning a “monumental defeat” into a victory.
However, these written events may make some people feel uncomfortable. Including those who lost family; any survivors and even those raised in a post WW Two era. But to view military history, requires ignoring the abhorrence of the political N**i regime - undoubtedly the most “evil” regime the world has ever known and focus on events on the battlefield. But we should learn from history.
In a very dangerous 21st century, some may consider the extended Europe suffering similar consequences and several European countries should now not ignore potential threats. But back to 1940 …and let’s look at a few “myths.”
Myth One: The all-conquering German Army is unstoppable. Huge Panzers force back the allies. Mechanised German infantry divisions are also mobilised along the autobahn and sweep their way to victory. If only.
In 1940, 90% of the German Army relied on horse-drawn wagons to move its artillery; infantry, supplies and stores. Only 10% of the German Army was mechanised. The Panzer divisions consisted of Panzer 1s and Panzer 2s, which were light armoured tanks in many cases used for reconnaissance purposes. Versions of the more capable Panzer 3s, only became available at the start of 1940 and a limited few hundred were used in 10th May offensive. The French Army had more tanks, and “better” tanks with some 3,254 compared to 2,439 German tanks. The BEF also left behind 445 tanks at Dunkirk. The BEF left behind 2,477 guns.
The BEF was the most mechanised in Europe – possibly in the world - at that time. Britain starting mechanisation in 1928 and France had a dual policy of mechanised and horse-drawn forces. The German Army use of horses was the largest amount ever used in the history of military conflict – the most horses the world has ever known (But we don’t see that in the WW 2 movies)
N**i propaganda films rarely showed horse-drawn units and preferred to film mechanised transport and Panzer units to portray the perception of invincibility. Studying rare old film footage demonstrates German dead horses following the Normandy landings (allied footage) and French Resistance footage shows German horse-drawn wagons vacating Paris in August 1944.
In 1939, the German Army had 514,000 horses and the average amount rose to 1.1 million horses during the war, using 2.75 million horses in total. Throughout WW Two the ratio of horse-drawn to mechanised divisions (Panzer and mechanised) remained the same being between 15% - 20% maximum. In 1943, the ratio was 322 divisions of which only 52 were mechanised and in late 1944, 264 divisions with only 42 mechanised. The German Army alone lost 179,000 horses in December 1940 and January 1941, part of Operation Barbarossa, Hi**er’s failed attack on Russia.
The German Infantry divisions effectively marched on foot supported by horse-drawn wagons carrying weapons and supplies. A rifle company’s transport consisted of three horse-drawn wagons loaded-up with their packs. This involved thousands of horses and thousands of men looking after the horses; feeding, grooming, shoeing and refitting the horse teams. A six-horse field gun team required six men spending at least one hour per-day in attendance duties. The cost of feeding the working horses was expensive requiring 12 pounds of grain per-day that had to be transported on the wagons.
The horse-drawn wagons travelling distance was slow, complex and arduous at approximately 20 miles per day (30 kilometres) Horse welfare deteriorated after 10 days of modest work (200 miles) that required refits and recuperation could take months; replacement horses also needed to settle into the system and work with new handlers.
Front-line horse refits took up to 8 –10 days and all this hard work slowed down military operations. Hi**er’s problem was he did not have oil and gasoline to support his military objectives and even produced synthetic oil by expensively turning six tonnes of coal to produce one tonne of oil.
Myth Two: Hi**er’s outrageously brilliant Blitzkrieg plan. If only.
First, it wasn’t Hi**er’s plan – but the N**i leader was never short of claiming great military accomplishments. After the Fall of France; Hi**er declared himself “the greatest military leader” the world had ever known.
Following the Declaration of War by Britain and France in September 1939, the German military planners started work in October, during the “phoney war” period. General Erich Von Manstein was the architect of the plan and over weeks and months, was amended and had further input from General von Rundstedt and Colonel-General Halder.
However, the plan is known as the “Manstein plan” and finally, after months of wrangling, Hi**er approved the plan in February 1940 and later declared Manstein was the “only person who understood him” and thereby aiming to take all the credit. But German military strategists were not all in favour of the Manstein plan stating Hi**er had a “weak” understanding of the German Army position and the army being poorly prepared to invade the Low Countries and France. This being the case after invading Poland.
In fact, 50% of German Divisions were not combat ready and were inferior equipped than the British and French armies. The allies had 45% more artillery guns than the German Army. Rather than being an army of young fit “supermen” as portrayed in movies and news reels; in 1940, 45% of the German Army was over 40-years-old. And Pervitin-fuelled.
Myth Three: No one thought Hi**er would attack France through the Ardennes in 1940. If only.
During French military “war games” in 1937 and 1938, French military strategists advocated Germany could invade through the Ardennes. French Commander-in-Chief Maurice Gamelin dismissed the warnings despite strategists stating it was “idiocy” to think the German Army could not pe*****te the Ardennes and occupy the Low Countries and France.
On 30th April 1940, French military attaches warned a German attack was due to occur and would probably happen between 8th – 10th May. Hi**er attacked on 10th May.
In the winter of 1939 – 1940, Belgian sources in Cologne anticipated German forces would attack through the Ardennes and would thrust forward and encircled the Belgian, British and French field armies in Belgium and north-east France. Swiss intelligence detected six Panzer Divisions on the German-border with Belgium and Luxembourg and informed French Intelligence Commanders.
Further intelligence by French sources as well as, of all places, sources at The Vatican, informed Gamelin and the French Command that a German military column had taken up position on the Luxembourg border stretching back 62 miles (100 kilometres) into Germany.
Gamelin and the French High Command were still living and preparing for a war based upon World War One tactics and strategy. The huge Maginot line – stretching from the Swiss border - was a wall of concrete bunkers and gun emplacements extending along the border with Germany and was supposed to prevent an attack, and thereby not resulting in another war on French territory, avoiding a similar situation to WW One.
The Ardennes warnings were ignored by Gamelin and resulted in thousands of brave French soldiers being killed or captured and the resulting occupation of France. Worst of all, Gamelin and the French Command did not have field telephones and had no idea of what was occurring in the fast-moving blitzkrieg attack. Gamelin remained locked-up in his Chateau HQ without communications and refused or take any military counter decisions. One out of three French troops suffer “shell-shock” as a result of devastating bombardments.
The German offensive swept through France and the Low Countries within a matter of days. On 17th May, Churchill was alarmed to discover that Gamelin had committed all his forces forward and had not any Reserve Divisions in place to counter the Ardennes offensive. Gamelin was replaced on 17th May by Maxime Weygand. The French therefore had no forces between the German Armies and the sea.
The BEF, French and Belgian armies to the north-east were pushed back and encircled at Dunkirk. Churchill described the events as a “colossal military disaster” whilst Hi**er described the Fall of France as the “greatest military achievement of all-time” – possibly with justification.
Myth Four: Hi**er hesitates for three days. If only.
History informs that Hi**er “hesitated” and stopped the Panzer advance on 23rd May for three days. The halt was the suggestion of General Field Marshall von Kluge and since then history and historians have repeated the “hesitated” claim. General von Rundstedt had ordered the Panzers to halt due to logistical concerns. The problem with this Blitzkrieg attack was the mechanised divisions had swept through the Netherlands and Belgium and were so far in advance of the supporting artillery; infantry and supplies.
As previously stated, 90% of the German Army was equipped with horse-drawn wagons and was way behind the mechanised Blitzkrieg advance. The German Army was also vulnerable on its flanks and did not have supply to its forward troops. German tank losses, such as the lightweight Panzer 1 and Panzer 2s in some units was up to 50% and the soft marshy ground was not suitable for tank advancement.
It’s easy to state post war, the “halt order” was a massive mistake by Hi**er. But there were sound reasons for the three-day halt to allow resupply – and some units did not mobilise for another 16 hours. Furthermore, Hi**er’s foot- troops were physically exhausted from the day and night advancement due to Pervitin and at the point of physical and mental collapse.
In the Desert War, Rommel encountered the same problem with his Blitzkrieg attacks and his advanced units being so far ahead of the artillery, infantry and supplies. On numerous occasions, the British counter attacked and cut-off Rommel’s supply lines. Likewise, the same happened to the British 8th Army (Desert Rats) and this was one of the negative effects of a lightning Blitzkrieg attack. Air Marshall Goering stated the Luftwaffe, with its air superiority, that had effectively wrecked carnage on the allied forces, would finish-off the British, French and Belgian armies in the retreat to Dunkirk.
Myth Five: Operation Dynamo saved the BEF and French armies. If only.
By a miracle and some incredible bravery by the RAF, Royal Navy and 933 ships, many of the boats described as “the little ships” and manned by civilians, resulted in 338,000 weary allied troops being evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk. Dunkirk was also fortuitous for the allied evacuation being the longest sand beach in Europe.
Of the 933 ships – 697 returned to English ports. The BEF lost nearly all its equipment of 2,477 guns; 68,000 vehicles, 455 tanks, 20,000 motor-cycles, 76,000 tons of ammunition and 416,000 tons of stores. Many of these machines were recycled by the German Army.
The RAF flew 3,500 sorties (derived from the French word “sortie” meaning “exit”) in order to keep the Luftwaffe as far away as possible from Dunkirk albeit, not always successful. The RAF lost 145 planes including 42 Spitfires and the Luftwaffe lost 156 planes.
The BEF lost 68,000 troops, wounded, missing or captured (3,500 killed and 13,000 wounded) As for the Battle of France itself, this resulted in allied losses of 360,000 dead or wounded and 1,900,000 captured. Operation Dynamo ensured Britain had the remnants of an army and founded the “Dunkirk spirit” that brought out the best of the nation in times of adversity.
This “backs -to-the-wall” spirit remains in the national consciousness today.
It’s not possible to include every detail in a short piece on Dunkirk and the Battle of France. Hopefully, this version will inform more fully on the events of May and June 1940.
Click the link:
CriticalPast is an archive of historic footage. The vintage footage in this video has been uploaded for research purposes, and is presented in unedited form....