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The People's Brief, Lusaka (2026)

28/05/2026

🇿🇲 EDITOR'S NOTE | M’membe Knows Economics, But Politics Still Escapes Him

When Fred M’membe unveiled Dolika Banda as his running mate weeks ago, the expectation in some political circles was that Zambia was finally witnessing the emergence of a serious ideological alternative to both the ruling UPND and the collapsing remnants of the Patriotic Front.

On paper, the formula appeared intellectually powerful.

M’membe is not politically lightweight in terms of credentials. He is a lawyer, veteran journalist, newspaper founder, and now an economist after obtaining a PhD in economics from the University of Zambia. Few opposition figures in Zambia possess that level of academic and intellectual authority. Dolika Banda brought technocratic credibility, financial governance experience, and corporate depth.

But politically, the project still feels stagnant.

And the reason is becoming clearer with every passing week.

M’membe has mastered criticism. He has not mastered political conversion.

Almost daily, the Socialist Party leader appears on Facebook attacking government slogans, mocking ruling party messaging, or dissecting economic failures. Recently, his attention turned toward the UPND’s “Salt Sana” slogan. Before that, it was debt, governance, inflation, and corruption. The criticism is often sharp, detailed, and intellectually structured.

But politics is not a university seminar.

Elections are not won by sounding more informed than your opponent. They are won by building emotional trust, organisational machinery, territorial pe*******on, and national momentum. That is where M’membe continues struggling despite his intellectual advantages.

His politics often sounds academically superior but emotionally disconnected.

Many ordinary voters do not experience him as hopeful. They experience him as permanently angry. The tone frequently carries ideological rigidity, intellectual impatience, and bitterness toward opponents rather than persuasion toward undecided citizens. In political communication, that distinction matters enormously.

People rarely vote for the person who sounds most intelligent in the room. They vote for the person who makes them feel politically safe, emotionally understood, and materially hopeful.

That gap explains why M’membe’s influence online and in intellectual spaces has never translated into electoral traction on the ground.

The Socialist Party remains visible in discourse but weak in structure. It has no dominant regional anchor. No major parliamentary machinery. No visible nationwide mobilisation network capable of competing constituency by constituency against either UPND or the broader PF ecosystem regrouping under alliances like Tonse.

And this is where the contradiction becomes sharper.

Following the collapse of PF credibility after 2021, many expected M’membe to emerge as the natural ideological opposition alternative. He had the intellectual profile. He had the anti-establishment credentials. He had media experience. He had economic vocabulary. In theory, he should have been the figure capable of converting national frustration into a disciplined reform movement.

That never happened.

Instead, PF-aligned political energy continues dominating opposition space despite the PF itself being rejected by voters in 2021. Even now, much of the opposition momentum sits around personalities linked to the same political culture Zambians voted out. That alone reflects M’membe’s biggest political failure: he has not succeeded in replacing PF emotionally within opposition politics.

And part of the reason is strategic.

M’membe speaks like a critic of the system, not like a future manager of the state.

There is a difference.

A successful presidential candidate must eventually transition from exposing problems to reassuring the nation that they can govern institutions, manage complexity, build coalitions, and maintain stability. M’membe often remains trapped in permanent confrontation mode. Every issue becomes evidence of collapse. Every government action becomes proof of failure. Every ruling party message becomes something to ridicule.

Over time, that style exhausts rather than expands political support.

Then there is the ideological problem.

Zambia is not naturally a deeply ideological voting country. Elections here are organised more through regional structures, personality trust, grassroots mobilisation, and economic sentiment than through doctrinal political theory. M’membe’s Marxist-Leninist orientation may excite sections of students and intellectuals, but it struggles to translate into broad national movement politics across rural and mixed constituencies.

This is why his campaigns consistently generate conversation without generating sufficient votes.

Even his strongest supporters often engage him intellectually rather than organisationally. They debate him online. They quote him. They admire his intellect. But admiration is not machinery. Retweets are not polling agents. Facebook engagement is not constituency pe*******on.

And while M’membe continues positioning himself as Zambia’s most intellectually prepared opposition figure, the political question voters increasingly ask is much simpler: if he understands the country so deeply, why has he failed repeatedly to build a movement capable of converting that understanding into power?

This question matters because Zambia’s political moment remains open.

UPND still faces genuine public frustrations around the cost of living, electricity, unemployment, and economic pressure. PF remains structurally wounded and morally burdened by its own record in government. This should have been fertile ground for a disciplined third-force alternative rooted in governance reform and intellectual credibility.

Instead, M’membe remains influential in debate but marginal in electoral mathematics. And in politics, ideas without machinery rarely reach State House.

— The People’s Brief welcomes reader responses, analysis, and opinion submissions. Write to us: [email protected]

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© The People's Brief | Editor

27/05/2026

🇿🇲 READER OPINION | Mundubile's Justice System

Yesterday, The People’s Brief carried remarks by Presidentiàl candidate Brian Mundubile following what he described as a failed attempt to visit jailed PF official Raphael Nakachinda at a correctional facility. In the statement, Mundubile lamented delays in accessing his client before delivering a political message that has since stirred debate across the country.

“The freedom that you are looking for, the freedom for Nakachinda, for Lusambo, for Malanji, for Bowman and everybody else who is behind bars, will only come when government changes,” he declared.

That statement may have excited sections of the opposition base. Politically, it was probably intended to reinforce a narrative that former PF officials are victims of state persecution. But legally and democratically, it opens a far more dangerous conversation that Zambia must approach with caution.

The statement indirectly suggests that freedom does not lie in the courts, evidence, appeals, or constitutional safeguards, but in political victory. This is where the problem begins. Once politicians start presenting elections as the pathway to freedom from criminal proceedings, the line between justice and political power starts collapsing. It creates the impression that court outcomes are tied to who controls State House rather than what the law says.

Ironically, this is the exact concern many Zambians had during the Patriotic Front era. The PF government was repeatedly accused by critics, civil society organisations, and opposition leaders of using state institutions against rivals. Today, for senior figures linked to that same political establishment to openly frame justice as something dependent on regime change raises uncomfortable contradictions.

There is nothing wrong with demanding fair treatment for accused persons. Every citizen, regardless of political affiliation, deserves access to legal counsel, a fair trial, and protection from abuse of process. If prison officials indeed blocked access to a lawyer without lawful justification, that deserves scrutiny. But the proper constitutional response is legal challenge, not political messaging that portrays elections as the only route to liberty.

Courts are not supposed to function like revolving doors that open or close depending on which party wins power. A healthy democracy depends on maintaining public confidence in judicial independence, even when outcomes are unpopular. The moment citizens begin believing that convictions are temporary political inconveniences waiting to be reversed by elections, respect for the justice system begins to erode.

There is also a wider political risk in the message being communicated. To some voters, such statements may sound less like a defence of justice and more like an assurance that political allies facing corruption or abuse-related charges will be protected under a future administration. That perception becomes particularly sensitive in a country where anti-corruption messaging played a central role in the 2021 transfer of power.

Zambia’s democracy cannot afford a future where every election becomes a struggle over who controls prosecutions, prisons, and acquittals. The country must move beyond politics where institutions appear tied to personalities and ruling parties. Otherwise, each change of government simply becomes another cycle of retaliation and protection.

If opposition leaders genuinely believe certain prosecutions are flawed, then the strongest response is to defeat those cases in court through evidence and law. That is how constitutional democracies mature. Freedom secured through legal principle strengthens institutions. Freedom framed as a reward for political change weakens them.

By Rodney Mwila

Rodney Mwila is a law student and governance commentator with interest in constitutional law, democracy, and public accountability.

— The People’s Brief welcomes reader opinion pieces, analysis, and responses from across Zambia and the diaspora.

To submit your article or commentary, write to: [email protected]

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© The People's Brief

27/05/2026

🇿🇲 EDITORIAL | Hichilema vs PF: Zambia’s Familiar Choice Returns

As 2026 election campaign begins taking shape, one reality is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore: this race is slowly consolidating into a contest between President Hakainde Hichilema and the political ecosystem of the former Patriotic Front now regrouping around Brian Mundubile and the Tonse Alliance.

And the more the campaign unfolds, the clearer the picture becomes.

The language, the mobilisation style, the faces surrounding the campaign, the grievances being amplified, and even the promises being made all point in one direction: this is PF politics attempting to return through another political doorway.

This observation is not emotional. It is structural.

Mundubile’s campaign has increasingly positioned itself around the unfinished emotional legacy of former President Edgar Lungu, promises to release jailed PF figures once government changes, and renewed appeals to political bases that once thrived during the PF years. The message is becoming unmistakable. This is not a fundamentally new political movement offering a different national philosophy. It is a reassembly of a former governing structure that Zambians decisively rejected in 2021.

And history matters in politics.

The PF years were not ordinary years in Zambia’s democratic journey. They were years marked by aggressive borrowing, shrinking fiscal discipline, cadre violence, weakening investor confidence, and eventually sovereign default. Zambia became Africa’s first Covid-era Eurobond defaulter under PF leadership. The kwacha depreciated heavily. Public debt spiralled. Political intimidation became increasingly normalised in sections of national life. By the time Zambians voted in 2021, the country was economically exhausted and politically tense.

It is therefore politically revealing that many of the loudest voices in today’s opposition were central actors within that same system.

Now, four years later, the campaign rhetoric emerging from the Mundubile camp raises equally serious questions. One moment the campaign promises freedom for jailed PF “bigwigs” through regime change. Another moment comes the promise to hand Black Mountain back to youths on the Copperbelt, reviving one of the most controversial symbols of informal mining patronage and cadre influence from the PF era.

This is not accidental messaging.

Black Mountain is not merely a mining issue. It became a political culture. It represented a period where informal structures, political patronage, and cadre mobilisation increasingly blurred the boundaries between empowerment and disorder. Many Zambians remember that period clearly. They remember the violence. They remember the lawlessness. They remember how quickly political muscle began overpowering institutions.

And now, as campaigns intensify, many of the same cadres who once terrorised markets, bus stations, and public spaces are visibly re-emerging around opposition mobilisation structures. The difference today is that they no longer control State authority. This reality alone has significantly restrained the atmosphere.

However, this does not mean the current government is flawless. It is not.

Load shedding damaged businesses and households. The cost of living remains high. Fuel prices continue frustrating citizens. Fertiliser costs remain contentious. Many young people still feel economically excluded despite broader macroeconomic improvements. These are real governance pressures, and the ruling party must account for them honestly.

But leadership must also be judged fairly against measurable outcomes.

Before entering office, the UPND promised to recruit 30,000 teachers. More than 40,000 were recruited. Thousands of health workers followed. Free education was introduced nationally and later anchored into law. Meal allowances for students were restored after being removed under PF. Debt restructuring, once dismissed by critics as impossible, was successfully negotiated. Foreign reserves improved significantly. Inflation moderated from earlier peaks. Mining investment returned. Constituency Development Fund allocations increased dramatically, pushing unprecedented resources into local communities.

No administration in Zambia’s democratic history has decentralised development financing at the scale currently being witnessed through CDF.

These are not slogans. They are measurable state actions.

And this is where the opposition’s current challenge becomes increasingly visible. Beyond criticism, what exactly is the alternative governing philosophy being offered?

So far, many of Mundubile’s proposals mirror policies already being implemented: mining-led industrialisation, tourism expansion, agro-processing, digital economy participation, and youth empowerment. The speeches are emotionally louder than the policy distinctions underneath them.

At The People’s Brief, we believe governments must always be scrutinised aggressively. Power must never become comfortable. Democracies require strong opposition voices, institutional accountability, and critical journalism. But patriotism also requires honesty.

And honestly speaking, based on the current field of contenders, we do not yet see a compelling national case for changing government in August. Not because Zambia has no problems. It does. Not because citizens are fully satisfied. They are not.

But because leadership transitions must be anchored on a credible alternative stronger than the system being replaced. Elections cannot become exercises in political nostalgia, emotional grievance, party score settling or recycled power structures seeking re-entry without demonstrating meaningful ideological or governance transformation.

At this moment, President Hichilema still appears, by performance, stability, and institutional direction, to be the strongest available option among those seeking the presidency.

Yes, this may change if the opposition presents a sharper national vision, a coherent economic alternative, and leadership visibly detached from the failures of the PF era.

But for now, Zambia’s political map increasingly resembles a familiar choice: imperfect continuity versus uncertain regression.

And many Zambians still remember too clearly what regression looked like.

— The People’s Brief welcomes reader responses, analysis, and opinion submissions. Write to us: [email protected]

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© The People's Brief | Editor-in-Chief

26/05/2026

🇿🇲 BRIEFING | ECZ Detects 10 Forged Grade 12 Certificates Ahead of 2026 Elections

The Examinations Council of Zambia has detected 10 forged Grade 12 certificates during the qualification verification process for aspiring candidates ahead of the 2026 General Elections.

Speaking during a media briefing, ECZ Executive Director Michael Chilala said the discovery remains concerning despite representing a sharp reduction from the hundreds of fake certificates uncovered during the 2016 election cycle.

Dr. Chilala warned that some aspiring leaders continue presenting fraudulent academic qualifications even though the Council possesses verification systems and historical records capable of detecting forged documents dating back to the 1960s.

The verification exercise was conducted in line with constitutional requirements which state that anyone seeking election as President, Member of Parliament, Mayor, or Councillor must possess, at minimum, a Grade 12 certificate or its equivalent.

The Council has since referred the suspected forgery cases to law enforcement agencies for further investigations.

Meanwhile, the verification process resulted in the issuance of 10,731 qualification confirmation letters, with 10,020 applications processed online and 711 handled physically.

The development once again places academic qualifications at the centre of Zambia’s electoral integrity debate, where nomination requirements continue serving not only as legal thresholds, but also as tests of credibility for those seeking public office.

© The People's Brief | Francine Lilu

26/05/2026

🇿🇲 BRIEFING | Mundubile Promises Freedom to Jailed PF Bigwigs After Govt Change

Brian Mundubile has escalated opposition criticism against the United Party for National Development government, declaring that jailed opposition figures such as Raphael Nakachinda, Bowman Lusambo, and others will only regain their freedom through a change of government.

Speaking Monday after what he described as a failed attempt to visit Nakachinda at a correctional facility, Mundubile said he and his legal team were allegedly denied access to their client despite waiting for more than an hour.

The opposition leader, who is also a practising lawyer, accused authorities of frustrating legal access to detained opposition figures, arguing that access to legal counsel is a constitutional right that should not depend on political considerations.

“It’s very, very sad indeed. We have been here for the past hour and a half and we have been giving one excuse after another,” Mundubile said, claiming officers at the facility insisted on obtaining clearance from senior authorities before allowing the meeting.

But it was his political conclusion that carried the sharpest implications.

“The freedom that you are looking for, the freedom for Nakachinda, for Lusambo, for Malanji, for Bowman and everybody else who is behind bars, will only come when government changes,” he stated.

The remarks reflect a growing opposition narrative that increasingly frames ongoing arrests, prosecutions, and incarcerations of former PF-linked figures as politically connected rather than purely legal processes.

Opposition leaders argue that the criminal justice system is being weaponised against rivals of the ruling party, while government maintains that law enforcement institutions are merely enforcing accountability regardless of political affiliation.

The issue remains politically sensitive because many of the individuals currently facing legal troubles are prominent figures from the former Patriotic Front administration, a government that itself faced criticism during its time in power over alleged political intolerance, abuse of state institutions, and shrinking democratic space.

That historical context continues to complicate the current debate.

For the opposition, the detentions are increasingly being used to reinforce broader claims about governance and democratic freedoms ahead of the August elections.

For the ruling party, however, backing away from high-profile prosecutions risks undermining its long-standing anti-corruption and accountability messaging that formed a major part of its rise to power in 2021.

The result is a political environment where courtrooms, correctional facilities, and legal processes are becoming deeply intertwined with campaign narratives as Zambia moves closer to one of its most polarised elections in recent years.

© The People's Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu

26/05/2026

🇿🇲 VIEWPOINT | Mundubile Criticizes an Economy Without Offering Alternative

When Brian Mundubile appeared on EMV — Emmanuel Mwamba Verified — on Sunday night, he attempted to reduce Zambia’s economic debate to one issue: electricity. “On what basis has the economy grown? This country has had no power for three years,” he said, dismissing government claims of recovery under the United Party for National Development administration. It was a strong political line. But it was also politically selective, historically incomplete, and economically weak.

Because neither Mundubile nor the programme host, Emmanuel Mwamba, are detached observers. Both are products of the Patriotic Front era, the same administration that presided over Zambia’s debt collapse, weakening fiscal space, shrinking reserves, and eventual sovereign default. Zambia became Africa’s first Covid-era Eurobond defaulter under PF rule, not under UPND. The current economic strain did not emerge in isolation. It emerged from policy decisions made over many years.

This does not excuse the failures of the current administration. Load shedding became severe and prolonged. The cost of living remains high. Fuel prices remain politically painful. Fertiliser prices remain a major frustration for farmers. These are legitimate areas of criticism, and government must account for them honestly. But criticism also requires balance. If opposition leaders want voters to trust them again, they must equally account for what they left behind and what the current government has actually achieved.

And that is where the conversation becomes more complicated than political slogans.

Before entering office, UPND promised to recruit 30,000 teachers. It recruited more than 40,000. It promised to recruit health workers and proceeded to employ thousands across the country. It promised free education and not only implemented it, but turned it into law. It promised to reinstate student meal allowances that had been removed under PF, and restored them. It promised debt restructuring at a time many critics insisted it was impossible, and eventually concluded one of the most closely watched restructuring processes on the continent.

The government also promised to expand the Constituency Development Fund from K1.6 million. Today, CDF allocations have risen dramatically, transforming local authorities into serious centres of community-level development financing. Clinics, schools, desks, bursaries, skills programmes, and local projects are increasingly being funded through structures that barely functioned at scale before. One may criticise implementation inefficiencies, but the scale of decentralised funding expansion is historically significant.

The UPND further promised to revive sections of the mining sector and restore investor confidence. Major mining assets that had stalled are now operational again. Foreign reserves have strengthened considerably compared to 2021 levels. Inflation, though still painful for ordinary citizens, has moderated from earlier highs. The kwacha stabilised after years of extreme volatility. Zambia also recorded successive bumper harvests after years of severe agricultural stress. These are measurable outcomes, not campaign slogans.

Even on the politically explosive issue of cadre violence, there has been a noticeable reduction compared to the PF years when lawlessness around markets, bus stations, and public spaces became normalised in parts of the country. The difference is visible enough that even critics of government rarely argue that the current atmosphere resembles the peak of PF-era political disorder.

This does not mean government has succeeded everywhere. It has not.

The promise to lower fuel prices remains largely unmet. Fertiliser prices remain contentious. The energy crisis exposed serious vulnerabilities in national planning. Many citizens still feel economic recovery more in speeches than in their pockets. These frustrations are real and politically dangerous for the ruling party. Governments are ultimately judged not by macroeconomic reports, but by lived experience.

But this is precisely where Mundubile’s argument weakens further. Beyond criticising load shedding and economic hardship, he is not offering a materially different economic framework from what already exists. Mining-led industrialisation, tourism growth, agro-processing, digital economy participation, and formalisation of small-scale miners are already embedded within Zambia’s current policy direction. He speaks of what should be done without explaining what specifically would change under his leadership.

Where is the alternative fiscal model? Where is the energy diversification roadmap? How would his government borrow differently? What expenditure would be cut? What taxes would change? How would these programmes be financed without pushing Zambia back toward unsustainable debt accumulation?

Those questions matter because Zambia is no longer in a period where rhetoric alone is enough. Citizens have lived through economic collapse before. They remember the debt crisis. They remember the default. They remember the weakening kwacha and the instability of the PF years. And increasingly, voters are asking opposition figures a harder question than before: if you now understand the solutions, why were those solutions not implemented when you already held power?

The truth is that Zambia’s political debate is increasingly trapped between frustration and memory. Many citizens remain unhappy with the pace of economic relief under UPND. At the same time, many opposition leaders remain unable to escape the shadow of the PF record they helped create. That is why this election is becoming less about who can complain the loudest and more about who can present the most believable governing alternative.

And at this moment, Mundubile’s intervention sounds less like a coherent economic alternative and more like an argument built around public frustration without a sufficiently detailed replacement plan beneath it.

— The People’s Brief welcomes reader responses, analysis, and opinion submissions.
Write to us: [email protected]

Share our work. Support independent journalism grounded in facts, context, and accountability.

© The People's Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu

25/05/2026

🇿🇲 BRIEFING | Tonga Calls Hichilema “Fake Messiah” in Escalating Political Rhetoric

Zambia’s political temperature continues to rise ahead of the August elections, with opposition leader Enock Roosevelt Tonga launching a fierce verbal attack against President Hakainde Hichilema in remarks that reflect the increasingly confrontational tone emerging within sections of the opposition.

In a strongly worded statement circulated on social media, Tonga accused the President of presiding over “poverty, division, anguish,” while questioning the ruling party’s confidence ahead of the 2026 elections.

“Hichilema the pathological liar and Fake Messiah delivers poverty, division, anguish; and shamelessly says give me another chance,” Tonga wrote.

The opposition figure further challenged assertions by ruling party supporters that President Hichilema remains electorally dominant despite mounting economic frustrations facing many households.

“How, amidst acute poverty and cheats, is Hichilema - the fake messiah, going to win an election when he has delivered anguish and pain?” Tonga asked.

But it was another section of the statement that is likely to attract even greater political attention.

“Tell your Fake Messiah — one Hichilema, never to try anything outside normal; or witness to face the equal measure,” Tonga stated, before adding: “We only worship the Almighty living God.”

The remarks come at a moment when Zambia’s political discourse is becoming increasingly hard-edged as campaigns intensify across the country. Economic situation, youth unemployment, and the rising cost of living are now colliding with aggressive political messaging from both the ruling party and opposition camps.

At the same time, the language being deployed by some political actors signals how rapidly the campaign environment is shifting from policy contestation into emotional mobilisation.

The ruling United Party for National Development has continued projecting confidence following strong mobilisation during nominations and growing numbers of unopposed candidates in some regions. Meanwhile, sections of the opposition are increasingly framing the election as a struggle against what they describe as shrinking democratic space and worsening economic conditions.

What is emerging is not simply an election contest.

It is becoming a battle of narratives, legitimacy, and public emotion. And with months still remaining before ballots are cast, the political language is already hardening.

© The People's Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu

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