Jigjiga Mirror

12/01/2026

Must Read: Very splendid and sober analysis

Israel’s gamble reshapes security, sovereignty, and regional order On 26 December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a historic move by officially recognizing the self-declared Republic of Somaliland as an independent, sovereign state. The decision broke a three-decade diplomatic cons...

02/01/2026

Scramble for Mustafa Caqjar’s Succession

As Mustafa Caqjar's term as leader of the Somali Region nears its end, the race to succeed him has heated up. In recent weeks, there has been intense lobbying and closed-door negotiations in Addis Ababa as various contenders, including key figures from Caqjar's administration and influential individuals aligned with the federal Prosperity Party (PP), vie for the top position.

While the federal government in Addis Ababa has the final say in the transition, President Mustafa's direct influence on the selection process seems limited. However, information from within the ruling party and regional political circles suggests that he is not sitting idly by. Caqjar is actively involved in forming coalitions behind the scenes, using his networks and experience to influence the outcome in a way that preserves his political legacy and safeguards his interests after his term ends.

President Mustafa's preferred succession model involves promoting Vice President Ibrahim Osman to the presidency and appointing Hussein Kassim, Caqjar's cousin and Chief of Cabinet, as the new Vice President. This strategy aims to maintain continuity and consolidate power within a close-knit group, blurring the lines between institutional governance and factional influence.

The Somali Region faces significant challenges due to administrative inefficiency, public discontent, and allegations of mismanagement. A succession process that excludes broader political participation and meritocratic competition could worsen fragmentation and deepen political and clan divisions. Prioritizing loyalty over competence may hinder reforms and entrench governance weaknesses.

Addis Ababa faces a strategic dilemma in managing a delicate political transition in the Somali Region. The dominance of insiders could threaten stability and development in the long run. The upcoming succession will be a crucial test for the federal government, which must decide between two options:

Option 1, managed continuity, involves endorsing a brokered transition that prioritizes loyalty, and appeasement of the incumbent's network. This option offers short-term predictability and rewards allies within the region but risks long-term legitimacy and reform.

Option 2, a credible reset, entails facilitating a more transparent, inclusive, and merit-based selection process. This could involve encouraging competitive vetting candidates against clear governance criteria.

If the federal government is serious about replacing the current president, it must also remove the corrupt individuals in his administration and establish a competent and effective leadership that can address the region's longstanding issues and support the Prime Minister's vision for Ethiopia.

The federal government's decision will have a significant impact beyond Jigjiga. It will be seen as a clear sign of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's dedication to his national agenda of political reform, institutional integrity, and inclusive governance. If a managed succession in favor of Caqjar's blueprint is chosen, it could indicate that centralized deal-making is prioritized over democratic institution-building.

On the other hand, opting for an open and credible process would demonstrate a commitment to transforming Ethiopia's political culture, even within its complex, regionally governed federation.

The succession of Mustafa Caqjar is not just a change in leadership but a crucial moment that will influence governance in the Somali Region and test the principles of Ethiopia's evolving federal system.

Jigjiga Mirror

01/01/2026

Analysis: Ethiopia's 2026 Outlook

Ethiopia's 2026 outlook is centered on Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's vision of a "new dawn," which is supported by a series of key projects. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, inaugurated in July 2025, is seen as a symbol of self-reliance that will reduce aid dependence and double the country's electricity capacity.

Building on this success, Addis Ababa has announced plans for Africa's largest airport and a nuclear power plant, as well as efforts to regain access to a Red Sea corridor lost after Eritrea's secession in 1993. These initiatives are seen as the cornerstone of a rapidly modernizing, export-oriented economy.

However, this ambitious agenda is at risk due to deep-seated ethnic tensions, ongoing repercussions from the ongoing conflict, and a changing regional landscape that could threaten Ethiopia's democratic progress and regional stability.

Ethiopia is facing significant internal challenges that threaten its unity. The conflict in Tigray, despite a 2022 peace deal, remains fragile with key aspects of the agreement unresolved. This has led to deep distrust and a precarious situation of "no war, no peace." Internal power struggles within the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) add to the risk of renewed conflict.

In Amhara and Oromia, Ethiopia's most populous regions, active insurgencies are ongoing. The Fano militia in Amhara has control over large areas, disrupting governance, while the conflict with the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) continues to result in civilian casualties and widespread insecurity.

Against a backdrop of turmoil, Ethiopia is preparing for its seventh general election in June 2026. The government is promoting it as the country's "best" election, signaling a return to stability. However, the reality is much more complex. The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) is facing significant logistical challenges and a crisis of legitimacy, making a free and fair vote difficult in conflict-affected areas where millions are displaced and infrastructure is damaged.

With major parties like the TPLF at risk of deregistration and others operating under severe repression, the political environment is restrictive. As a result, the election is shaping up to be a controlled process that strengthens central power while excluding many in Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray, which could exacerbate grievances and undermine the state's legitimacy further.

Ethiopia's foreign policy is causing dangerous tensions that could lead to regional conflict. The immediate concern is a potential war with Eritrea in 2026, driven by Ethiopia's desire for direct sea access. Prime Minister Abiy's statements about reclaiming the Eritrean port of Assab have raised alarm in Asmara, leading to accusations of military buildup and support for rebel groups on both sides.

While a full-scale invasion is not imminent, the risk of a proxy war escalating is significant. This tension is closely linked to the situation in Tigray and Amhara, where Eritrea is reportedly influencing TPLF and Amhara factions, creating a volatile situation that could spark a wider interstate conflict.

Ethiopia's regional ambitions have sparked opposition from key neighbors. Egypt, strongly against the GERD, has bolstered security ties with Eritrea and signed agreements with Somalia. The controversial 2024 port memorandum with Somaliland almost led to conflict with Somalia and remains a major source of tension.

Israel's recognition of Somaliland in late 2025 has changed the strategic landscape. This move challenges Ethiopia to make a critical decision: follow suit for sea access through Berbera, risking a rift with Somalia, or show restraint, potentially missing out on a historic opportunity and facing domestic criticism. This choice will reshape Ethiopia's regional alliances and conflicts in 2026.

The political and security crises are exacerbated by a worsening economic situation. Although reforms have led to some positive macroeconomic outcomes, the impact on people has been severe. Poverty has increased from 33% to 43%, highlighting significant economic disparities between the urban development in Addis Ababa and rural poverty. This disparity fuels insurgency and feelings of injustice.

The government is facing financial strain due to high defense spending and debt distress. Additionally, high living costs and high youth unemployment make it easier for armed groups to recruit members.

Ethiopia in 2026 faces challenges on multiple fronts. The government is promoting renewal through mega projects and elections, but is also dealing with armed insurgencies, economic strain, and regional changes.

Addis Ababa's success in balancing bold development with internal reconciliation and diplomatic caution will determine whether the "new dawn" leads to a lasting renaissance or becomes a flashpoint for conflict.

Jigjiga Mirror

22/12/2025

Analysis: Post President Mustafa Omar (Cagjar) Discussion

The absence of Mustafa Mohammed Omar, also known as Cagjar, the President of the Somali Region, from two recent federal events has raised concerns about his political standing.

His absence from two key federal events, the "Nation and Nationalities" conference in Assosa and a nationwide Prosperity Party leadership training attended by all other regional leaders, is seen as a significant indication of strained relations with the central government.

As the region's longest-serving president with an eight-year tenure, these absences suggest a widening gap and potential political isolation that casts doubt on his future.

Given these tensions, the discussion has therefore shifted from whether President Mustafa will be replaced to debating when and how such a transition might occur.

If the federal government drives the process, Mustafa's influence over his successor would be minimal.

The selection process is expected to prioritize candidates who can balance federal interests with regional stability.

Possible profiles could include a senior diplomatic official from the Somali Region for policy continuity, a trusted figure from the administration for loyalty to Addis Ababa, or a prominent leader to uphold social legitimacy within the region's intricate clan system.

President Mustafa's absence from the federal stage suggests a possible change in leadership. Speculation about his successor has been fueled by reports that influential elders and Somali intellectuals in Addis Ababa have lodged complaints with the federal government about his mismanagement.

The next leader must be able to advance federal goals and handle the challenges of the Somali Region to ensure stability.

What are your thoughts on who could be the potential successor to Caqjar?

Jigjiga Mirror

06/11/2025

Dancing in the Footsteps of Oppressors: The Periphery's Plight in 'New' Ethiopia

Eight years after the political changes of 2018, Ethiopia faces a critical moment. The initial hope for unity following the rise of Oromo leaders has given way to concerns about replicated autocracy and one ethnic domination. These leaders had a chance to dismantle long-standing structures of domination in the Ethiopian state, but the reality is sobering.

Rather than creating a new, truly inclusive social contract, they have mostly opted to adopt the outdated practices of their predecessors. The systems of marginalization they once fought against have been adjusted, not abolished, resulting in peripheral communities like the Somalis and Afar still feeling governed as a means of control rather than liberation.

The replication of past conflicts is evident in the current political climate through cynical and absurd territorial claims. Recent statements by figures like the prime minister and Oromo Media Network, asserting that Dire Dawa and Jigjiga are part of Oromia, are a concerning deviation from rational political dialogue. These claims lack historical basis, legal support, or alignment with the country's federal structure. Instead, they serve as a divisive tactic that exploits identity and land issues to incite conflict and strengthen political control.

This tactic mirrors the expansionist and assimilationist policies historically used by the center against the peripheries. It shows a lack of originality or moral progression among the new political class.

The real tragedy of this cynical posturing lies in its human cost. For the Somali community and other marginalized groups, these claims are not just abstract political debates; they represent existential threats that bring back painful memories of land dispossession, cultural erasure, and political violence.

The casual claims made by the country's top leadership and echoed by prominent Oromo opposition figures regarding major cities like Dire Dawa and Jigjiga show a clear disregard for the principles of self-determination and the territorial integrity of the Somali people. This undermines Ethiopia's ethnic federalism and risks pushing the nation back into a destructive cycle of conflict and recrimination.

The message is that the new leadership in Ethiopia is continuing the same patterns of domination they once fought against, just with different people and ethnic in charge.

The current situation in Ethiopia is a far cry from the hopeful promise of 2018. The political changes were meant to move away from a history of centralized power and division among communities. However, the recent territorial claims show that the chance for real change has been lost.

The casual contestation of the capital of the Somali region highlights a dangerous trend where borders, communities, and identities are at risk. This descent into a cynical and absurd struggle over land and history threatens to unravel the fragile state fabric, showing that despite political changes, destructive tactics persist.

Jigjiga Mirror

27/10/2025

Saudi Arabia’s RSGT Secures 30-Year Concession to Develop Djibouti’s Tadjourah Port

Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT) has signed a 30-year concession to operate and develop the Port of Tadjourah in Djibouti. This partnership builds on a Memorandum of Understanding signed in March 2025. The agreement, finalized in Jeddah, aims to transform the underutilized port into a multi-purpose facility capable of handling five million tons of cargo annually, positioning it as a vital gateway for Ethiopian trade.

This development marks a significant shift in control over one of Ethiopia’s key trade corridors. Since 2017, Tadjourah has served as an alternative route for Ethiopian cargo, particularly potash from the Afar region and coal for cement factories. The modernization under Saudi management could improve operational efficiency but also raises questions about Ethiopia’s long-term reliance on foreign-operated ports, despite being their primary user.

RSGT brings considerable regional expertise, having managed 3.1 million containers at Jeddah Islamic Port in 2024 despite regional security challenges in the Red Sea. The company has been expanding globally, recently launching operations in Bangladesh and adding multiple terminals to its portfolio. This growth aligns with Saudi Arabia’s broader strategy to expand its maritime influence along key trade routes.

Djibouti has benefited significantly from Ethiopia’s landlocked status since 1991, generating over $1 billion annually in port fees from Ethiopian trade. The Tadjourah concession further cements Djibouti’s role as a regional logistics hub and extends Saudi Arabia’s influence in Horn of Africa infrastructure. Ethiopian authorities have yet to comment on how the new arrangement might affect trade costs, sovereignty, or efforts to secure direct port access.

The RSGT concession comes at a time when there are plans to expand multi-modal connections to Tadjourah port. Last week, the Ethiopian Railway Corporation announced plans for a $1.58 billion standard-gauge railway intended to connect Northern Ethiopia to the Red Sea ports of Tadjourah, Assab, and Massawa. These ports offer the closest sea access for Ethiopia’s Afar and Tigray regions, which are seeing growth in the potash mining sector.

The proposed extension of the railway to Tadjourah port is part of the existing Ethiopia-Djibouti line, completed in 2017. The route is currently served by the Tadjourah-Balho-Mekelle highway. The northward expansion of the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway to reach Tadjourah will go a long way in accelerating growth for the port.

Jigjiga Mirror

19/10/2025

5th Pakistan-Africa Trade Forum concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

The 5th Pakistan-Africa Trade Development Conference and Made in Pakistan Exhibition concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with over 100 Pakistani exporters promoting trade with African partners.

Pakistan’s Ambassador to Ethiopia, Mian Atif Sharif, highlighted the event as a key step in the "Look Africa" policy, while Ethiopia’s Ambassador Jemal Bakir praised the growing bilateral ties.

The conference, attended by Pakistan’s Commerce Minister Jam Kamal Khan and Ethiopia’s Transport Minister Dr. Alemu Sime Feyisa, focused on enhancing trade and regional integration. The event included productive meetings, a visit from African Union Chair Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, and a gala celebrating Pakistan-Ethiopia relations.

Youssouf commended Pakistan’s efforts in South–South cooperation and praised the conference as a model for regional collaboration aligned with the African Union’s goals. Business sessions saw increased participation from Ethiopia, Pakistan, and other African nations, promoting new partnerships in manufacturing, agriculture, engineering, pharmaceuticals, and textiles.

A press briefing ahead of the gala highlighted the momentum in bilateral relations and the potential for deeper private-sector collaboration.

Jigjiga Mirror

15/10/2025

FGS Delegation Denied Landing at Doolow Airport

Reports from Dollo Ado indicate that officials and delegates from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) attempting to land at Doolow Somalia Airport were denied permission to do so. Instead, the delegation was redirected to land on the Ethiopian-controlled side of Dollo Ado, where they are currently engaged in discussions with Ethiopian authorities.

The District Commissioner of Doolow in Jubbaland confirmed that local authorities were not informed of the delegation’s visit, which prevented their entry into Jubbaland-controlled territory.

This incident has heightened tensions in the already fragile Gedo region amid ongoing disputes over control and sovereignty.

We will continue to monitor the situation and provide updates as more information becomes available.

Jigjiga Mirror

15/10/2025

Horn of Conflict: The Return of War and Geopolitical Rivalries in the Horn of Africa

The 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian war was a conflict between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), once allies with shared histories and struggles for independence. The war resulted in tens of thousands of casualties and strained relations between the two nations. Today, the potential for renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains high, amidst a shifting landscape of regional alliances and interests.

The Horn of Africa is currently a hotspot for global and regional powers, with conflicts in Sudan showcasing this complex dynamic. Countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and Iran are all vying for influence in the region. From Russia's naval activities in the Red Sea to the UAE's disruptive actions and Qatar's backing of Islamist factions, the region is a tangled web of competing interests.

The Sudan conflict has become a geopolitical battleground as regional powers vie for control of the Red Sea coastline. Tensions are rising over the strategic port of Assab, with a potential conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea looming. This could worsen the already volatile situation and involve external actors, heightening regional instability. The UAE, a former ally of Ethiopia, faces a dilemma on whether to support a conflict that could threaten its own interests, including investments and diplomatic ties.

Eritrea's role in the escalating chaos is gaining significance. In the past year, Asmara has been directly involved in Sudan's unrest by providing arms and training to fighters from eastern Sudanese communities and establishing military ties with Khartoum. Sudanese military aircraft have been moved to Asmara for protection against ongoing drone attacks, and recent high-level meetings between Sudanese and Eritrean officials indicate a strengthening alliance. These developments have raised concerns in Addis Ababa, as Ethiopia is worried that Eritrea and Sudan's collaboration could spill over into its own borders.

In June, Ethiopia's leadership sent envoys to Sudanese military officials to urge restraint and warn against escalation. However, with Cairo backing Sudan's military and in disagreement with Ethiopia over Nile waters, the risk of regional destabilization is increasing. Clashes in the Al-Fashaga region, a disputed fertile land since the Tigray conflict, underscore the potential for conflict to spill over. Egypt, frustrated by the stalled progress on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), is keen to exploit any opportunity to weaken Addis, including by supporting Eritrean alliances or destabilizing Ethiopia's internal security.

The complex network of alliances suggests that a future conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea would have far-reaching consequences beyond their borders. It could extend across the Horn of Africa, from Darfur to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, potentially triggering a regional crisis of unprecedented magnitude. Ethiopia's internal vulnerabilities, including insurgencies in Oromia, Amhara, and Somali regions, could be exploited by Eritrea and its allies, creating multiple fronts that would strain the Ethiopian military.

Eritrea's support for armed groups like the Fano militias in Ethiopia's Amhara region has strengthened in recent years, with weapons crossing the porous Sudanese border. The Fano insurgency has become more organized, engaging in significant clashes with Ethiopian government forces. Meanwhile, unrest is brewing in Ethiopia's peripheral regions, and a northern invasion could empower insurgent groups like the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).

Eritrea's diplomatic stance is expected to be defiant, seeking support from allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt while hindering foreign investments in Ethiopia. This could further weaken the Ethiopian economy, already struggling due to internal conflicts, as international financial institutions may suspend aid and development programs. Despite this, Ethiopia's military strength is significant, with access to advanced Russian jets and other weaponry from Iran, which could be used against Eritrea's port of Assab.

The main concern now is not whether Ethiopia can afford to engage with Eritrea but whether it can manage multiple conflicts simultaneously. A repeat of the devastating 1998-2000 war seems unlikely, as Ethiopia has since shown resilience. However, being involved in multiple conflicts could jeopardize its political stability and economic recovery, potentially threatening Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's leadership.

In this complex geopolitical scenario, former partners turned adversaries are now embroiled in a regional power struggle that could destabilize the Horn of Africa if diplomatic efforts falter. The coming months will be critical in deciding whether these nations can pursue peace or escalate conflict, with significant implications for the entire region.

Jigjiga Mirror

13/10/2025

Debunking Mustafe Agjar’s Claim of 50% Revenue share for Somali Region

The debate over oil and gas revenue sharing between Ethiopia's federal government and the Somali Regional State (SRS) is a highly sensitive and potentially volatile issue. Oil production in the Ogaden Basin is still in its early stages, but its estimated reserves of over 7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas offer significant economic potential for Ethiopia. A fair and transparent revenue distribution framework is essential to address regional concerns about resource allocation and autonomy.

Currently, Ethiopia's federal system maintains centralized control over major natural resource projects. The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) is the primary authority responsible for signing international agreements, such as the Production Sharing Agreement with Poly-GCL for the Ogaden Basin. The Somali Regional State plays an advisory role with limited authority over financial terms. While regional authorities can collect local revenues like land rents and royalties, the majority of oil and gas revenues from sales are managed at the federal level.

A proposed revenue-sharing model, known as "50/25/25," has been informally discussed. This model envisions 50% of revenue for the region, 25% for the federal government, and 25% for neighboring states. However, this framework is still in draft form and has not been made into law. Mustafe Agjar's claim of a 50% revenue share for the Somali Region is not backed by evidence. His assertion seems to be a political tactic to garner support and assert regional claims, but it could lead to heightened tensions and unrealistic expectations among the local population without legal backing.

The region's demand for a larger share of resource revenues and transparency in the federal government's management of natural resources stems from a history of marginalization and grievances. In 2018, then-Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's proposal to allocate only 5% of oil and gas revenues to the Somali region faced strong local opposition, contrasting with President Agjar's current assertions.

The Ogaden Basin, Ethiopia's significant hydrocarbon discovery, symbolizes the region's aspirations and frustrations over what is perceived as an inequitable distribution of resources, lack of transparency, displacement, environmental harm, and job disparities favoring non-locals.

Mustafe Cagjar is navigating challenges in balancing Somali regional expectations and potential opposition from groups like the ONLF in a complex political landscape. Accusations suggest he may prioritize federal interests over regional aspirations. To bolster his position and deflect attention from potential unrest, Cagjar is falsely claiming a 50% revenue share to portray himself as a champion of Somali regional interests as elections approach.

The absence of a clear, legally binding revenue-sharing framework poses serious risks to regional stability and national development. Without transparent laws and legitimate agreements, public trust is at stake. Unfounded claims can deepen grievances, empower Somali nationalist narratives, and discourage cooperation on major energy projects.

Ethiopia's success in the Ogaden Basin project hinges on reaching a fair and legal revenue-sharing agreement. This is vital for reducing the country's $4 billion fuel import bill and achieving energy independence.

A transparent and equitable deal will promote regional peace, economic growth, and ensure that the Somali region benefits from its natural resources. It will also provide Ethiopia with a stable revenue stream for sustainable development, promoting trust, stability, and shared prosperity in the country.

Jigjiga Mirror

13/10/2025

Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) Members Block Key Road in Mekelle Over Pay Dispute

In Mekelle, a unit of the Tigray Defense Forces staged a protest on Monday, blocking a major road and causing traffic disruptions for several hours. Witnesses reported that soldiers from the TDF's 22nd Army initiated the blockade around 5:30 AM local time.

The protesters expressed frustration over delayed salary payments and demanded the fulfillment of promised benefits, as per sources within the unit who requested anonymity. The demonstration affected access to the city's airport and vital supply routes before peacefully dispersing by midday.

The TDF's leadership has not released an official statement regarding the incident. This protest underscores internal tensions within the forces as the region works towards post-conflict recovery.

Jigjiga Mirror

13/10/2025

Somaliland President Abdirahman (Irro) is set to visit Addis Ababa following the recent trip by the Somalia leader

Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi (Irro) is scheduled to visit Addis Ababa in the coming days at the invitation of Ethiopia. This will be his first official trip since assuming office. The visit comes after a recent undisclosed meeting between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, indicating increased diplomatic engagement in the Horn of Africa region.

During his two to three-day visit, President Irro will hold discussions with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on bilateral relations, regional cooperation, and strengthening ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The visit comes amid growing engagement between the two countries on trade partnerships, security cooperation, and the strategic use of Somaliland's Berbera Port as a regional logistics hub.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Addis Ababa on Sunday to address diplomatic tensions related to Ethiopia's engagement with Somaliland and political disputes in Somalia's Jubaland region. While official statements focused on strengthening bilateral relations and promoting regional cooperation, diplomatic sources indicate Mohamud also sought to peruse Ethiopia from supporting Ahmed Madobe, the current leader of Jubaland who is at odds with the federal government of Somalia, and garner support for Mogadishu's efforts to establish a new Jubaland in Garbaharey, the headquarters of Gedo State.

The recent diplomatic activities are rooted in the controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in January 2024 between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which granted Ethiopia naval and commercial access to a portion of Somaliland's coastline. This agreement sparked opposition from Somalia, which views Somaliland as part of its sovereign territory.

The ongoing diplomatic efforts, including the Ankara Declaration brokered by Turkey, aim to normalize relations between Ethiopia and Somalia while addressing the complexities of the MoU with Somaliland. The outcomes of these talks will have significant implications for regional stability and international interests in the Horn of Africa.

Jigjiga Mirror