Jigjiga Mirror

Jigjiga Mirror Reflecting the stories, voices, and aspirations of the Somali Region

Dancing in the Footsteps of Oppressors: The Periphery's Plight in 'New' EthiopiaEight years after the political changes ...
06/11/2025

Dancing in the Footsteps of Oppressors: The Periphery's Plight in 'New' Ethiopia

Eight years after the political changes of 2018, Ethiopia faces a critical moment. The initial hope for unity following the rise of Oromo leaders has given way to concerns about replicated autocracy and one ethnic domination. These leaders had a chance to dismantle long-standing structures of domination in the Ethiopian state, but the reality is sobering.

Rather than creating a new, truly inclusive social contract, they have mostly opted to adopt the outdated practices of their predecessors. The systems of marginalization they once fought against have been adjusted, not abolished, resulting in peripheral communities like the Somalis and Afar still feeling governed as a means of control rather than liberation.

The replication of past conflicts is evident in the current political climate through cynical and absurd territorial claims. Recent statements by figures like the prime minister and Oromo Media Network, asserting that Dire Dawa and Jigjiga are part of Oromia, are a concerning deviation from rational political dialogue. These claims lack historical basis, legal support, or alignment with the country's federal structure. Instead, they serve as a divisive tactic that exploits identity and land issues to incite conflict and strengthen political control.

This tactic mirrors the expansionist and assimilationist policies historically used by the center against the peripheries. It shows a lack of originality or moral progression among the new political class.

The real tragedy of this cynical posturing lies in its human cost. For the Somali community and other marginalized groups, these claims are not just abstract political debates; they represent existential threats that bring back painful memories of land dispossession, cultural erasure, and political violence.

The casual claims made by the country's top leadership and echoed by prominent Oromo opposition figures regarding major cities like Dire Dawa and Jigjiga show a clear disregard for the principles of self-determination and the territorial integrity of the Somali people. This undermines Ethiopia's ethnic federalism and risks pushing the nation back into a destructive cycle of conflict and recrimination.

The message is that the new leadership in Ethiopia is continuing the same patterns of domination they once fought against, just with different people and ethnic in charge.

The current situation in Ethiopia is a far cry from the hopeful promise of 2018. The political changes were meant to move away from a history of centralized power and division among communities. However, the recent territorial claims show that the chance for real change has been lost.

The casual contestation of the capital of the Somali region highlights a dangerous trend where borders, communities, and identities are at risk. This descent into a cynical and absurd struggle over land and history threatens to unravel the fragile state fabric, showing that despite political changes, destructive tactics persist.

Jigjiga Mirror

Saudi Arabia’s RSGT Secures 30-Year Concession to Develop Djibouti’s Tadjourah PortSaudi Arabia’s Red Sea Gateway Termin...
27/10/2025

Saudi Arabia’s RSGT Secures 30-Year Concession to Develop Djibouti’s Tadjourah Port

Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Gateway Terminal (RSGT) has signed a 30-year concession to operate and develop the Port of Tadjourah in Djibouti. This partnership builds on a Memorandum of Understanding signed in March 2025. The agreement, finalized in Jeddah, aims to transform the underutilized port into a multi-purpose facility capable of handling five million tons of cargo annually, positioning it as a vital gateway for Ethiopian trade.

This development marks a significant shift in control over one of Ethiopia’s key trade corridors. Since 2017, Tadjourah has served as an alternative route for Ethiopian cargo, particularly potash from the Afar region and coal for cement factories. The modernization under Saudi management could improve operational efficiency but also raises questions about Ethiopia’s long-term reliance on foreign-operated ports, despite being their primary user.

RSGT brings considerable regional expertise, having managed 3.1 million containers at Jeddah Islamic Port in 2024 despite regional security challenges in the Red Sea. The company has been expanding globally, recently launching operations in Bangladesh and adding multiple terminals to its portfolio. This growth aligns with Saudi Arabia’s broader strategy to expand its maritime influence along key trade routes.

Djibouti has benefited significantly from Ethiopia’s landlocked status since 1991, generating over $1 billion annually in port fees from Ethiopian trade. The Tadjourah concession further cements Djibouti’s role as a regional logistics hub and extends Saudi Arabia’s influence in Horn of Africa infrastructure. Ethiopian authorities have yet to comment on how the new arrangement might affect trade costs, sovereignty, or efforts to secure direct port access.

The RSGT concession comes at a time when there are plans to expand multi-modal connections to Tadjourah port. Last week, the Ethiopian Railway Corporation announced plans for a $1.58 billion standard-gauge railway intended to connect Northern Ethiopia to the Red Sea ports of Tadjourah, Assab, and Massawa. These ports offer the closest sea access for Ethiopia’s Afar and Tigray regions, which are seeing growth in the potash mining sector.

The proposed extension of the railway to Tadjourah port is part of the existing Ethiopia-Djibouti line, completed in 2017. The route is currently served by the Tadjourah-Balho-Mekelle highway. The northward expansion of the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway to reach Tadjourah will go a long way in accelerating growth for the port.

Jigjiga Mirror

5th Pakistan-Africa Trade Forum concluded in Addis Ababa, EthiopiaThe 5th Pakistan-Africa Trade Development Conference a...
19/10/2025

5th Pakistan-Africa Trade Forum concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

The 5th Pakistan-Africa Trade Development Conference and Made in Pakistan Exhibition concluded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with over 100 Pakistani exporters promoting trade with African partners.

Pakistan’s Ambassador to Ethiopia, Mian Atif Sharif, highlighted the event as a key step in the "Look Africa" policy, while Ethiopia’s Ambassador Jemal Bakir praised the growing bilateral ties.

The conference, attended by Pakistan’s Commerce Minister Jam Kamal Khan and Ethiopia’s Transport Minister Dr. Alemu Sime Feyisa, focused on enhancing trade and regional integration. The event included productive meetings, a visit from African Union Chair Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, and a gala celebrating Pakistan-Ethiopia relations.

Youssouf commended Pakistan’s efforts in South–South cooperation and praised the conference as a model for regional collaboration aligned with the African Union’s goals. Business sessions saw increased participation from Ethiopia, Pakistan, and other African nations, promoting new partnerships in manufacturing, agriculture, engineering, pharmaceuticals, and textiles.

A press briefing ahead of the gala highlighted the momentum in bilateral relations and the potential for deeper private-sector collaboration.

Jigjiga Mirror

FGS Delegation Denied Landing at Doolow AirportReports from Dollo Ado indicate that officials and delegates from the Fed...
15/10/2025

FGS Delegation Denied Landing at Doolow Airport

Reports from Dollo Ado indicate that officials and delegates from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) attempting to land at Doolow Somalia Airport were denied permission to do so. Instead, the delegation was redirected to land on the Ethiopian-controlled side of Dollo Ado, where they are currently engaged in discussions with Ethiopian authorities.

The District Commissioner of Doolow in Jubbaland confirmed that local authorities were not informed of the delegation’s visit, which prevented their entry into Jubbaland-controlled territory.

This incident has heightened tensions in the already fragile Gedo region amid ongoing disputes over control and sovereignty.

We will continue to monitor the situation and provide updates as more information becomes available.

Jigjiga Mirror

Horn of Conflict: The Return of War and Geopolitical Rivalries in the Horn of AfricaThe 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian war...
15/10/2025

Horn of Conflict: The Return of War and Geopolitical Rivalries in the Horn of Africa

The 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian war was a conflict between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), once allies with shared histories and struggles for independence. The war resulted in tens of thousands of casualties and strained relations between the two nations. Today, the potential for renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains high, amidst a shifting landscape of regional alliances and interests.

The Horn of Africa is currently a hotspot for global and regional powers, with conflicts in Sudan showcasing this complex dynamic. Countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and Iran are all vying for influence in the region. From Russia's naval activities in the Red Sea to the UAE's disruptive actions and Qatar's backing of Islamist factions, the region is a tangled web of competing interests.

The Sudan conflict has become a geopolitical battleground as regional powers vie for control of the Red Sea coastline. Tensions are rising over the strategic port of Assab, with a potential conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea looming. This could worsen the already volatile situation and involve external actors, heightening regional instability. The UAE, a former ally of Ethiopia, faces a dilemma on whether to support a conflict that could threaten its own interests, including investments and diplomatic ties.

Eritrea's role in the escalating chaos is gaining significance. In the past year, Asmara has been directly involved in Sudan's unrest by providing arms and training to fighters from eastern Sudanese communities and establishing military ties with Khartoum. Sudanese military aircraft have been moved to Asmara for protection against ongoing drone attacks, and recent high-level meetings between Sudanese and Eritrean officials indicate a strengthening alliance. These developments have raised concerns in Addis Ababa, as Ethiopia is worried that Eritrea and Sudan's collaboration could spill over into its own borders.

In June, Ethiopia's leadership sent envoys to Sudanese military officials to urge restraint and warn against escalation. However, with Cairo backing Sudan's military and in disagreement with Ethiopia over Nile waters, the risk of regional destabilization is increasing. Clashes in the Al-Fashaga region, a disputed fertile land since the Tigray conflict, underscore the potential for conflict to spill over. Egypt, frustrated by the stalled progress on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), is keen to exploit any opportunity to weaken Addis, including by supporting Eritrean alliances or destabilizing Ethiopia's internal security.

The complex network of alliances suggests that a future conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea would have far-reaching consequences beyond their borders. It could extend across the Horn of Africa, from Darfur to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, potentially triggering a regional crisis of unprecedented magnitude. Ethiopia's internal vulnerabilities, including insurgencies in Oromia, Amhara, and Somali regions, could be exploited by Eritrea and its allies, creating multiple fronts that would strain the Ethiopian military.

Eritrea's support for armed groups like the Fano militias in Ethiopia's Amhara region has strengthened in recent years, with weapons crossing the porous Sudanese border. The Fano insurgency has become more organized, engaging in significant clashes with Ethiopian government forces. Meanwhile, unrest is brewing in Ethiopia's peripheral regions, and a northern invasion could empower insurgent groups like the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF).

Eritrea's diplomatic stance is expected to be defiant, seeking support from allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt while hindering foreign investments in Ethiopia. This could further weaken the Ethiopian economy, already struggling due to internal conflicts, as international financial institutions may suspend aid and development programs. Despite this, Ethiopia's military strength is significant, with access to advanced Russian jets and other weaponry from Iran, which could be used against Eritrea's port of Assab.

The main concern now is not whether Ethiopia can afford to engage with Eritrea but whether it can manage multiple conflicts simultaneously. A repeat of the devastating 1998-2000 war seems unlikely, as Ethiopia has since shown resilience. However, being involved in multiple conflicts could jeopardize its political stability and economic recovery, potentially threatening Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's leadership.

In this complex geopolitical scenario, former partners turned adversaries are now embroiled in a regional power struggle that could destabilize the Horn of Africa if diplomatic efforts falter. The coming months will be critical in deciding whether these nations can pursue peace or escalate conflict, with significant implications for the entire region.

Jigjiga Mirror

Debunking Mustafe Agjar’s Claim of 50% Revenue share for Somali RegionThe debate over oil and gas revenue sharing betwee...
13/10/2025

Debunking Mustafe Agjar’s Claim of 50% Revenue share for Somali Region

The debate over oil and gas revenue sharing between Ethiopia's federal government and the Somali Regional State (SRS) is a highly sensitive and potentially volatile issue. Oil production in the Ogaden Basin is still in its early stages, but its estimated reserves of over 7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas offer significant economic potential for Ethiopia. A fair and transparent revenue distribution framework is essential to address regional concerns about resource allocation and autonomy.

Currently, Ethiopia's federal system maintains centralized control over major natural resource projects. The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) is the primary authority responsible for signing international agreements, such as the Production Sharing Agreement with Poly-GCL for the Ogaden Basin. The Somali Regional State plays an advisory role with limited authority over financial terms. While regional authorities can collect local revenues like land rents and royalties, the majority of oil and gas revenues from sales are managed at the federal level.

A proposed revenue-sharing model, known as "50/25/25," has been informally discussed. This model envisions 50% of revenue for the region, 25% for the federal government, and 25% for neighboring states. However, this framework is still in draft form and has not been made into law. Mustafe Agjar's claim of a 50% revenue share for the Somali Region is not backed by evidence. His assertion seems to be a political tactic to garner support and assert regional claims, but it could lead to heightened tensions and unrealistic expectations among the local population without legal backing.

The region's demand for a larger share of resource revenues and transparency in the federal government's management of natural resources stems from a history of marginalization and grievances. In 2018, then-Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's proposal to allocate only 5% of oil and gas revenues to the Somali region faced strong local opposition, contrasting with President Agjar's current assertions.

The Ogaden Basin, Ethiopia's significant hydrocarbon discovery, symbolizes the region's aspirations and frustrations over what is perceived as an inequitable distribution of resources, lack of transparency, displacement, environmental harm, and job disparities favoring non-locals.

Mustafe Cagjar is navigating challenges in balancing Somali regional expectations and potential opposition from groups like the ONLF in a complex political landscape. Accusations suggest he may prioritize federal interests over regional aspirations. To bolster his position and deflect attention from potential unrest, Cagjar is falsely claiming a 50% revenue share to portray himself as a champion of Somali regional interests as elections approach.

The absence of a clear, legally binding revenue-sharing framework poses serious risks to regional stability and national development. Without transparent laws and legitimate agreements, public trust is at stake. Unfounded claims can deepen grievances, empower Somali nationalist narratives, and discourage cooperation on major energy projects.

Ethiopia's success in the Ogaden Basin project hinges on reaching a fair and legal revenue-sharing agreement. This is vital for reducing the country's $4 billion fuel import bill and achieving energy independence.

A transparent and equitable deal will promote regional peace, economic growth, and ensure that the Somali region benefits from its natural resources. It will also provide Ethiopia with a stable revenue stream for sustainable development, promoting trust, stability, and shared prosperity in the country.

Jigjiga Mirror

Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) Members Block Key Road in Mekelle Over Pay DisputeIn Mekelle, a unit of the Tigray Defense F...
13/10/2025

Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) Members Block Key Road in Mekelle Over Pay Dispute

In Mekelle, a unit of the Tigray Defense Forces staged a protest on Monday, blocking a major road and causing traffic disruptions for several hours. Witnesses reported that soldiers from the TDF's 22nd Army initiated the blockade around 5:30 AM local time.

The protesters expressed frustration over delayed salary payments and demanded the fulfillment of promised benefits, as per sources within the unit who requested anonymity. The demonstration affected access to the city's airport and vital supply routes before peacefully dispersing by midday.

The TDF's leadership has not released an official statement regarding the incident. This protest underscores internal tensions within the forces as the region works towards post-conflict recovery.

Jigjiga Mirror

Somaliland President Abdirahman (Irro) is set to visit Addis Ababa following the recent trip by the Somalia leaderSomali...
13/10/2025

Somaliland President Abdirahman (Irro) is set to visit Addis Ababa following the recent trip by the Somalia leader

Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi (Irro) is scheduled to visit Addis Ababa in the coming days at the invitation of Ethiopia. This will be his first official trip since assuming office. The visit comes after a recent undisclosed meeting between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, indicating increased diplomatic engagement in the Horn of Africa region.

During his two to three-day visit, President Irro will hold discussions with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on bilateral relations, regional cooperation, and strengthening ties between Ethiopia and Somaliland. The visit comes amid growing engagement between the two countries on trade partnerships, security cooperation, and the strategic use of Somaliland's Berbera Port as a regional logistics hub.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Addis Ababa on Sunday to address diplomatic tensions related to Ethiopia's engagement with Somaliland and political disputes in Somalia's Jubaland region. While official statements focused on strengthening bilateral relations and promoting regional cooperation, diplomatic sources indicate Mohamud also sought to peruse Ethiopia from supporting Ahmed Madobe, the current leader of Jubaland who is at odds with the federal government of Somalia, and garner support for Mogadishu's efforts to establish a new Jubaland in Garbaharey, the headquarters of Gedo State.

The recent diplomatic activities are rooted in the controversial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in January 2024 between Ethiopia and Somaliland, which granted Ethiopia naval and commercial access to a portion of Somaliland's coastline. This agreement sparked opposition from Somalia, which views Somaliland as part of its sovereign territory.

The ongoing diplomatic efforts, including the Ankara Declaration brokered by Turkey, aim to normalize relations between Ethiopia and Somalia while addressing the complexities of the MoU with Somaliland. The outcomes of these talks will have significant implications for regional stability and international interests in the Horn of Africa.

Jigjiga Mirror

The Unfinished War Over Oil in the SRS The Ogaden National Liberation Front's (ONLF) attack on the Chinese-operated oil ...
07/10/2025

The Unfinished War Over Oil in the SRS

The Ogaden National Liberation Front's (ONLF) attack on the Chinese-operated oil exploration site in Obole in April 2007 was arguably the single most consequential event of the decades-long insurgency. Coming shortly in the wake of the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, 65 Ethiopian workers and 9 Chinese engineers were slain in the dawn raid, with the ONLF justifying the attack by arguing that "foreign companies who exploit the wealth of the Ogaden while our people are killed, starved, and displaced are legitimate targets." Nearly two decades later, the reverberations of the attack —and the subsequent government crackdown —are still keenly felt in the peripheral Somali Regional State (SRS). With the announcement of another Chinese company's involvement in the building of a new hydrocarbon refinery last week in the SRS, and the now-disarmed ONLF's furious response, the ugly history of resource extraction in the eastern region is rearing its head once again.

The aftermath of the Obole massacre in 2007 was immediate and brutal, with the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government launching scorched-earth counterinsurgency operations in the restive SRS. Entire districts, including Fiiq, Degahbur, Wardher, Korahe, and more, were sealed off, and many of the rural areas where the ONLF drew its support were rendered uninhabitable. Despite such repression, the Asmara-backed ONLF nevertheless sustained a guerrilla campaign for several years, continuing to advocate for the rights and self-determination of the Somali-speaking people of the SRS. Meanwhile, the Liyu paramilitary troops and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) were accused of a series of atrocities, with a 2008 Human Rights Watch report detailing the "collective punishment" meted out in the SRS. Such tactics followed a familiar pattern that pre-dated the EPRDF, with the Derg adopting a similarly militarised posture towards the SRS in the 1970s and 1980s, which was regarded as somewhat betwixt and between due to its ethnic and political linkages with neighboring Somalia, particularly in the aftermath of the calamitous 1977-78 Ogaden War.

Across these intervening years, oil in the SRS has remained a particularly potent symbol of the sustained underdevelopment of the Somali-speaking region. The discovery of oil in the Ogaden Basin dates back to the 1920s, when the US firm Standard Oil carried out some early exploration work. It was not until the 1970s, however, that significant quantities of gas were discovered in the Calub and Hilala fields in the Basin, signalling substantial hydrocarbon deposits. And while the Derg regime was floundering amidst war with Tigrayan and Eritrean rebels, it nevertheless began granting oil and gas exploration rights in the late 1980s onwards, including to Tenneco and Petronas. But for the ONLF and other opposition movements, the natural resources of the Ogaden have always belonged to its citizens, rather than Addis or some foreign company, and they have repeatedly argued that the revenues have been used to repress Ethiopian Somalis rather than to develop the SRS.

On 2 October, PM Abiy Ahmed laid the foundations for another substantial energy project, the Gode Oil Refinery, with a capacity of refining 3.5 million tonnes of fuel from the Hilala fields per year, in partnership with the Chinese firm Golden Concord Ltd. This marks the third substantial energy project announced or inaugurated in just a handful of weeks, following the unveiling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in September and the recent announcement of a nuclear power plant with Russian backing. However, unlike the gold of Tigray, where small-scale, militarised mining has proliferated in the aftermath of the war, oil remains a heavily centralised resource, with the complexity of refining and exporting often meaning that few benefits are directly funnelled back towards the areas from which it was drawn. This centralised political economy of oil is perhaps best seen in South Sudan, where the elite are addicted to the petrodollars from the national oilfields, while the overwhelming majority of the population remains highly impoverished.

As part of the SRS's hydrocarbon development, the prime minister also inaugurated the first phase of the Ogaden Liquid Natural Gas project in Calub, with a capacity of 111 million litres of extraction per year, with the second phase projected to increase this by 1.33 billion litres per year. Upon completion, this will provide an additional 1,000 megawatts of power and serve as feedstock for fertiliser, at least according to Addis. Much like the nuclear power plant deal, though, while the cost of the refinery has been estimated at around USD 2.5 billion, the commissioning date has yet to be announced. Spokesperson Billene Seyoum has asserted that the first phases will be completed within two years, but given enduring security and logistical concerns, this may be ambitious.

Still, the prime minister has pledged-- as others have before him-- that these projects will be transformative for the SRS, supposedly dragging the impoverished region out of its mire. But nearly two decades after the ONLF's attack, and although the former insurgents may have laid down their arms, the SRS remains the most underdeveloped region in the country. And while the feared Liyu forces—the favoured weapon of the former Abdi Iley administration—may have been partially disbanded, it would be naive to dismiss the rumblings of discontent within the SRS. Initial hopes that SRS President Mustafa Omer 'Agjar' might herald a new era have long since dissipated, with his administration marred by successive corruption scandals as well as intermittent clashes along the Oromia and Afar boundaries. The latest controversy to engulf Agjar's administration in Jigjiga was the unilateral redrawing of contested boundaries and administrations in mid-2025, a move widely regarded as an attempt to consolidate power and exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions with the Oromo. And since the 2018 peace deal in Asmara, Agjar's government has repeatedly sought to neuter and undermine the ONLF through a host of underhanded tactics, including establishing splinter leadership cells. In turn, the ONLF —now a registered political party —has increasingly warned of a return to the battlefield this year, citing the failure of Addis and Jigjiga to abide by the peace agreement.

With relations already badly deteriorated between the ONLF and Addis, the party's press release yesterday outlined a detailed series of criticisms against Addis and the abuse of the SRS, asserting that the "Ogaden Gas Project" marks a new "chapter of colonial exploitation." With a graphic of a bloodstain on the first page, the ONLF warns that the project is cloaked in the language of "investment" and "modernisation" but is part of a campaign of "exclusion, dispossession and environmental destruction." It further lists issues such as the displacement of villages by the ENDF and toxic waste spills amid the broader sidelining of the people of the SRS. Only briefly referencing the Obole raid, the statement ends ominously, stating that "the Somali nation will never accept development built upon its suffering and silence."

It is improbable that the disarmed ONLF would somehow attempt a repeat of Obole, but it is unmistakable that, despite changes in leadership in Addis and Jigjiga, the same issues surrounding the extraction of oil to the detriment of the people of the SRS remain. From administration to administration, the underdevelopment of the SRS and its political sidelining has persisted, with Iley and now Agjar permitted to rule the region as their personal fiefdoms. The grand pronouncements last week appear to be more of the same, with the unpopular Agjar clinging to his position and the SRS's political settlement inching towards total collapse. Furthermore, it seems increasingly improbable that the rent-seeking administration in Jigjiga, or the forex-starved Addis, will be willing to cede any future profits from the latest extractive project —if it is even built. Years on from Obole, in the eyes of the ONLF, oil and gas remain the symbol of the SRS's subjugation-- not its salvation. - EC

Fano Militias Ramp Up Attacks on Federal Government StrongholdsOver the past few days, the Fano militias, representing A...
02/10/2025

Fano Militias Ramp Up Attacks on Federal Government Strongholds

Over the past few days, the Fano militias, representing Amhara ethno-nationalist forces, have significantly intensified their offensive in Ethiopia's Amhara region. They are targeting strategic towns in eastern Amhara, particularly in North and South Wollo.

The offensive is being led by the Amhara Fano National Force (AFNF), a coalition of four militias. The AFNF has reportedly taken control of key areas in surrounding districts and has encircled Woldia, an important junction linking Addis Ababa, Tigray, and Bahir Dar.

The Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) are now engaged in a fierce counteroffensive, employing drone attacks, ground forces, and air support.

However, experts caution that the decentralized command structure of Fano, internal divisions, and regional sentiments are hindering a clear military victory.

The conflict's complexity is exacerbated by Ethiopia's broader regional tensions, including the ongoing Tigray conflict, Eritrean involvement, and internal political instability.

Despite multiple military campaigns, Fano has struggled to translate its territorial gains into political power due to factional disputes and a lack of cohesive leadership.

The situation remains highly volatile, with potential implications for Ethiopia's stability and wider regional security.

Jigjiga Mirror

Fact Check: Assessing the Natural Gas Development Initiatives in Ethiopia’s Somali Region Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy ...
02/10/2025

Fact Check: Assessing the Natural Gas Development Initiatives in Ethiopia’s Somali Region

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited the Somali region today to lay the foundation stone for a major fertilizer manufacturing plant in Gode. The project is valued at nearly $2.5 billion. During the visit, he also inaugurated the first phase of the Ogaden Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project, with an annual production capacity of 111 million liters.

Questions have been raised about the status of the LNG project. The project was initiated by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and inaugurated in 2018, as documented in below link.

However, after Abiy Ahmed became the Prime Minister, the government revoked rights from Chinese company Poly-GCL due to delays and financing issues. This led to the suspension of operations at the Calub and Hilala sites.

In June 2004, the federal government reversed its decision to revoke Poly-GCL's natural gas concession after years of delays, highlighting ongoing challenges in project ex*****on. There are concerns about whether these long-dormant projects can produce concrete results in the next few years.

Oil and gas exploration in Somali region has faced challenges such as financing constraints, security issues, and infrastructural deficiencies, hindering commercial success. International companies like Tenneco, Petronas, and Chinese firms have conducted exploration activities in the Ogaden Basin since the 1970s, demonstrating continued interest despite obstacles.

Critics argue that the government's recent claims are reminiscent of past attempts to attribute accomplishments from the EPRDF era to the current administration, especially in light of stalled projects.

These highly publicized mega projects are seen as symbolic tactics to divert attention from the struggling economy and create a false impression of sustained prosperity in Ethiopia.

The federal government and Poly-GCL are said to be working on developing a major gas refinery and setting up a metallurgy hub in Dire Dawa.

Despite ambitious plans, the only project Prime Minister Abiy can confidently attribute to his legacy is the fertilizer plant, developed in partnership with Aliko Dangote. However, Dangote's ventures are facing financial challenges, including a $4 billion bailout for his Nigerian oil refinery and a recent suspension of his company's credit rating by Fitch Ratings.

As Ethiopia’s economy faces mounting difficulties, including security concerns and waning investors' confidence, the prospects for the successful and timely completion of these high-profile projects remain uncertain.

https://youtu.be/FiGgjgHThOY?si=fKkES_MPYsf5IgeA

Jigjiga Mirror

Address

Jigjigamirror@gmail. Com
Jijiga

Alerts

Be the first to know and let us send you an email when Jigjiga Mirror posts news and promotions. Your email address will not be used for any other purpose, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Share