23/08/2025
A Crooked Legacy: U.S. Diplomats, Somalia, and a Web of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse
Not long ago, an eye-opening Op-Ed alleged that former U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Donald Yamamoto squandered over $1 billion in a war-torn nation that could least afford it. As concerning as that was, the fallout deepens with his successor—Larry André, appointed under what critics deride as “Sleepy Jeo’s” diplomatic system—now facing serious allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, and blatant conflicts of interest.
Danab Brigade Scandal: U.S.-Trained Forces and Misuse of Aid
During Ambassador Larry André’s tenure, scrutiny mounted around the Danab Brigade, a special forces unit the U.S. funded, trained, and armed. Several reports indicated that the Brigade’s logistical chains, food supplies, and equipment were misused or diverted, raising troubling questions about oversight, mismanagement, and whether humanitarian and military aid intended to stabilize Somalia ended up fueling corruption at the frontline.
USAID in Somalia: Humanitarian Funding Gone Awry?
Parallel to security-sector concerns, the broader landscape of USAID-funded humanitarian assistance in Somalia has long been riddled with accountability gaps. Under André’s ambassadorship, aid inflows intended for development and famine relief often faced theft, diversion by armed groups, or were funneled through illicit checkpoints—particularly those controlled by Al-Shabaab. The intersection of insecurity and weak governance meant aid meant for vulnerable communities was frequently offered up to pay “protection” or extorted by insurgents—a harrowing misuse of funds meant to save lives.
Post-Diplomacy: Lobbying for Hormuud—Conflict of Interest?
After leaving his post in May 2023, Ambassador André registered as a foreign agent alongside a Somali Member of Parliament to lobby on behalf of Hormuud Telecommunications, Somalia’s largest telecom operator. Notably, Hormuud’s founder also controls Barakaat, a money-transfer network that was suspended by the U.S. after 9/11 amid suspicions of terror financing roots. Given André’s access to intelligence as ambassador—particularly around Somalia’s financial networks—this turn raises serious concerns about a conflict of interest that undermines diplomatic norms.
Al-Shabaab’s Use of Digital Financial Networks
Reports from UN panels have confirmed that Al-Shabaab extensively exploits Somalia’s mobile money networks and banks, using them to store, transfer, and distribute funds, often bypassing formal regulation. Mobile money platforms—of which Hormuud’s EVC Plus is the dominant player—account for more than two-thirds of all payments in Somalia, comprising a staggering portion of the country’s GDP .
These platforms are the most accessible means for Al-Shabaab to move funds quickly, especially in a largely cash-based, informal economy where regulation remains weak.
Al-Shabaab’s Financial Footprint: Extortion, Mobile Money & Informality
UN investigations underscore how Al-Shabaab finances itself through:
• A widespread network of extortion checkpoints, taxing vehicles, commercial goods, agriculture, livestock, and even urban households—sometimes charging over $1,400 per truck and tens of thousands per property.
• Mobile money usage to distribute wages and transit operational funds.
• Bank accounts for storing and transferring extorted money .
These networks thrive in part due to Somalia’s under-regulated digital finance sector, with mobile money platforms like Hormuud’s operating broadly with limited enforcement and lax KYC (Know Your Customer) standards .
Red Flags: Conflict, Influence, and Lack of Transparency
This caveat encapsulates multiple warning signs:
• Conflict of Interest: André had privileged, classified insight into Somalia’s financial channels. Lobbying afterward for a telecom operator with ties to controversial networks erodes diplomatic credibility.
• Undue Influence: Critics argue that his diplomatic role may have included implicit backing of Somali government structures that later served as lucrative platforms.
• Opacity: His FARA filings lack critical details, such as compensation. The fact that he reportedly agreed to rotate back to Mogadishu every six months implies an ongoing financial arrangement—deepening concerns about hidden agendas.
• Enabling Terror Financing: Hormuud’s dominance of mobile money infrastructure, combined with its size and reach, means that when insurgents exploit these channels, U.S. strategic assets may be indirectly facilitating terror finance.
Conclusion: America’s Credibility—and Security—is at Stake
When former U.S. diplomats pivot into private contracts with entities deeply embedded in Somalia’s contested financial landscape, it isn’t just ethically dubious—it compromises national security, counterterrorism efforts, and public trust.
These allegations warrant immediate and rigorous scrutiny by U.S. oversight bodies—including FBI and congressional watchdogs. The U.S. can no longer afford for its envoys to transition seamlessly from wielding state power to representing entities tied to corrupt or illicit networks.
Possible Next Steps:
• Deep-dive reporting or a Congressional hearing to obtain:
o Audits of USAID and Danab Brigade logistics and spending.
o Complete FARA documentation for André, including financial terms.
o Investigations into human aid diversion and telecom sector governance.
• Policy reforms:
o Tighten post-service lobbying restrictions for ambassadors.
o Expand AML/CFT oversight over mobile money platforms in fragile states.
o Implement moral-ethics training and post-diplomatic career guidelines.
By Suleiman Ismail Bolaleh ‘Xuquuq’
Prominent Human Rights Researcher/Defender
Self Determination Rights Advocate and Anti Corruption Campaigner
California, US
