23/10/2025
BANKING WITH GHOSTS: WHEN ADB LOOKED AWAY
There’s a question Ghana has been too polite to ask:
How does ₵31 million move through a regulated bank without alarms going off? How do nearly 10,000 fake names pass through a system built on compliance, risk management, and anti-money laundering checks?
The answer is blunt — this wasn’t banking as usual. It was banking that looked away.
The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) may not have created the ghosts in the National Service Authority’s ₵653 million scandal, but it kept them alive. Money doesn’t move itself — it needs channels, authorizations, and signatures. ADB provided all three.
Under the Banks and Specialised Deposit-Taking Institutions Act, 2016 (Act 930) and the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044), no ₵31 million should have slipped through unnoticed. Yet ADB’s systems slept while public money vanished.
A bank built to nourish farmers became the feeding tube for phantoms.
This failure runs in layers — negligence, dereliction, and likely complicity.
Negligence: Repetitive, high-value payments went unflagged.
Dereliction: ADB ignored due diligence and processed fake beneficiaries without verification.
Complicity: Fraud of this magnitude does not go unseen — someone inside made it possible.
By law, banks are liable not only for what they know, but for what they should have known. ADB failed both tests.
This scandal is more than an NSA problem; it’s a mirror of how Ghana’s financial institutions have become safe passageways for public theft. When banks stop asking questions, corruption stops needing answers.
If ADB had done its job, the ghosts would have starved.
Instead, they thrived — because even our banks have learned how to live comfortably with the dead.