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05/01/2026

Citizens of countries around the world have come forward in protest action against the kidnapping of Venezuelan president Nicholas Maduro by the US DEA / Army; Navy whom acted under instructions by President Donald Trump, not the US Senate.
Let it be noted that every simple one of those US soldiers who participate in the kidnapping of Maduro are now Global War Criminals by default.

04/01/2026

🇺🇸🇻🇪Breaking News🇻🇪🇺🇸
The FACTS surrounding Maduro's kidnapping is: 304 BILLION BARRELS OF CRUDE OIL.

That’s the real reason the US kidnapped Maduro and wants to establish political influence in Venezuela.

27/12/2025

🇬🇾Cash Grant Must be Replaced with Tax Relief Benefit and Tax-Parity Grant🇬🇾

26/12/2025

🇬🇾🎄NO CASH GRANT FOR CHRISTMAS🇬🇾
A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME (UBI) MODEL IS NEEDED

🛑🤦‍♀️BROKEN PROMISES AND FALSE HOPE🤦‍♀️🛑“...The PPP/C has failed the Guyanese people and Guyana miserably and they delib...
13/12/2025

🛑🤦‍♀️BROKEN PROMISES AND FALSE HOPE🤦‍♀️🛑
“...The PPP/C has failed the Guyanese people and Guyana miserably and they deliberately create false hope with promise of gratification with the uneconomical, unmanaged, unconstitutional disbursement of Cash Grants...”

First 100 Days Delivery of Promises by Guyanese Presidents in Historical and Regional Context.

This report examines whether presidents of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana (Guyana) delivered major campaign promises within their first 100 days in office. It also provides a regional comparison with Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago, Jamaica, Suriname, Venezuela, and French Guiana.

Before we get into the details let’s first acknowledge that the 100th day for the PPP/C elected presidential candidate and current president of Guyana will be on December 15, 2025. By my counting that's September 7, 2025 as day one.

Guyanese are frustrated, impatient and feel betrayed by the promises of the PPP/C.
Guyanese have become sharply critical of the PPP/C and their tone speaks volumes as they yell out their frustration with disappointment publicly.

Base on the promises made by the PPP/C, Guyanese expected immediate, tangible fulfillment of campaign promises (pensions, grants, bonuses, etc.) within the first 100 days of office.
Since those promises have not materialised, it translates by interpretation to neglectful actions via the silence and distracting activities that interminably been the evidence of the PPP/C leadership and ultimately the president, Irfan Ali.

The embarrassment, failure and cronyism of the PPP/C are ever present as it is broadcasted publicly on all social media platforms.

The repeated use of “One Guyana” and the many "builds" that they proclaim as progress have only created an environment of segregation by financial capabilities, partisan delivery of resources and social benefits, which breads distrust and further confirms their lack of empathy, patriotism, service to the people and direct inaction to create a better life for all Guyanese.

The PPP/C has failed Guyanese and Guyana miserably and they deliberately create false hope with promise of gratification with the uneconomical, unmanaged, unconstitutional disbursement of Cash Grants.

Guyana: Presidential First-100-Days Performance

Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham (in power 1964–1985; executive President 1980–1985)
Burnham’s early governance focused on structural and state‑building reforms, not quick-turnaround campaign pledges. His first months lacked any documented 100‑day fulfilment program.

Hugh Desmond Hoyte (President 1985–1992)
Hoyte initiated rapid policy redirection through the Economic Recovery Programme shortly after taking office, but these large economic reforms unfolded over time rather than being completed within 100 days.

Cheddi B. Jagan (President 1992–1997)
Jagan used the “100 days” frame for public communication, emphasising the reversal of austerity and restoration of services. However, most major promises required budget cycles and were not completed within the first 100 days.

Bharrat Jagdeo (President 1999–2011)
Jagdeo’s early months focused on macroeconomic stabilisation, debt relief groundwork, and long-range planning. These reforms exceeded the 100‑day window and were not packaged as rapid-delivery pledges.

Donald Ramotar (President 2011–2015)
Press analysis at the time described Ramotar’s first 100 days as limited in major achievements, with no large-scale campaign promises fulfilled in that period.

David Arthur Granger (President 2015–2020)
The APNU+AFC coalition published a 100‑day plan in 2015. Performance assessments show mixed results—some actions initiated, many delayed or incomplete at the 100‑day checkpoint.

Mohamed Irfaan Ali (President — 1st. term - Dec 3, 2020; 2nd. term sworn in Sept 7, 2025)
President Ali’s administrations (2020– and 2025–) highlighted budgetary and institutional constraints. Some symbolic actions occurred early, but major fiscal promises generally required budget approval and administrative systems beyond 100 days.

Irfaan Ali’s second term as president 100th day is December 15, 2025. By my counting that's September 7, 2025 as day one.

The PPP/C has failed Guyanese and Guyana miserably and they deliberately create false hope with promise of gratification with the uneconomical, unmanaged, unconstitutional disbursement of Cash Grants.

Guyanese are frustrated, impatient and feel betrayed by the promises of the PPP/C.
The embarrassment, failure and cronyism of the PPP/C are ever present as it is broadcasted publicly on all social media platforms.

Here is the Regional Comparative Context

Barbados – Mia Mottley ((took office in 2018)
Mottley’s government is known for decisive early action, particularly strong communications and immediate institutional moves. Structural reforms, however, including the later transition to a republic, occurred beyond the first 100 days.

Trinidad & Tobago – Kamla Persad-Bissessar (took office in 2010)
Her administration published early priorities and highlighted initial successes within the first months. As in Guyana, large structural reforms were mixed and extended beyond the 100‑day window.

Jamaica – Andrew Holness (took office in 2011)
Holness administrations often announce 100‑day targets. Some administrative actions occur quickly but major socio-economic reforms take longer. Jamaica’s political culture commonly treats the 100‑day mark as a public accountability moment.

Suriname - Dési Bouterse (took office in 2010) & Dr. Jennifer Geerlings-Simons - (took office in 2025)
Suriname’s governments typically act quickly on cabinet restructuring and administrative directives. However, economic, anti-corruption, and constitutional reforms exceed the 100‑day threshold.

Venezuela – Nicolas Maduro (took office in 2013)
Maduro is a leader similar to Chávez which is an example of a leader who implemented dramatic early measures, including initiating a constitutional overhaul soon after taking office. Although sweeping, even these processes extended beyond 100 days, underscoring the limits of the 100‑day metric.

French Guiana - The President of this Assembly is Gabriel Serville (took office in 2021
French Guiana isn't an independent country with its own "President," but a French overseas department, so its leader is the French President (currently Emmanuel Macron) and locally, the President of its Assembly, with Gabriel Serville being the current Assembly President.
Being an overseas department of France, major policy moves depend on Paris. Thus, the 100‑day milestone is largely irrelevant to local governance autonomy.

Overall Conclusions
Across Guyana and the wider region, the “first 100 days” framework functions mostly as a political communications tool rather than an achievable timeline for substantial socio‑economic or constitutional reforms. Symbolic actions are common; budget-dependent promises rarely materialize fully within 100 days.

🛑Azruddin Mohamed does not Qualify as a 'Fugitive Offender'.🛑Attorney General Anil Nandlall should be sued by Azruddin M...
08/12/2025

🛑Azruddin Mohamed does not Qualify as a 'Fugitive Offender'.🛑
Attorney General Anil Nandlall should be sued by Azruddin Mohamed for Libel and Defamation of Character for his misleading, incompetent and ignorant false statements

In recent public statements, Guyana's Attorney General, Anil Nandlall, referred to Member of Parliament and businessman Azruddin Mohamed as a "fugitive offender." However, a review of the Fugitive Offenders Act, Cap. 10:04, alongside publicly known facts, suggests that this description does not align with the statutory requirements or current circumstances.

Nandlall’s comments, made on his televised programme “Issues in the News,” centered on Mohamed’s indictment in the United States and the possibility of extradition. He warned of the constitutional implications of having a sitting MP facing extradition, asserting that Mohamed qualifies as a “fugitive offender.”

The Fugitive Offenders Act defines a fugitive offender as a person who has already been convicted or unlawfully remains at large after conviction, and is present outside the jurisdiction where the offense took place.
The Act states:
“‘fugitive offender’ means a person who is accused, or alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction, of an extraditable offence committed within the jurisdiction of Guyana or any Commonwealth country or foreign territory and is or is suspected to be in any country or territory, other than the country or territory in which the offence was committed or the person was convicted.”

The text makes clear:
Conviction is a prerequisite for the label. Mohamed has not been convicted in the United States or anywhere else. His case sits at the indictment stage and is pending extradition proceedings in Guyana.
Additionally, for fugitive status to apply, a person must be outside the jurisdiction of the offense or conviction. Instead, Mohamed was arrested in Guyana, released on bail, and continues to report to authorities.

Therefore, the conditions of conviction and being at large outside the relevant jurisdiction are both unmet.
Legal experts point out that while indictment and extradition requests raise serious questions, they do not automatically trigger the statute’s invocation. Mohamed’s attorneys have further argued that the charges listed may not qualify as “extraditable offences” under Guyanese law or the applicable extradition framework.

The legal and factual analysis thus indicates: as of today, Azruddin Mohamed does not meet the statutory criteria to be labeled a “fugitive offender.” Any claims suggesting otherwise appear to stretch—and potentially misapply—the wording of the Act.
The extradition process remains ongoing, but unless and until a conviction occurs and Mohamed becomes unlawfully at large, the description “fugitive offender” does not align with the law.

Explore the facts that matter and gain insights into the issues shaping Guyana, the Caribbean and your world.Visit us to...
27/11/2025

Explore the facts that matter and gain insights into the issues shaping Guyana, the Caribbean and your world.
Visit us today at theharpyeaglemedia.com to stay informed and engaged with the latest analyses of the current events happening in Guyana, the Caribbean, the USA and the world.

I've just reached 300 followers! Thank you for continuing support. I could never have made it without each one of you. 🙏...
13/10/2025

I've just reached 300 followers! Thank you for continuing support. I could never have made it without each one of you. 🙏🤗🎉

🇬🇾🛑Local Government Minister will decide Region 10 Chairman🛑🇬🇾The Minister of Local Government and Regional Development,...
11/10/2025

🇬🇾🛑Local Government Minister will decide Region 10 Chairman🛑🇬🇾

The Minister of Local Government and Regional Development, Priya Manickchand is set to decide who will be the Region 10 Chairman of the Region's Regional Democratic Council.
The decision rests between the We Invest in Nationhood (WIN) Mark Goring and A Partnership for National Unity (APNU) Dominique Blair.

Guyana recently concluded their General and Regional Elections on September 1, 2025. From the results of that election WIN party secured the majority of the Regional votes in Region 10.
The party was able to secure nine seats in the region whilst the APNU obtained five seats, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) secured three seats and the Forward Movement Guyana (FGM) obtained one seat.

On Friday October 10, 2025 the parties met to decide by voting who will be the Region 10 Chairman. The results of the process was a tie with the APNU’s five councillors, the PPP’s three councillors and FGM’s one councillor voting in favour of the the APNU's Dominique Blair.

As a result, the final decision now rests with Minister Manickchand.

Abstract:
Some things require simple common sense.
If the WIN party got the majority vote of the people in the region then it's obvious, that party deserves the seat to represent the region.
It's that simple.
Give the people what they asked for.
No individual party leader of the FGM, PPPC or APNU should be allowed to deny the majority decision of the people.
If this is what will be done then the actual Constitutional will of the people will be ignored and violated by self-serving political dictators.

Transparency International CNN International The Commonwealth United Nations Human Rights United Nations The Canadian Press News British Council India Today CNN Politics Indian National Congress Canada’s International Development – Global Affairs Canada WION CNN Modern China Canada and the World Music Radio 97.1 FM (Trinidad & Tobago) Suriname Herald BARBADOS We Invest in Nationhood

10/10/2025

🇬🇾🛑APNU & FGM PARTIES VOTE FOR PPPC AGAINST WIN🛑🇬🇾
THE HYPOCRISY OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES VOTING AGAINST THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF THEIR POLITICAL ENEMY.

The RDC Chairmanship Tie/Dispute has brought a new political dynamic of alliances to the forefront ahead of the convening of the National Assembly (Parliament).

Though WIN has the plurality in seats in Region 10’s RDC (9 seats), they "do not have an outright majority" among all councillors; hence, forming alliances is required for election of the Chairman.

The election for Chairman between WIN’s Mark Goring and APNU’s Dominique Blair ended in a tie.

Azruddin Mohamed (WIN Leader) expressed disappointment over how the RDC election process in Region 10 was conducted, especially given the tie between Mark Goring (WIN) and Dominique Blair (APNU) for Chairman. He was “surprised by the way APNU, PPP, and FGM councillors voted”, because the councillors from other parties may have crossed expected lines/unified to block his candidate or at least resulted in the tie.

Mark Goring is confident he can still secure the chairmanship by getting support from councillors outside of WIN, given that WIN does NOT have an outright majority of seats.

Here are the key facts and numbers from the 2025 Guyana General & Regional Elections and the Region 10 RDC issue, plus what is known publicly about reactions. If you want, I can try to dig up what Azruddin Mohamed has said more specifically about the tie.

Summary of the 2025 Guyana Regional, Region 10 (Upper Demerara-Upper Berbice) — Specifics & RDC Election

A. In the General Elections in Region 10:
✓ WIN got 10,458 votes
✓ APNU got 5,334 votes
✓ PPP/C got 4,260 votes
✓ Other parties FGM, AFC, ALP had smaller counts (FGM 662, AFC 210, ALP 85)

B. Number of electors vs turnout:
✓ Of the 38,460 Electors on the list in Region 10, 21,195 actually voted.
✓ Rejected/spoiled ballots: In Region 10
There were 186 rejected ballots, 8 destroyed, 91 spoiled

C. Seat allocations in the Regional Democratic Council (RDC) for Region 10:
1. WIN got 9 seats with 10,262 votes
2. APNU got 5 seats with 5,370 votes
3. PPP/C got 3 seats with 4,197 votes
4. FGM got 1 seat with 818 votes

Transparency International The Commonwealth The Canadian Press News CNN Politics CNN India Today WION Canada’s International Development – Global Affairs Canada CNN International Indian National Congress British Council Music Radio 97.1 FM (Trinidad & Tobago) BARBADOS Suriname Herald

09/10/2025

🇬🇾🛑NO NEW INFRASTRUCTURAL INDUSTRY IN GUYANA SINCE 1992🛑🇬🇾
INDUSTRIAL STAGNATION UNDER THE PPPC: A FAILURE TO HARNESS TECHNICAL TALENT.

THE PPPC government of Guyana since 1992 to present has failed to timely, adequately and effectively create and implement new Infrastructural industries in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana.

However, the irony is that the PPPC government prides themselves on the basis of them executing numerous Infrastructural development projects, while there is no industry in Guyana that produces any of the raw materials for these projects.

This industrial production deficit has resulted in the overpricing of projects due to the importance of raw materials, equipment and services.
This has also resulted in increased corruption, unaccountability and BOOTS Projects.

Transparency International United Nations Human Rights CNN International United Nations The Commonwealth Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation The Canadian Press News Canada’s International Development – Global Affairs Canada Canada and the World British Council India Today Modern China Canada’s International Trade - Global Affairs Canada British Army Indian National Congress WION CNN CNN Politics @

🛑🛑 WAR IN THE CARIBBEAN🛑 🛑US military influence in the Caribbean - Guyana's Sovereignty and Survival at risk and threate...
06/10/2025

🛑🛑 WAR IN THE CARIBBEAN🛑 🛑
US military influence in the Caribbean - Guyana's Sovereignty and Survival at risk and threatened.

In recent months, while Barbados Prime Minister has expressed some amount of dissatisfaction with foreign influence in the Caribbean region, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago (TT) has openly endorsed the deployment of U.S. military assets into the southern Caribbean with the goal of dismantling “terrorist drug cartels.”
President, Mohamed Irfan Ali of Guyana and Prime Minister Kamla Persad‑Bissessar of Trinidad and Tobago have declared full support for the U.S. naval deployment, including destroyers, a nuclear submarine, and marines, as an inevitable response to escalating crime, especially violence tied to narcotics, arms, and human trafficking.

This posture marks a continuation of a long pattern in the Caribbean: post‑colonial states aligning with U.S. strategic and security agendas, sometimes willingly, often because they feel they have no viable alternative.

Endorsing U.S. Military Action Without Regional Consensus
Guyana's President and TT’s Prime Minister did not consult CARICOM on the matter. While TT's Prime Minister explicitly said she had “no intention of engaging” the regional integration grouping regarding U.S. military deployment, Guyana's president said, "The government of Guyana underscores the necessity for strengthened cooperation concerted efforts at the national. regional, hemispheric and global levels to effectively combat this menace." This signals a willingness to side with U.S. policy individually rather than with regional solidarity or joint decision‑making.

Framing Narratives in U.S. Terms
Guyana and TT’s leadership has adopted language familiar from U.S. counter‑narcotics framing: “terrorist drug cartels,” “narco‑trafficking,” invoking “law‑of‑conflict,” etc. The Prime Minister praised U.S. strikes and even said that all traffickers “should be killed violently.”

Dependence for Security
Guyana much like TT admits it lacks sufficient resources, capacity, or jurisdictional reach to police transnational crime, porous sea lanes, arms and drug smuggling, etc. Support for U.S. presence is justified in part by inability to manage these threats alone.

Aligning with U.S. Geopolitical Goals
While the explicit goal is counter‑narcotics, the presence of U.S. naval might in the Caribbean, especially near Venezuela, also carries the potential for pressure against regimes considered adversarial by the U.S. Some in the region perceive this not just as crime control, but as geopolitical positioning.

1. Compromised Sovereignty and Public Risk
When a small country like Guyana allows foreign military presence (or publicly supports foreign strikes in regional waters), it risks being drawn into conflicts or operations that impinge on its own sovereignty. Mistaken strikes, collateral damage, or diplomatic blowback are risks. Also, local populations (fishers, coastal communities) may suffer from disruption, dangers, or restrictions. Guyana has already begun to within and feel the blunt of such disruptions and danger within and along the borders of the rivers between them and Venezuela.

2. Erosion of Regional Solidarity and Voice
Guyana at the head of CARICOM has long maintained, or aspired to maintain, principles like the Caribbean as a "Zone of Peace" and non‑interference. Individual member countries supporting U.S. military deployment unilaterally weaken the ability of the region to negotiate from a unified front, impose collective conditions, or resist U.S. pressure. TT’s refusal to engage CARICOM on this matter weakens regional cohesion.

3. Legal Ambiguities and Potential Violations
Strikes in international waters, the question of whether U.S. operations respect international law, whether cartels are "terrorist organizations," etc., are contested issues. Caribbean governments may lack the capacity to independently verify or challenge U.S. claims, leaving them vulnerable to legal and moral criticisms.

4. Dependency and Weak Internal Capacity
Because states like Guyana and TT feel they cannot handle crime alone, they lean heavily on U.S. military, intelligence, funding, training. This dependency reduces incentives or opportunities to build internal capacity, judicial systems, policing, community resilience, etc. Over time, this can weaken sovereign governance.

5. Public Backlash and Domestic Political Costs
The Guyana government’s alignment may be unpopular with segments of the population who see foreign military presence as threatening or as undermining national dignity or sovereignty. It can also provoke opposition parties.

6. Geopolitical Vulnerability
By aligning closely with one superpower, Guyana and Caribbean countries might alienate other regional powers or neighbors (e.g., Venezuela), reducing diplomatic flexibility. They also may become pawns in larger U.S. geopolitical strategies (e.g. U.S. vs Venezuelan tensions) without direct benefits beyond security assurances.

Economic Dependency
Trade, foreign direct investment, remittances, aid, tourism—all of which often flow from or through the U.S. or U.S.‑tied markets—are crucial to many Caribbean economies. Governments fear economic consequences of opposing U.S. policies.

Security & Enforcement Gaps
With the recent resurfacing of a controversial border dispute between Guyana and Venezuela Maritime boundaries, law enforcement, customs, border control, intelligence gathering and auspicious aerial supervision are costly, and technically demanding. Guyana and very few Caribbean states can patrol large sea zones, monitor trans-shipment, or police organised crime alone. U.S. cooperation often offers capacity that otherwise doesn’t exist.

Debt and Aid Dependence
Like many other Caribbean countries, Guyana is indebted, rely on loans or grants from international institutions in which the U.S. has influence (e.g., World Bank, IMF, multilateral development banks). Thus, pushing back strongly against U.S. policy can risk aid suspension, economic penalties, or adverse treatment in multilateral forums.

Political and Institutional Constraints
Smaller island states have limited diplomatic corps, limited technical capacity to evaluate military/legal claims (about international law, rules of engagement), or to sustain prolonged diplomatic conflict with an external power.

Historical / Cultural Legacy of Colonialism
The institutions, alliances, legal systems, foreign policy orientations of Guyana and many Caribbean states were shaped during colonial rule by the British, French, Dutch, etc. Over time, these have created patterns of deference, foreign dependency, and norms that favor alignment with powerful external actors over regional assertiveness.

Lack of Unified Regional Mechanisms
CARICOM aims to provide collective bargaining power, but in practice its capacity to enforce unified foreign policy or security policy is weak. Member states often act independently. Disagreements, different threat perceptions, political ideologies, and domestic priorities make coherent regional opposition difficult.

Conclusion
Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago’s recent statements and policy choices are a case study in how post‑colonial Caribbean states grapple with imperfect sovereignty. On one hand, leaders publicly align with U.S. military actions and rely on U.S. capacity to counter threats they say they cannot handle alone. On the other hand, this alignment carries risks: loss of autonomy, legal, moral, and diplomatic exposure, domestic political costs, and potential erosion of regional unity.

For CARICOM and other regional bodies, the challenge is to find a way to assert collective decision‑making, strengthen internal capacities (judicial, security, border control), and negotiate terms with external powers from a position of greater leverage. But given the economic, security, institutional, and historical realities, full independence in decision‑making vis‑à‑vis a superpower like the U.S. remains difficult.

Story - A Cheddi Sepaul

Transparency International United Nations Human Rights United Nations CNN International The Commonwealth Canada’s International Development – Global Affairs Canada Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Canada and the World Canada’s International Trade - Global Affairs Canada The Canadian Press News British Army British Council Modern China India Today Indian National Congress

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