https://www.facebook.com/704765442719175/

Inside Sikkim- Watchdog, Bhanjyang Road, Namchi (2026)

13/08/2026

A NOTE FROM TEAM INSIDE SIKKIM

Behind every post you read, there is a lot of work -reading documents, analysing data, researching records, verifying facts, checking figures and then presenting everything in a way that is easy to understand.

We know our reach is still limited. Our goal is simple: to reach more readers and help more people understand the facts that affect Sikkim.

We have bigger plans ahead. We are currently developing a dedicated webpage and have plans to build a full-fledged website, app-based news portal and eventually a complete digital news platform.

But plans need capital, and at this juncture, we are short of the resources required to take these ideas forward. For now, our biggest strength is you -our readers.

If you believe Inside Sikkim is doing something useful by educating people, questioning issues and presenting facts and figures, please do one simple thing:

SHARE OUR POSTS.

Every share expands our reach. Every new reader helps us grow. And every bit of support brings us closer to building the digital platform we envision for Sikkim.

We don’t ask for much. Just your support, your reach and your voice.

Team Inside Sikkim

13/08/2026

INSIDE SIKKIM | VIEWPOINT

PAY FIXATION 2026: WHAT SHOULD GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES EXPECT?

Inside Sikkim has received numerous messages from government employees asking us to cover pay fixation. This is an issue that deserves facts and context not another WhatsApp calculator.

To understand what employees may reasonably expect in 2026, it helps to look at the 7th Central Pay Commission and Sikkim’s own Revised Pay Rules, 2018. The 7th CPC was constituted in February 2014 and submitted its report in November 2015. The report itself did not revise salaries; the Union Government first examined and accepted the recommendations before notifying the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2016, effective from 1 January 2016.

Under the 7th CPC, the old Pay Band and Grade Pay system was replaced by a Pay Matrix. Existing basic pay was multiplied by the 2.57 fitment factor and placed in the appropriate Level and cell. The 2.57 was a mechanism for translating existing pay into the new structure not a simple 157% increase in take-home salary. Fixation also had to account for increments, promotions and other service circumstances. Subsequent clarification orders show that implementation continued even after the principal Rules were issued.
Sikkim followed a similar broad model in 2018. The Sikkim Government Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2018 were notified on 23 June 2018 and made effective from 1 January 2016. The State adopted a Pay Matrix and the 2.57 multiplier, but importantly, it created its own State rules. A Central Pay Commission does not automatically revise the salaries of Sikkim Government employees.

The 2018 experience also provides a useful precedent on arrears: the revised pay was retrospective, while arrears were paid through three equal instalments. Therefore, the effective date, actual fixation and payment of arrears need not occur simultaneously.

Now comes 2026. The 8th Central Pay Commission was constituted on 3 November 2025 and has 18 months to submit its report. It is still undertaking consultations. As of August 2026, there is no officially notified 8th CPC fitment factor or final Pay Matrix. Figures circulating on social media should therefore be treated as projections, not Government decisions.

For Sikkim, the Central exercise may provide a benchmark, but the State must ultimately decide its own pay structure. Employees therefore need clarity on the effective date, fixation formula, Pay Matrix, treatment of DA, increments and promotions, retirement cases and arrears.

There is also a practical reason for timely clarity. While a revision is being processed, employees continue to receive increments, promotions and financial upgradations, while others retire. Each event eventually has to be reconciled with the revised structure. The longer the gap between the effective date and actual fixation, the more complicated the exercise becomes.

The discussion should therefore move beyond “What will the fitment factor be?” The more important question is: What is the Government’s roadmap from pay revision to individual fixation?

The journey is straightforward in principle: Government decision → revised rules → fixation formula → Pay Matrix → individual fixation → salary implementation → arrears.

Employees do not need another unofficial calculator. They need an official framework that tells them how their revised Basic Pay will actually be determined.

A Pay Commission becomes real not when a committee is constituted or a report is written, but when the employee opens the salary slip and sees the revised Basic Pay.

INSIDE SIKKIM

13/08/2026

INSIDE SIKKIM | VIEWPOINT

Is Sikkim Really Bankrupt?

A data-driven assessment beyond political rhetoric

The word “bankrupt” has entered Sikkim’s political vocabulary. The Citizen Action Party has used it to describe what it sees as the state’s deteriorating finances. The SKM government rejects the description and points to roads, infrastructure, welfare and a larger Budget. Both sides are looking at different parts of the same balance sheet. The question is whether Sikkim’s present model of borrowing, spending and welfare can continue.

The 2026–27 Budget provides a reason to take the question seriously. Revenue receipts are projected at about ₹12,379 crore against revenue expenditure of ₹11,173 crore, leaving a relatively narrow revenue surplus. More striking is the projected fiscal deficit of ₹5,251 crore, or 8.34 per cent of GSDP. Public debt and other obligations are projected to rise substantially, while the state’s own revenue remains comparatively narrow. This does not make Sikkim bankrupt. It does, however, point towards shrinking fiscal flexibility.

That distinction matters. Bankruptcy is a dramatic political word. Fiscal stress is a measurable condition.

The pressure becomes clearer when one looks at committed expenditure. Salaries are budgeted at ₹4,253.62 crore, pensions at ₹1,648.81 crore and interest payments at ₹1,262.26 crore together about 64 per cent of projected revenue expenditure. At the same time, the state faces the financial implications of the 2026 pay fixation, regularisation of employees appointed before the 2024 elections, teachers’ regularisation, pending arrears for new appointees and reportedly unpaid bills of petty contractors, including fair-weather road works. None of these obligations is unreasonable by itself. The question is whether the revenue base is growing quickly enough to carry all of them.

Then there is welfare.

Sikkim’s governments have long used social-security schemes to provide housing and assistance. Roof sheets, house upgradation and REDRH CMRHM under the SDF government were continued. Social protection is necessary but a welfare state also needs to know whether it is reducing vulnerability or repeatedly subsidising the same households.

The CMRHM numbers deserve scrutiny. If a house originally estimated at around ₹9 lakh in the 2012–13 DPR reached approximately ₹18 lakh by 2019–20, with furniture added, ordinary escalation alone does not explain the entire increase. At 4.57 per cent compounded annually, ₹9 lakh becomes roughly ₹12.31 lakh after seven years. Reaching ₹18 lakh implies an annual increase of about 10.4 per cent. That does not prove that the revised cost was unjustified specifications, site conditions, furniture and additional scope may explain the difference but the revised DPR should make the explanation visible.

The same principle should apply to major projects, one such example Dhapper–Bhaleydhunga at Yangang. A project becoming more expensive is not evidence of wrongdoing. Himalayan construction is expensive, and delays have consequences but every major escalation should answer four simple questions:
What was the original estimate? What changed? Why did it change? Who approved the additional cost?

The welfare question is equally simple. If a household that previously benefited from roof sheets, house upgradation or REDRH later has two sons separately allotted houses under CMRHM, that is not automatically wrongdoing. Adult children may independently qualify. But does the government have an integrated beneficiary database showing the family’s cumulative assistance? If not, successive welfare schemes can overlap without the state knowing how much public money has ultimately reached the same household.

This is also why CAP’s “bankrupt” argument cannot simply be dismissed as political rhetoric. CAP has pointed to rising debt alongside welfare commitments, salary obligations, regularisation, infrastructure expenditure and other liabilities. Its debt figures should be independently reconciled with official accounts, but the underlying question is legitimate: how much more can Sikkim commit before its fiscal room begins to disappear?

The government, however, has an equally legitimate defence. Sikkim is a small Himalayan state. Infrastructure costs more. The GLOF of October 2023 damaged roads, hydropower infrastructure and tourism, weakening revenue and increasing reconstruction requirements. Borrowing for productive infrastructure is not inherently irresponsible. Welfare is not inherently a “freebie”. A house for a vulnerable family can be an investment in social security; a road can create economic value.

The test is what comes next.

Does the expenditure create future economic capacity or merely future liability?

Sikkim’s own-revenue base remains limited, while central transfers play a major role. That makes fiscal discipline more important, not less. A state can have a growing GSDP, impressive infrastructure and still have declining fiscal freedom if its recurring commitments grow faster than its revenue.

So, is Sikkim bankrupt? No ,not in the literal sense but the numbers explain why CAP has chosen that word, even if the word itself is politically exaggerated. The more accurate description may be fiscal stress accompanied by narrowing fiscal flexibility.

The government should publish the complete picture: employee arrears, pay-fixation costs, regularisation liabilities, contractor dues, welfare commitments, guarantees, debt servicing and the original versus revised costs of major projects.

CAP should do more than criticise. It should tell Sikkim what it would cut, what it would retain and how it would finance its alternative.
The real choice is not between development and bankruptcy.It is between development that creates future economic capacity and development that creates future fiscal obligations.
The question Sikkim should ask is not whether it can borrow again.It is whether it can afford to keep doing exactly what it is doing now.

Inside Sikkim | Viewpoint

11/08/2026

Inside the File | When an Application Changed Categories

Every recruitment begins with a form. A candidate declares their eligibility, selects a category, uploads the required documents and submits the application. From that point, the process is expected to be mechanical scrutiny, verification, recommendation and appointment, each stage building upon the last but sometimes, somewhere between the application and the appointment, the file changes its story.

A recent judgment of the High Court of Sikkim in WP(C) No.16 of 2026, along with WP(C) No.25 of 2025, reveals one such case. The petitioner had applied for the post of Horticulture Development Officer under the OBC Central List and was ranked seventh among fifteen vacancies. During scrutiny, however, he produced an OBC State List certificate. The Sikkim Public Service Commission accepted it and appointed him against a State List vacancy.

The candidate argued that the change was made following advice from the authorities. The High Court rejected that explanation, holding that once an application is submitted and the cut-off date passes, both the candidate and the recruiting authority are bound by the particulars in that application unless the rules permit correction.

The matter then reached the State Scrutiny Committee but here too, the process became complicated. Instead of determining the candidate’s caste status, the Committee examined how the certificate had been obtained. The High Court held that this was outside the Committee’s mandate and set aside its order, reiterating that the Committee’s role was to determine caste status and make a recommendation not conduct an inquiry into the recruitment process itself.

On the central issue, the Court was clear: a candidate who applied under the OBC Central List could not claim appointment against a vacancy reserved for the OBC State List. The termination order dated 6 March 2026 was therefore upheld but the Court did not simply close the file.

Recognising the consequences of the earlier appointment, it directed the State to consider accommodating the petitioner against a future vacancy within two months. If no vacancy arose, the Court directed the creation of a supernumerary post, to be regularised against the next available substantive vacancy.

The legal question has been answered. The administrative questions remain.

How did an application under one reservation category result in an appointment under another? At what stage was the discrepancy missed? And if recruitment involves application, scrutiny, verification and recommendation, what failed when the mismatch passed through those stages?

The judgment does not accuse any individual of wrongdoing, nor does it answer those administrative questions. But it does leave behind an uncomfortable lesson: a recruitment system is only as strong as the checks that operate between the application and the appointment.

Because sometimes, the most revealing part of a government file is not the judgment that finally closes it.

It is the page where nobody stopped it.

11/08/2026

THE GDZP FILE : How Slow Does a File Move?

By Inside Sikkim Desk

The press release dated 11 August 2026 announced another arrest in the GDZP financial-misappropriation case. A Head Assistant of the Tourism Department was arrested on allegations of conspiracy and receipt of funds allegedly diverted from GDZP accounts and the Jal Jeevan Mission security deposit.

But this was not where the story began.

On 21 February 2026, two GDZP Accountants were arrested over allegations of manipulating salary bills and forwarding fabricated payee lists to banks, resulting in alleged diversion of government funds. On 15 April, the investigation moved higher up the financial chain with the arrest of a retired Senior Accounts Officer-cum-DDO of GDZP.

Then, almost four months later, came the latest arrest.

Three stages. 171 days and behind them lies an allegation far bigger than the arrests themselves.

The latest Vigilance release says the alleged manipulation of salary bills covers the period 2018 to 2025 seven years of records, payments and financial transactions.

That raises the questions the press releases do not answer.
How much money was actually misappropriated? How many salary bills were manipulated? Who prepared, verified and authorised them? When was the irregularity first detected? And where did the money ultimately go?

A government payment does not ordinarily travel from a salary bill straight into a bank account. There is a chain preparation, verification, certification, disbursement and banking records.

If the allegations are eventually proved, the real story may therefore not be limited to the people who allegedly benefited. It will also be about how the system allowed the alleged transactions to continue for years.

The investigation is ongoing, and every accused person remains entitled to due process and the presumption of innocence.

But public money demands public answers.

Six months after the first arrests, the file is still moving. What the public is waiting for is not another page announcing another arrest.
It is the page that explains the money, the mechanism and the complete chain of responsibility.

Because the question is no longer simply who was arrested?

It is How slow does a file have to move before someone asks why?

30/07/2026

Inside Sikkim | Inside the Budget

Demand No. 1 – Agriculture Department

A Larger Budget, but the Real Test Begins Now

The Agriculture Department awaited four months of the financial year 2026–27 with an ambitious budget that promises to strengthen agricultural infrastructure, improve irrigation, promote climate-resilient farming, expand digital agriculture and continue support for organic farming. On paper, the department appears to have been entrusted with a renewed developmental mandate. The Budget Estimates suggest a government seeking to accelerate investment in one of Sikkim’s most important sectors.

However, budgets are statements of intent. Their credibility is determined not by the figures presented on Budget Day, but by the expenditure ultimately achieved at the end of the financial year.

The experience of 2025–26 offers an important benchmark for evaluating the current year’s allocations.

The Agriculture Department began the previous financial year with a Budget Estimate of ₹390.70 crore. By the time the Revised Estimates were prepared, the allocation had been reduced to ₹283.16 crore, reflecting a reduction of over ₹107 crore, or nearly 28 per cent of the original budget. Such a substantial revision indicates that a significant portion of the department’s planned expenditure could not be translated into actual spending during the course of the year.

The reductions were concentrated largely in developmental programmes rather than in administrative expenditure. Major Centrally Sponsored Schemes, including the Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana (PMKSY), Mission Organic Value Chain Development for North Eastern Region (MOVCDNER), National Mission on Agricultural Mechanisation (SMAM) and the National Food Security Mission (NFSM), all witnessed downward revisions before the financial year concluded.

This pattern is significant because these are the schemes through which farmers receive direct developmental support whether in the form of irrigation, mechanisation, organic value chains, productivity enhancement or technology adoption. While the budget documents do not specify the reasons for these reductions, they clearly demonstrate that the pace of implementation did not match the original financial planning.

Against this backdrop, the 2026–27 Budget proposes a substantially restructured agricultural programme. New allocations have been made under the Prime Minister Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana (PM-RKVY) framework, covering initiatives such as the Digital Agriculture Mission, Per Drop More Crop, Climate Resilient Integrated Farming Systems, Soil Health and Fertility Management, Agri Infrastructure through DPR-based projects, and several other interventions aimed at modernising the agricultural sector.

These initiatives reflect a broader policy shift towards technology-driven, climate-resilient and infrastructure-based agricultural development. The vision is ambitious. The challenge, however, lies in implementation.

The lessons of 2025–26 suggest that generous allocations alone do not guarantee successful ex*****on. Delays in project implementation, slower utilisation of Central assistance, procurement bottlenecks, administrative approvals or other operational constraints can all result in significant downward revisions before the financial year closes. If these underlying issues remain unresolved, the enlarged allocations announced for 2026–27 may once again fail to translate into actual expenditure.

Consequently, the performance of the Agriculture Department during the current financial year should be evaluated not merely on the basis of sanctioned allocations but on its ability to sustain expenditure throughout the year. The Revised Estimates of 2026–27 will ultimately reveal whether this year’s ambitious Budget represents genuine expansion or another instance of overestimation.

Budget Watch: A ₹1,000 Provision for Medical Treatment

One entry in the 2026–27 Demand for Grants deserves particular attention.

The Budget provides an allocation of only ₹1,000 under the Medical Treatment head.

Although medical expenditure constitutes a relatively small component of the department’s overall budget, such a nominal provision leaves virtually no room for meeting unforeseen medical reimbursement or emergency medical expenses from the original allocation. Should claims arise during the financial year, the department may have to depend upon re-appropriation of funds from other heads or seek Supplementary Demands for Grants before adequate funds become available.

Until such financial adjustments are made, the extremely limited budget provision could affect the department’s ability to settle medical claims immediately, subject to the applicable financial rules and availability of funds. The budget documents do not explain the rationale behind fixing the provision at ₹1,000, making this a budget head that warrants closer observation as the financial year progresses.

While the amount itself is insignificant in the context of the department’s overall expenditure, it illustrates the importance of detailed budget scrutiny. Small allocations can often reveal larger questions regarding budget planning and financial management.

Inside Sikkim Analysis

The Agriculture Budget for 2026–27 should therefore be viewed as a budget of opportunity rather than accomplishment.

It carries the promise of expanded public investment, modern agricultural practices and improved rural infrastructure. Yet the credibility of these promises rests on one critical factor—implementation.

For Sikkim’s farming community, success will not be measured by the size of the Budget Estimate announced in the Legislative Assembly, but by the number of irrigation systems completed, machinery distributed, infrastructure created, climate-resilient projects implemented and schemes actually reaching the intended beneficiaries.

The real test of this Budget will come not today, but when the Revised Estimates for 2026–27 are placed before the House. If the department succeeds in maintaining expenditure close to its original allocation, this Budget could represent a meaningful step towards strengthening Sikkim’s agricultural economy. If, however, substantial downward revisions recur as they did in 2025–26, the gap between budgetary ambition and administrative ex*****on will once again define the department’s financial performance.

In public finance, allocations create expectations. Delivery creates confidence. The Agriculture Department’s challenge in 2026–27 is not simply to spend more—but to spend effectively, transparently and on time.

20/07/2026

Inside Sikkim | REPORT

Budget Session 2026-27 Begins Today: Governor’s Address, Six Bills and Four-Day Budget Marathon Ahead

Gangtok, July 20: The Fourth Session (Part-II) of the Eleventh Sikkim Legislative Assembly, the Budget Session 2026-27, begins today with the customary Governor’s Address and the presentation of the General Budget for the financial year 2026-27. The session will continue till 23 July, during which legislators will debate the Budget, scrutinise departmental demands for grants, consider legislation and pass the Appropriation Bill.

According to the official List of Business, members will assemble at 10:50 AM, with the Governor scheduled to address the House at 11:00 AM. Following the Governor’s departure, Speaker Mingma Norbu Sherpa will formally report the address to the Assembly before Chief Minister P.S. Tamang, as Leader of the House, moves the Motion of Thanks, which will be seconded by Minister Arun Kumar Upreti.

Six Bills on Today’s Agenda

Apart from the Budget, the House is scheduled to introduce six Bills:
• Sikkim Medical Council for Indian System of Medicine Bill, 2026
• Sikkim Private Universities (Establishment and Regulation) (Amendment) Bill, 2026
• Board of Open Schooling and Skill Education Sikkim (Amendment) Bill, 2026
• Board of Open Schooling and Vocational Education, Sikkim Bill, 2026
• National Council for Skill Education, Sikkim (Repealing) Bill, 2026
• Sikkim Fire and Emergency Services (Amendment) Bill, 2026

Budget to Be Presented Today

Chief Minister P.S. Tamang, who also holds the Finance portfolio, will present the Explanatory Memorandum, Annual Financial Statement, Estimates of Receipts and Demands for Grants for 2026-27, marking the first stage of the Budget process.

What Happens Over the Next Three Days?

The provisional calendar shows that the Assembly will undertake an intensive four-day Budget exercise:

July 21
• Discussion on the Governor’s Address and voting on the Motion of Thanks.
• General discussion on the Budget.
• Department-wise discussion and voting on Demands for Grants relating to:
• Public Health Engineering, Water Resources and Ecclesiastical Affairs.
• Rural Development, Panchayati Raj and Cooperation.
• Social Welfare, Women, Child, Senior Citizen & Divyangjan Welfare, and Printing & Stationery.

July 22

The Assembly will take up Demands for Grants of:
• Buildings & Housing and Labour.
• Urban Development and Food & Civil Supplies.
• Health & Family Welfare, Ayush and Culture.
• Agriculture, Horticulture, Animal Husbandry & Veterinary Services and Fisheries.
• Forest & Environment, Mines & Geology and Science & Technology.

July 23

The final day of the session will include:
• Demands for Grants relating to Roads & Bridges; Education, Sports & Youth Affairs, Law & Parliamentary Affairs; Tourism & Civil Aviation, Commerce & Industries and Food Processing Industries.
• Consideration of the large group of departments under the Chief Minister, including Finance, Home, Planning & Development, Personnel, Power, Transport, Information Technology, Excise, Land Revenue, Disaster Management and several others.
• Voting and passing of the General Budget 2026-27.
• Presentation, consideration and passing of the Sikkim Appropriation Bill, 2026.
• Presentation of CAG reports and other reports, followed by valedictory remarks before the House adjourns sine die.

Why This Budget Matters

The 2026-27 Budget comes at a crucial time as Sikkim faces growing fiscal challenges, increasing infrastructure commitments and rising public expectations. Beyond announcing allocations, the four-day session will determine how resources are distributed across departments, what legislative reforms are prioritised, and how the government intends to balance development with financial sustainability.

Inside Sikkim will closely track the Budget speech, departmental allocations, fiscal indicators, policy announcements and debates in the House, providing in-depth analysis throughout the Budget Session.

13/07/2026

Inside Sikkim | Editorial

Borrowing Tomorrow: Sikkim’s ₹1,000 Crore Question
Governments borrow because development costs money. Roads, hospitals, schools and power projects are rarely built from current revenues alone. Debt, therefore, is not a sign of failure. It is a financial instrument. Whether it becomes a burden or a catalyst depends entirely on what is built with it.

On 8 July 2026, the Government of Sikkim entered the debt market once again, raising ₹200 crore through a 13-year State Development Loan at a cut-off yield of 7.58 per cent. The auction attracted bids worth nearly ₹930 crore, more than four times the amount the State intended to borrow. Investors clearly believed Sikkim was a safe borrower. The market, in other words, has shown confidence. Now it is the government’s turn to show clarity.

The latest borrowing is not an isolated event. According to the Reserve Bank of India’s borrowing calendar, Sikkim is expected to return to the market three more times before the end of September. If those auctions proceed as scheduled, the State will have borrowed ₹1,000 crore in just the first phase of its market borrowing programme for 2026-27.

There is nothing extraordinary about this. States across India borrow every year. What deserves attention is the trend. RBI data shows that Sikkim’s gross market borrowing increased from ₹1,951 crore in 2024-25 to ₹2,650 crore in 2025-26. Borrowing is growing faster than it did a year ago, suggesting that debt is becoming an increasingly important part of the State’s fiscal strategy.

That, by itself, should not trigger alarm. Sikkim is a young Himalayan state with enormous infrastructure needs. Better roads, resilient bridges, reliable water supply, stronger hospitals, tourism infrastructure and modern public utilities all require capital. Borrowing to create such assets is not merely justified -it is often unavoidable. The concern arises only when the public cannot clearly see the connection between the money being borrowed and the assets being created.

The government has repeatedly maintained that Sikkim’s finances remain sound. There is no reason to dismiss that claim outright. But confidence is strengthened by transparency, not by assurances alone. Citizens know that ₹200 crore has been borrowed. They also know that another ₹800 crore is likely to follow over the next few months. What they do not know is which projects these loans will finance, how much each project will cost, and how those investments are expected to strengthen the State’s economy over the next decade.

These are not partisan questions. They are questions that naturally arise whenever public debt increases. Every rupee borrowed today will eventually be repaid from future budgets. Those repayments will be met not by anonymous balance sheets but by the revenues generated by Sikkim’s economy and, ultimately, by its taxpayers. Debt is sustainable only when it leaves behind assets that continue to generate economic and social value long after the loan has been repaid.

This is also an opportunity for the government. Rather than allowing speculation to fill the information gap, it can place before the public a clear picture of its borrowing strategy. If these funds are financing transformative infrastructure, there is every reason to say so. Transparency does not weaken governance; it strengthens public confidence in it.

The Reserve Bank has answered one question by confirming that investors are willing to lend Sikkim another ₹1,000 crore.

The government must answer the one that matters more.

When these loans are finally repaid thirteen years from now, what will Sikkim have built with them?

Sikkim Market Borrowing Calendar (July–September 2026)

Auction Date Settlement Date Amount
7 July 2026 8 July 2026 ₹200 crore (Completed)
4 August 2026 5 August 2026 ₹200 crore (Indicative)
1 Sept 2026 2 Sept 2026 ₹200 crore (Indicative)
29 Sept 2026 30 Sept 2026 ₹400 crore (Indicative)

Total Planned Market Borrowing (July–September 2026): ₹1,000 crore

References
1. Reserve Bank of India, Result of Yield/Price Based Auction of State Government Securities, Press Release dated 7 July 2026.

2. Reserve Bank of India, Indicative Calendar of Market Borrowings by State Governments/Union Territories for the Quarter July–September 2026.
3. Reserve Bank of India Bulletin (May 2026), Current Statistics – Market Borrowings of State Governments.

Inside Sikkim- Watchdog

13/08/2026

13/08/2026

13/08/2026

11/08/2026

11/08/2026

30/07/2026

20/07/2026

13/07/2026

Address

Website

Alerts

Shortcuts

Share

Category

Listing takedown request