01/03/2025
UKRAINE WAR;
Reciprocity and Saving Face Matter for Any Deal Between Russia-Ukraine.
The Russia-Ukraine war, now in its third year as of March 2025, looks like a grinding stalemate with no easy end.
Russia is bogged down by military and economic strain, while Ukraine fights for survival against a larger foe, backed by a West wary of escalation.
To break this deadlock, two psychological principles from Robert Cialdini’s work: reciprocity and saving face-could be key.
On the first hand, Reciprocity means the idea that giving something prompts a return. This offers Russia-Ukraine a path to de-escalation: if one side concedes, the other might too, creating a balanced exit.
On the other hand, Saving face ensures neither side looks defeated. This is especially important when pride and national identity fuel both Putin’s aggression and Ukraine’s resistance.
History shows these dynamics can work, as they did in 1962.
See, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was a masterclass in applying reciprocity and saving face under nuclear stakes. The Soviet Union, led by Nikita Khrushchev, had secretly placed missiles in Cuba to offset America’s nuclear dominance and shield its ally from American threats post-Bay of Pigs.
When America learned of the missiles sites, it became a Soviet nightmare: caught red-handed (they couldnt sing “it wasn’t me”), they faced war with a stronger foe or a humiliating retreat. Kennedy demanded the missiles’ removal, threatening escalation, but the resolution hinged on negotiation.
To avert a nuclear war, a deal was eventually reached. The first step was Reciprocity: Khrushchev withdrew the Cuban missiles, and Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba. This public reciprocity gave the Soviets a concession to justify their pullback. Without making it public, America agreed to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey, near the Soviet border (it would be revealed many years later). These aging missiles irked Moscow, and their quiet withdrawal was a reciprocal gesture that balanced the scales.
Turkey’s role was big as it gave Khrushchev a strategic win to offset Cuba’s loss, easing Soviet fears of encirclement.
To seal all these deals, both sides had to Save Face.
To save face back home, Khrushchev claimed he forced American concessions (which are rare) while Kennedy touted the missiles’ exit as a triumph. The quiet removal of the Jupiter Missiles in Turkey allowed Kennedy not to lose his stature back home. If this had been made public, perception in America would have been Kennedy was weak.
This conflict ended with no shots fired and both leaders’ images intact.
Fast forward to 2025, and Russia’s war with Ukraine echoes 1962’s stakes, of course, minus the nuclear showdown (so far).
For Russia, the conflict is a mess: heavy losses, sanctions, and NATO’s growth (Finland, Sweden). These undermine Putin’s goals of dominance and security. Like the Soviets in Cuba, Russia risks overreach and disgrace if it can’t claim victory. Ukraine, battered but defiant, needs to preserve its sovereignty without breaking. The West wants stability but fears a deal too lenient on Moscow.
Can Reciprocity and Saving Face work?
For Reciprocity, Russia could pull back from occupied zones, and Ukraine agrees to neutrality (no NATO) or cedes Crimea formally. The West might ease sanctions or fund rebuilding, giving Putin an economic lifeline. Each side gives to get, mirroring Kennedy and Khrushchev’s swap.
How do all the sides Save Face? This is thornier but doable. Putin could spin a withdrawal as “securing Russia’s borders” or “stopping NATO’s creep.” Zelensky might frame it as “repelling an empire,” keeping most of Ukraine intact. The West could boast of defending democracy without war widening.
Russia and Ukraine need something to take, and a story to tell.
All these shenanigans at the White House etc, they don’t mean anything and if I was a negotiator, I would just laugh because they have no bearing on the eventual deal.
