20/09/2025
What a Reported SNA Base in Somaliland’s Las Anod/Sanaag Would Mean for the Horn?
— Reports emerging from Mogadishu indicate China is working closely with Somalia’s federal authorities to establish a new command base for the Somali National Army (SNA), designated as the 26th command, either on the outskirts of LasAnod or at a site within the Sanaag region. Officials have kept details deliberately opaque, citing security sensitivity; however, multiple sources suggest the project has been in motion for months and is moving into its final stages.
Somalia’s Defence Minister, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, is said to be in Beijing to finalize arrangements after meetings with China’s defence leadership—talks that, if consummated, would deepen a fast-tightening military relationship. 
LasAnod and broader Sanaag are not just dots on a map; they sit at the fault line of overlapping claims and fragile political arrangements in the Horn. Since early 2023, Las Anod has been the epicentre of intense fighting among Somaliland forces, clan-based formations aligned with the SSC-Khatumo movement, and rival claimants including Puntland. Any move to plant a federally aligned SNA command node in or near this theater would be inherently escalatory; it would harden federal presence in a contested region, invite retaliatory dynamics from Somaliland and Puntland, and complicate already tenuous ceasefire and humanitarian conditions. 
For Mogadishu, the reported calculus is straightforward; consolidate federal authority, project deterrence against rivals, and demonstrate momentum in Somaliland where narratives of sovereignty and control remain fiercely disputed. For Beijing, the logic is strategic depth; a footprint—however indirect—in a corridor that connects the Gulf of Aden, Bab el-Mandeb, and the western Indian Ocean.
A federated SNA command installation supported by Chinese training, materiel, or infrastructure would complement China’s existing logistics presence in Djibouti and align with its broader pattern of security engagement across the Horn. 
China’s first overseas military base opened in Djibouti in 2017, a watershed that formalized years of anti-piracy deployments and maritime logistics along one of the world’s busiest sea lanes. Officially framed as a “support facility,” the PLA Navy site expanded China’s capacity to replenish, repair, and stage operations near the Red Sea chokepoint. Over time, commercial port stakes, infrastructure finance, and security cooperation have formed a reinforcing triangle of influence. An SNA command post in Somaliland’s Sool region, even if nominally Somali-run, would fit with the incremental, partner-centered way China extends reach without the optics of a new “Chinese base.” 
Beijing’s defence diplomacy with Somalia has intensified in the past two years amid Mogadishu’s aggressive push against Somaliland and its search for diversified partners. Public statements from Somali and Chinese officials have trailed promises of training, equipment, and capacity-building for the SNA—low-visibility but high-impact levers that can reshape force readiness and command-and-control. With Fiqi now back at Defence after a stint as Foreign Minister, the portfolio alignment is ideal for sealing a security package that has both tactical utility and strategic symbolism. 
Any federal command footprint around Las Anod or within Sanaag is not a neutral act. Planting a new command centre there could be read by local actors as an effort to predetermine a political settlement by force posture, not consensus—particularly if the command’s supply chain and training are seen as underwritten by a great power. That perception matters, It risks turning a Somali political dispute into a proxy theatre for great-power competition and encouraging countermoves from regional actors who view a strengthened Mogadishu-Beijing axis with suspicion. It also risks complicating de-escalation with Somaliland and sharpening intra-Somali fissures at a moment when alignment against al-Shabaab requires maximum political bandwidth and unity of effort. 
From a bird’s-eye view, Somaliland lies along the maritime approach to Bab el-Mandeb, which funnels global trade between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and Suez Canal. The PLA’s Djibouti facility already confers proximity to this chokepoint, but influence radiates more effectively when paired with inland partners, logistics corridors, and security cooperation nodes. If Chinese trainers, equipment, or engineering support begin to flow toward an SNA command in the north, Beijing would gain added situational awareness and political ties on the African shore opposite Yemen—anchoring presence on both sides of a strategic funnel. 
If the reported Beijing talks translate into concrete deployments and construction, the Horn of Africa will feel the tremor first in Somaliland’s Sool and Sanaag regions. The aftershocks—across, HoA, and great-power competition at the mouth of the Red Sea—will follow quickly.
