08/08/2025
Letter From Saclepea
With Musa Hassan Bility
A Ban Without a Bridge, Liberia’s Rubber Export Policy Risks Outpacing Its Infrastructure
President Joseph Boakai’s recent Executive Order No. 151, which restricts the export of unprocessed natural rubber from Liberia, has reignited national debate over the future of the country’s most historic agricultural commodity. While the intent behind the policy, to spur domestic processing and value addition, is laudable, its success hinges on a critical question, Does Liberia currently have the infrastructure, institutions, and inclusive strategy to make this work?
A Noble Goal, Risking a Costly Misstep
The Executive Order builds upon similar actions taken by the previous administration. It restricts the export of raw rubber (commonly in the form of “cup lump”) and instead requires that Liberian rubber be processed locally before being shipped abroad. The aim is to move Liberia from being a mere exporter of raw materials to a value adding economy, in line with global best practices.
Supporters of the policy, including large rubber processors and some planters, argue that this shift will reduce smuggling, improve tax compliance, create jobs, and help retain wealth within Liberia. On paper, it makes economic sense. After all, exporting processed rubber brings in more income than exporting it raw, and the benefits of such a policy have been documented in countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana.
But policies do not operate in a vacuum; they require an enabling environment.
The Infrastructure Gap
What Liberia lacks, today, is adequate domestic processing infrastructure to absorb the rubber that will no longer be exported in raw form. While a handful of companies such as Firestone Liberia, LAC, and Jeety Rubber process rubber domestically, their capacities are limited and their operations capital intensive. The vast majority of smallholder farmers and independent traders do not have access to processing facilities. Nor do they have the financing or logistical capacity to build or transport their products to distant plants.
With limited electricity, high transportation costs, and little technical support for agro processing, the policy risks stranding thousands of farmers with no buyers for their rubber. In the absence of alternatives, they may be forced to sell to the few major processors at disadvantageous prices, reinforcing monopolies and shrinking already thin profit margins.
Disempowering the Informal Sector
While the Executive Order exempts large processors who are already producing Technically Specified Rubber (TSR) for export, it imposes significant new fees, restrictions, and procedural hurdles on smaller actors. A $150 per metric ton levy, a mandatory payment to the Rubber Development Fund, and a 4% presumptive tax on exported rubber may be manageable for corporations, but they can be devastating for small scale exporters and independent tappers.
For a policy that claims to empower Liberians, it appears to disproportionately favor the few companies that already dominate the market. This contradiction is not lost on farmers, many of whom have publicly expressed concern that they were not consulted before the policy was announced.
Policy Without Support is Policy Without Impact
The rationale behind Executive Order No. 151 is not the problem. Liberia, like many resource rich countries, must learn to add value to its products and reduce its dependency on raw exports. However, banning raw rubber exports without first building the infrastructure, offering financial support to smallholders, and ensuring inclusive access to processing opportunities may cause more harm than good.
The government must urgently pair this Executive Order with,
• Massive investment in rubber processing
infrastructure, including incentives for Liberian
owned processors,
• Access to affordable energy and transport to
reduce the cost of domestic processing,
• Financing and grants for smallholders to co-
invest in cooperatives or local processing units,
• Market access support and price stabilization
mechanisms to prevent exploitative pricing by
dominant processors.
Conclusion, Vision Must Be Matched by Strategy
President Boakai’s desire to transform the rubber sector is commendable. But ambition alone cannot substitute for planning. Liberia cannot afford to trade one dependency, for raw exports, for another, corporate monopoly over processing. If this policy is to succeed, it must be part of a broader economic transformation strategy that places Liberian farmers, processors, and communities at the center.
A ban without a bridge will not take us across the river of dependency; it will only leave our people stranded on the wrong side of progress.
