06/04/2026
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT
White Paper on the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Jos Civil Disturbances (September 2001)
Overview
This is a 232-page official government document produced by the Plateau State Government of Nigeria. It presents both the findings of a Judicial Commission of Inquiry — chaired by Hon. Justice Niki Tobi (then of the Court of Appeal, later elevated to the Supreme Court) — and the government's formal responses to each finding and recommendation.
The Commission was inaugurated on 18 October 2001 to investigate the violent civil disturbances that erupted in Jos and its environs between 7–12 September 2001.
Chapter 1 — Introduction & Methodology
The Commission comprised a chairman, eight members, and a legal team. It held public sittings from 30 October 2001 to 30 May 2002, received 456 memoranda, admitted 614 exhibits, and heard oral evidence from 331 witnesses. Its mandate was later expanded to cover fresh violence that broke out in Vom, Turu, Vwang, Kwall, and Miango districts around 30–31 December 2001. Commission members also conducted a week-long physical inspection tour of all affected areas.
Chapter 2 — Immediate Causes of the Crisis
The Commission identified two immediate triggers:
1. The Congo-Russia Mosque Incident. On Friday 7 September 2001, Miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam, a Christian woman, attempted to walk through a road blocked by Muslim worshippers at the Congo-Russia mosque during Juma'at prayers. She was physically blocked, slapped, and pursued by armed men. Her father was stoned. The resulting confrontation rapidly escalated into widespread communal violence. The Commission evaluated conflicting Christian and Muslim accounts and concluded that Rhoda's version was credible and that the Muslim worshippers initiated the violence.
2. The NAPEP Appointment Controversy. On 20 June 2001, Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed — a Hausa/Jasawa man — was appointed NAPEP Coordinator for Jos North Local Government. This sparked fierce protests from the three indigenous communities (Afizere, Anaguta, and Berom), who viewed it as an incursion into their territory. Counter-threats were issued by Hausa-Fulani youth groups. Inflammatory posters and leaflets circulated throughout Jos. The Commission found this appointment to be the "proverbial straw that broke the camel's back," creating a months-long powder keg that detonated on 7 September.
Chapter 3 — Remote (Underlying) Causes of the Crisis
The Commission identified ten deeper, structural causes:
1. Contested ownership of Jos. The Afizere, Anaguta, and Berom communities claim to be the original indigenous owners of Jos, while the Hausa-Fulani community also asserts historical ownership. The Commission examined extensive historical evidence, including colonial records and oral testimonies, and concluded that the evidence supported the three indigenous tribes as the original inhabitants of the Jos area, rejecting the Hausa-Fulani claim for lack of documentary authentication.
2. The indigene/settler divide. Long-running tensions between those claiming indigeneity and those labelled as "settlers" (particularly the Jasawa/Hausa-Fulani community) had created deep social and political grievances.
3. The role of the Jasawa Development Association (JDA). The JDA was found to have persistently and aggressively promoted Hausa-Fulani interests in ways that heightened ethnic tension.
4. Political marginalisation. Both sides accused each other of exclusion from political appointments and economic benefits.
5. Religious intolerance. Mutual distrust between the predominantly Christian indigenous communities and the predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani population had festered over years.
6. Misuse of traditional institutions. Some traditional rulers had taken sectarian positions, inflaming rather than calming tensions.
7. Failure of security agencies. Prior warning signs were ignored by the police.
8. Illegal arms stockpiling. Evidence showed weapons had been accumulated in preparation for conflict.
9. Presence of illegal aliens. Foreign nationals with no stake in local peace were found to have participated in the violence.
10. Non-implementation of the 1994 Commission Report. The Commission drew striking parallels with the 12 April 1994 Jos riots (triggered similarly by opposition to a Hausa/Jasawa appointee as LGA head). That Commission's recommendations were never implemented by government — a failure the 2001 Commission strongly condemned as emboldening repeat offenders.
Chapter 4 — Persons and Organizations Responsible
Individual suspects:
A list of over 100 named individuals was compiled and referred to the police for investigation and possible prosecution on charges including homicide, arson, conspiracy, house-breaking, r**e, and illegal possession of fi****ms.
The Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar:
The Commission reserved its harshest individual criticism for the State's top police officer. Despite receiving written intelligence about planned attacks (including a letter from a civilian informant, CW41, detailing planned arson and weapons caches), he failed to conduct investigations or make arrests. He also controversially transferred 31 Divisional Police Officers just days before the crisis, withdrew ALGON vehicles on the very day violence erupted, and gave the state government falsely reassuring security reports. The Commission concluded he was guilty of "at best, gross negligence and at worst, sheer incompetence," and found circumstantial evidence suggesting possible deliberate facilitation of the attacks.
Organizational wrongdoing:
The Jasawa Development Association, the BECO Elders Solidarity Forum, the Plateau State Youth Council, and a branch of the Jama'atu Nasril Islam were all found to have contributed to the crisis through inflammatory rhetoric and peace-threatening statements.
Persons cleared:
Several individuals and groups against whom allegations were made were found not liable after examining the evidence.
Chapter 5 — Extent of Damage to Lives and Property
The Commission tabulated claims from 120 claimants covering destroyed homes, vehicles, churches, mosques, businesses, livestock, and personal property. The total claimed damage amounted to ₦3,369,716,404.95 (approximately 3.37 billion Naira). The Commission acknowledged that some claims may have been inflated, as the terms of reference did not extend to awarding compensation. However, it specifically recommended that ECWA Evangel Hospital be paid ₦1.5 million for medical services rendered to crisis victims — a recommendation the government accepted.
The Commission also recorded hundreds of deaths, though a comprehensive verified casualty count was not produced. Lists of the deceased from both Muslim and Christian communities run across several pages of the document.
Chapter 6 — Angwan Rogo and Angwan Rimi Communities
These two densely populated communities adjoin the University of Jos. During the crisis, residents of Angwan Rogo (predominantly Muslim) attacked the University — killing 14 staff members and 8 students — and attempted to breach its perimeter fence. The Commission found that both communities are technically squatting on University land. It rejected calls for full relocation as financially unworkable, but recommended establishing a police mobile barracks as a buffer zone and replanning the communities to improve road access.
Chapter 7 — Recommendations (29 in total)-The key recommendations, with the government's responses, include:
1. Implement this Report's recommendations — Government accepts.
2. Prosecute all named suspects — Government directs the Police Commissioner to investigate and refer cases to the Ministry of Justice.
3. Ban blocking of public roads for prayers (by both religions) — Government accepts.
4. Ban external loudspeakers on churches and mosques — Government accepts.
5. Stop indiscriminate construction of places of worship in residential areas — Government accepts.
6. The Congo-Russia mosque not be rebuilt — Government accepts.
7. Reform the inter-religious committee to be more effective and operate at LGA level — Government notes.
8. Promote religious education and tolerance in schools — Government accepts.
9. Monitor private school syllabi for religious fundamentalism — Government accepts.
10. Crack down on illegal fi****ms — Government accepts and directs law enforcement agencies.
11. Deport illegal aliens — Government accepts.
12. Consult stakeholders before sensitive appointments — Government accepts.
13. Ban roadside petrol hawking (which facilitated arson) — Government accepts.
14. Encourage the Hausa-Fulani community to accept the indigenous ownership of Jos — Government accepts.
15. Keep security forces on alert and responsive — Government accepts.
17. Avoid posting religious fanatics to head state police commands — Government accepts.
18. Retire or dismiss Alhaji M.D. Abubakar from the Police Force — Government accepts and refers to the Police Service Commission.
19. Remove Alhaji Mukhtar Mohammed as NAPEP Coordinator — Government accepts.
20. Monitor Alhaji Sale Hassan's activities — Government accepts.
21. Remove Alhaji Inuwa Ali as Turakin Jos — Government accepts, refers to the Jos Joint Traditional Council.
23. Suspend the Jasawa Development Association for 2 years — Government goes further and proscribes (bans outright) the JDA.
24. Suspend the BECO Elders Solidarity Forum for 2 years — Government accepts.
25. Suspend the Jos North branch of Jama'atu Nasril Islam — Government accepts and refers to the national body.
26. Reprimand the Plateau State Youth Council — Government notes.
27. Remove Alhaji Sale Bayeri as Special Adviser on Fulani Affairs — Government accepts.
28. Establish a police barrack near Angwan Rogo/University of Jos and replan the communities — Government accepts.
29. Urgently equip and train the police for crisis management — Government accepts.
Conclusion
The Commission concluded that the September 2001 Jos crisis was both preventable and predictable, rooted in longstanding ethnic and religious rivalries that were repeatedly allowed to fester without accountability. It warned that non-implementation of its report — as had happened with the 1994 Commission — would guarantee future violence. The government, in its closing remarks, expressed appreciation for the Commission's work and committed to implementing the recommendations, noting that it had also undertaken to implement the earlier 1994 report.
