18/08/2026
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Apparently, our schools are safer now.
At least, that is what we were told.
After the shooting at San Jose National High School in Tacloban that left three students dead and around twenty others wounded, authorities promised to tighten security in schools. The Philippine National Police announced a review of school-security protocols, DepEd directed schools to revisit their safety measures, and police-school coordination was supposed to be strengthened. There was no shortage of promises.
And yet, here we are again. Another school. Another shooting. Another student dead.
In Zamboanga, a Grade 9 student reportedly entered a school campus carrying a rifle and a pistol, opened fire, killed another student, and later took his own life. So naturally, one question deserves to be asked: What happened to everything we were promised after Tacloban? Because if this is what "heightened security" looks like, then perhaps we need to reconsider what exactly we have been calling security.
Nobody is asking the government to predict every act of violence before it happens. Nobody is demanding that schools become impenetrable fortresses, and nobody is naive enough to believe that a security protocol can guarantee that no student will ever be harmed. But there is a very reasonable expectation that when something as catastrophic as Tacloban happens, the system learns from it. That is the entire point of having a system. You identify what failed, you fix it, you test whether the solution works, and then you make sure it is actually being implemented. You do not simply issue another directive, hold another meeting, release another statement, and wait for the next tragedy to tell you whether it worked.
Because today, we have another tragedy, and students are once again paying the price for whatever weaknesses remained after the last one. That is what makes this particularly difficult to accept. This was not the first warning. The Philippines had already been given one. Tacloban should have been enough to force every institution involved to ask the uncomfortable questions: How did the firearm enter the campus? Were access points properly monitored? Were security personnel adequately trained? Were warning signs reported? Were schools actually capable of implementing the measures being demanded of them? Those questions should have been answered before another student was killed. Instead, we are asking them again.
And this time, the public has every right to demand specifics. Not "we will strengthen security." Not "we are coordinating with authorities." Not "we are reviewing existing protocols." What specifically failed? Was the school's entrance secured? Was the student's bag checked? Were there security personnel present? Were the school's security protocols actually implemented? If they were, how did a rifle and a pistol make their way into a school? And if they weren't, why weren't they?
Those questions aren't an attack on teachers, guards, or school administrators who are themselves often working with limited resources. If anything, they deserve to be part of the conversation. Because handing schools a list of security requirements without giving them the manpower, equipment, training, and resources to realistically enforce those requirements is not a security strategy. It is passing responsibility downward and calling it preparedness.
And students should not be the ones paying for that distinction. They should not have to wonder whether the person standing at the school gate is actually equipped to protect them. They should not have to treat evacuation routes as something they might one day need because a gunman entered their campus. They should not have to learn the difference between a lockdown drill and the real thing. They should be worrying about recitations, examinations, deadlines, friendships, competitions, and what they want to become after graduation. Instead, some now have to learn how quickly a classroom can turn into a crime scene.
There is also something deeply unfair about how these incidents are eventually discussed. After every shooting, attention understandably turns toward the perpetrator: Who was the shooter? What was the motive? Where did the firearm come from? Were there warning signs? All of those questions matter, but the investigation cannot end there. A school shooting is not merely a story about one person pulling a trigger. It is also a test of every layer of protection that was supposed to exist before that trigger was pulled. And if those layers failed, someone needs to explain why.
Not necessarily to find a convenient scapegoat -- to find the hole. Because if we do not identify the hole, we cannot close it. And if we do not close it, we are simply waiting for the next school to discover it.
There will undoubtedly be statements again. There will be condolences, calls for calm, and promises that authorities are taking the matter seriously. But the Filipino public has heard these words before. The students of Tacloban heard them. Their families heard them. And now, students in Zamboanga have become part of the same conversation. At some point, condolences without correction begin to feel less like accountability and more like a routine.
The public's frustration is not difficult to understand. Parents sent their children to school expecting them to come home. Students walked through school gates expecting to spend the day learning. Teachers entered classrooms expecting to teach. None of them should have had to calculate the possibility of being shot. Yet here we are, asking the same questions we were supposed to have answered months ago.
So yes, security needs to be reviewed again. But this time, let us not settle for another announcement that security will be reviewed. Publish what failed. Explain what was implemented after Tacloban. Identify what did not work. Show what is changing now. And give schools the resources to actually enforce those changes.
Because a security system that exists only in memoranda, press releases, and policy documents is not much of a security system. It is security on paper. And paper cannot stop a bullet.
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