Buayan Broadcasting Network

21/04/2026

Hajj as an Individual Obligation, Not a State Program: A Critical Reflection

Sa kasalukuyang panahon, maraming bansa ang nagpapatupad ng government-sponsored Hajj programs bilang bahagi ng kanilang public service o religious assistance. Bagama’t tila ito ay isang mabuting hakbang upang matulungan ang mga mamamayan, mahalagang suriin kung ito ba ay naaayon sa prinsipyo ng Islam. The central question is clear: Is Hajj a responsibility of the state, or is it strictly an individual obligation? Sa masusing pagsusuri ng Qur’an, Hadith, at mga pananaw ng mga kilalang iskolar, malinaw na ang Hajj ay isang personal na tungkulin (fard ‘ayn) at hindi obligasyon ng pamahalaan.

Ayon sa Qur'an, malinaw ang utos:

“And [due] to Allah from the people is a pilgrimage to the House—for whoever is able to find thereto a way.” (3:97)

Ang salitang “for whoever is able” ay tumutukoy sa kakayahang pinansyal at pisikal ng isang indibidwal. Ibig sabihin, hindi obligado ang isang Muslim na magsagawa ng Hajj kung siya ay walang sapat na kakayahan. Hindi rin binabanggit sa talata na ang estado ang dapat sumagot sa gastusin. Sa ganitong konteksto, malinaw na ang responsibilidad ay nakatuon sa indibidwal, hindi sa gobyerno.

This is further reinforced in the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Sa isang hadith mula sa Sahih Muslim, sinabi ng Propeta:

“Islam is built upon five… and pilgrimage to the House for whoever is able to find a way.”

Dito, muling binibigyang-diin ang konsepto ng istita‘ah (ability). Walang pahiwatig na ang estado ay may obligasyong pondohan ang Hajj ng mga mamamayan. Sa halip, ipinapakita na ang Hajj ay isang personal na pagsamba na nakasalalay sa sariling kakayahan.

Maging ang mga classical scholars ay nagkakaisa sa ganitong pananaw. Ayon kay Imam al-Nawawi, ang istita‘ah ay nangangahulugang ang isang tao ay may sapat na yaman upang maisagawa ang Hajj nang hindi umaasa sa iba. Idinagdag pa ni Ibn Qudamah na kung ang isang tao ay walang kakayahang pinansyal, siya ay hindi obligado at walang kasalanan kung hindi siya makapagsasagawa ng Hajj. Sa pananaw naman ni Imam Abu Hanifa, ang pagtanggap ng tulong pinansyal para sa Hajj ay maaaring magdulot ng isyu kung ito ay magpapawalang-bisa sa prinsipyo ng personal na kakayahan.

From a broader perspective, the idea of government-sponsored Hajj risks transforming a deeply spiritual act into a bureaucratic or political program. Kapag ang estado ang pumipili kung sino ang makakapag-Hajj, maaaring magkaroon ng bias, patronage, o politikal na impluwensya. Sa halip na maging isang personal na sakripisyo at debosyon, ang Hajj ay maaaring magmukhang isang pribilehiyo na ipinagkakaloob ng pamahalaan.

Dagdag pa rito, sa panahon ng Propeta Muhammad (peace be upon him) at ng mga Khulafa al-Rashidun, walang umiiral na sistematikong state-funded Hajj. Ang papel ng pamahalaan noon ay tiyakin ang kaligtasan ng mga manlalakbay, hindi ang sagutin ang kanilang gastusin. This historical reality further supports the argument that Hajj was never intended to be a state responsibility.

Gayunpaman, mahalagang linawin na ang pagtulong ng gobyerno ay maaaring ituring bilang optional charity o social assistance, ngunit hindi ito dapat ituring bilang religious obligation ng estado. Ang problema ay nagsisimula kapag ito ay ipinapakita bilang tungkulin ng gobyerno, na taliwas sa malinaw na aral ng Islam.

In conclusion, both textual evidence and scholarly consensus affirm that Hajj is an individual duty conditioned upon personal ability. Hindi ito obligasyon ng estado, at hindi rin dapat iasa sa pamahalaan ang pagsasagawa nito. Ang tunay na diwa ng Hajj ay nakasalalay sa personal na sakripisyo, kahandaan, at pananampalataya ng bawat Muslim.

10/04/2026

Oras lang matapos magkasundo ng America at Iran na magkaroon ng 2 linggong ceasefire, inilunsad ng Israel ang pinakamadugo nitong pag-atake sa Lebanon mula nang sumiklab ang krisis sa Middle East.
Mahigit 200 ang nasawi, kabilang ang mga sibilyan. Ayon sa mga awtoridad sa Lebanon, maituturing itong "full-fledged war crime."
Ano nga ba ang mga bawal sa giyera at paano pinoprotektahan ang sibilyan? Alamin sa video.

05/04/2026

From Revolution to Responsibility: A Wise Reframing of the Paths of the M**F and MNLF

By Prof. Iqbal Murad Sammy, Ph.D

There is a moment in the life of every revolutionary movement when it must confront a deeper truth: that the struggle it once defined itself by can no longer remain the same. History is not only about resistance—it is about transformation. And in the case of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (M**F), that transformation is no longer unfolding—it has already taken place.

A revolutionary group, by its essence, exists outside the system. It challenges, resists, and seeks to alter the foundations of political order. But once that same group enters into agreements, accepts autonomy within a state, and assumes positions within governance, it crosses a decisive threshold. It is no longer a force against the system—it becomes a steward within it.

This reality is grounded in concrete historical milestones. The MNLF’s path after the 1996 Final Peace Agreement and the M**F’s transition through the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signify not merely peace settlements, but a redefinition of purpose. Today, both movements operate within the institutional framework of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), exercising authority through governance rather than insurgency.

Sa madaling salita, ang M**F at MNLF ay hindi na mga rebolusyonaryong kilusan sa kanilang kasalukuyang anyo. Sila ay naging bahagi na ng pamahalaan—isang awtonomiyang kinikilala sa loob ng estado. Ang kanilang tungkulin ngayon ay hindi na pagbuwag ng sistema kundi ang pagpapatatag nito. Ito ay hindi kahinaan; ito ay isang yugto ng pagbabago. Ngunit dapat itong tawagin sa tamang pangalan.

More profoundly, both movements have embraced political participation. The M**F, through the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP), has entered the arena of democratic governance, while elements of the MNLF have similarly engaged in political processes. This transition from armed struggle to electoral politics is not a mere tactic—it is an admission that the path forward is no longer through the rifle, but through responsibility, negotiation, and public service.

Dahil dito, nararapat lamang na baguhin din natin ang ating pananaw sa mga bagong kilusan o organisasyon. Kung may mga grupo man na magtatatag ng panibagong partidong politikal, hindi na makatarungan na agad silang lagyan ng label na “separatist” o anumang termino na nag-uugat sa nakaraang armadong pakikibaka. Ang konteksto ay nagbago na. Ang mismong mga dating rebolusyonaryo ay lumipat na sa pulitika—isang malinaw na indikasyon na ang kanilang pananaw sa pakikibaka ay nagbago na rin.

To insist on old labels is to misunderstand new realities. Political participation is not rebellion; it is evolution. Forming parties, engaging in elections, and competing within democratic structures are expressions of transition—not defiance.

At higit sa lahat, nararapat maging malinaw ang usapin ng jihad. Ang ginagawa ngayon ng M**F at MNLF—pamamahala, pakikilahok sa halalan, at maging ang kompetisyon para sa posisyon—ay hindi na bahagi ng jihad sa kanyang tunay at banal na kahulugan. Ito ay bahagi ng normal na daloy ng pulitika at pamahalaan.

The Qur’an reminds us with clarity and gravity:

“And do not mix the truth with falsehood or conceal the truth while you know [it].” (Qur’an 2:42)

At isa pang paalala:

“Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice…” (Qur’an 4:58)

Ang mga talatang ito ay nagsisilbing gabay: ang katotohanan ay hindi dapat baluktutin, at ang kapangyarihan ay isang amanah—isang pananagutang hindi dapat gamitin para sa pansariling interes.

The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) also warned:

“Whoever seeks leadership will be left to it, and whoever is given it without seeking it will be aided (by Allah).” (Sahih al-Bukhari & Muslim)

This hadith reminds us that leadership is not a prize to be pursued, but a burden to be carried with sincerity and fear of accountability.

Sa ganitong liwanag, ang paggamit ng Islam—ang pangalan ng Allah (SWT), ang konsepto ng jihad, o anumang banal na prinsipyo—upang bigyang-katwiran ang personal o politikal na layunin ay isang mabigat na pagkakamali. Alam natin sa ating mga sarili kung ang ating mga pahayag ay tapat o hindi. At kapag ginamit natin ang relihiyon upang ipagtanggol ang isang layuning alam nating hindi na naaayon sa katotohanan, ito ay isang kasalanan na may malalim na pananagutan.

Contemporary scholars such as Abdullah bin Bayyah and Hamza Yusuf consistently remind the Muslim world that political engagement must be anchored in ikhlas (sincerity), adl (justice), and maslahah (public welfare). Religion must guide politics—not be reduced into a tool for it.

Sa huli, ang kwento ng M**F at MNLF ay hindi na kwento ng rebolusyon, kundi kwento ng pananagutan. Ang kanilang laban ngayon ay hindi na laban sa estado, kundi laban sa katiwalian, kawalan ng katarungan, at kahinaan sa pamamahala.

And for the broader society, there is a parallel responsibility: to speak truthfully, to avoid outdated and unjust labels, and to preserve the sanctity of Islam from being misused for personal or political gain.

Sapagkat ang tunay na sukatan ng isang kilusan ay hindi kung paano ito nagsimula, kundi kung paano ito nagbago—at kung paano nito pinananagot ang sarili sa harap ng tao at ng Allah (SWT).

05/04/2026

From Revolution to Governance: Isang Mapanuring Pagninilay sa Pagbabago ng Pakikibaka at Pananagutan

By: Prof. Iqbal Murad Sammy, Ph.D

Ang kasaysayan ng mga kilusang rebolusyonaryo ay hindi lamang kuwento ng pakikibaka, kundi kuwento rin ng pagbabago. Sa sandaling ang isang armadong kilusan ay pumasok sa loob ng balangkas ng estado—lalo na sa ilalim ng isang kasunduang awtonomiya—nagbabago ang kanyang kalikasan. Hindi na ito maituturing na rebolusyonaryo sa dating kahulugan nito, sapagkat ang rebolusyon ay likas na laban sa umiiral na sistema, samantalang ang pakikibahagi sa gobyerno ay nangangahulugan ng pagtanggap at pagpapatakbo nito.

Revolution, in its essence, is a force that resists and seeks to transform existing structures. However, once a movement signs agreements, participates in governance, and becomes part of institutional authority, it transitions from resistance to administration. This is not merely a strategic shift—it is an identity shift. The language of struggle is replaced by the language of policy, bureaucracy, and political negotiation.

Isang mahalagang bahagi ng pagbabagong ito ay ang tinatawag na decommissioning. Sa praktikal na pananaw, ito ay ang pagsuko ng armas at ang pagtalikod sa armadong pakikibaka. Bagamat ito ay inilalarawan bilang hakbang tungo sa kapayapaan, hindi maikakaila na ito rin ay tanda ng pagtatapos ng isang yugto ng rebolusyonaryong paglaban. Ang isang kilusan na nagbaba ng sandata at tumanggap ng kapangyarihan sa loob ng sistema ay hindi na maaaring ituring na nasa labas ng sistemang iyon.

In Islamic perspective, leadership and authority are not merely political positions—they are trusts (amanah). The Qur’an reminds us:

“Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice…” (Qur’an 4:58)

Ang talatang ito ay malinaw na nagsasaad na ang kapangyarihan ay hindi premyo ng pakikibaka kundi isang pananagutan sa Allah (SWT) at sa sambayanan. Kaya kapag ang isang dating kilusan ay naging bahagi ng pamahalaan, ang kanilang sukatan ay hindi na ang kanilang rebolusyonaryong nakaraan kundi ang kanilang kakayahan na magpatupad ng katarungan at mabuting pamamahala.

Furthermore, the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) warned about the nature of leadership:

“You will be keen for leadership, but it will be a source of regret on the Day of Resurrection…” (Sahih al-Bukhari)

Ipinapakita nito na ang paghahangad ng kapangyarihan ay may kaakibat na mabigat na pananagutan. Hindi ito dapat gamiting instrumento para sa pansariling interes o dominasyon, kundi para sa tunay na paglilingkod.

Sa kontekstong ito, mahalagang pagnilayan ang pagbabago ng mga kilusan na naging bahagi ng gobyerno. Kapag ang isang organisasyon ay lumahok sa negosasyon, tinanggap ang mga kondisyon ng estado, at kalaunan ay naging isang partidong politikal, malinaw na ito ay dumaan sa isang malalim na transpormasyon. Ang kanilang tungkulin ngayon ay hindi na pakikibaka laban sa sistema kundi pamamahala sa loob nito.

Contemporary scholars such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi have emphasized that political participation in modern states must be guided by maslahah (public interest) and ethical responsibility, not merely by the pursuit of power. Similarly, Tariq Ramadan has argued that Muslim engagement in governance must reflect integrity, transparency, and accountability, rather than ideological rigidity or historical romanticism.

Gayunpaman, isang sensitibong usapin ang paggamit ng relihiyon sa pulitika. Hindi dapat gamitin ang pangalan ng Allah (SWT) o ang konsepto ng jihad upang bigyang-katwiran ang mga tunggalian sa kapangyarihan. Sa Qur’an, malinaw ang babala:

“And do not mix the truth with falsehood or conceal the truth while you know [it].” (Qur’an 2:42)

Ang jihad sa tunay nitong kahulugan ay hindi simpleng pakikibaka para sa kapangyarihan. Ito ay mas malalim—isang moral at espiritwal na pagsusumikap tungo sa katarungan at kabutihan. Ayon sa mga iskolar, kabilang na si Ibn Taymiyyah, ang layunin ng jihad ay itaguyod ang katarungan at alisin ang pang-aapi, hindi upang magtatag ng dominasyon para sa sariling interes.

Therefore, invoking sacred concepts to legitimize political struggles risks distorting الإسلام itself. It transforms faith into a tool rather than a guiding principle. This is a dangerous path, as it not only misleads people but also undermines the moral foundation of leadership.

Sa huli, ang tunay na sukatan ng isang kilusan ay hindi ang kanyang nakaraan kundi ang kanyang kasalukuyang ginagawa. Kung ito man ay naging bahagi na ng pamahalaan, ang kanyang responsibilidad ay malinaw: maglingkod nang may integridad, magpatupad ng katarungan, at igalang ang tiwala ng mamamayan.

Revolution ends when power is accepted within the system. What begins thereafter is governance—an arena that demands humility, accountability, and sincerity before both the people and Allah (SWT). At dito nasusubok ang tunay na layunin: ito ba ay para sa kapakanan ng sambayanan, o para lamang sa pagpapatuloy ng kapangyarihan?

24/03/2026

23/03/2026

ISRAELI ARMY HITS QASMIYEH BRIDGE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

14/03/2026

Wahhabism, British Imperial Strategy, and the Politics of Religious Authority in the Muslim World

Sa kasaysayan ng Middle East, maraming iskolar ang nag-aaral kung paano nagtagpo ang relihiyosong ideolohiya at imperyal na geopolitika. Isa sa mga kontrobersiyal na diskurso sa larangan ng political history ay ang argumento na ang pag-usbong ng Wahhabi movement sa Arabian Peninsula ay nagkaroon ng ugnayan sa mas malawak na estratehiya ng British Empire sa rehiyon. Bagaman may iba’t ibang interpretasyon ang mga historian tungkol dito, malinaw na ang ika-19 at ika-20 siglo ay panahon kung kailan aktibong nakialam ang Great Britain sa pulitika ng Middle East upang mapanatili ang kanilang impluwensiya sa ruta ng kalakalan, langis, at seguridad ng imperyo.

Ang Wahhabi movement ay nagsimula noong ika-18 siglo sa pamamagitan ng repormistang pangangaral ni Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab sa Najd region ng Arabia. Ang kanyang layunin ay ibalik ang Islam sa isang mahigpit na interpretasyon ng tawhid (absolute monotheism) at alisin ang mga praktis na kanyang itinuring na bidʿah o pagbabago sa relihiyon. Gayunpaman, ang kilusang ito ay hindi lamang nanatiling teolohikal. Ito ay naging isang political-religious alliance nang makipag-ugnayan siya sa pamilya ng Muhammad bin Saud, na nagresulta sa pagbuo ng unang Saudi state noong ika-18 siglo. Ayon sa historian na si Natana J. DeLong-Bas (2004), ang alliance na ito ang nagbigay ng pundasyon para sa pagsasama ng relihiyosong doktrina at state power sa Arabian Peninsula.

However, the geopolitical context changed dramatically during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the British Empire expanded its influence across the Middle East. Britain sought to weaken the Ottoman Empire, which at the time was the dominant Muslim political authority. Scholars of imperial history note that Britain frequently formed alliances with local political movements and tribal leaders in order to undermine Ottoman authority and secure its strategic interests in the region, particularly around the Persian Gulf and the route to India.

Sa kontekstong ito, maraming historian ang nagsasabing nagkaroon ng pragmatic relationship ang Britain sa mga lokal na kapangyarihan sa Arabia, kabilang ang mga lider ng Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. Ayon kay historian David Fromkin (1989), ang British policy sa Middle East ay nakabatay sa prinsipyo ng “divide and manage,” kung saan sinuportahan ang iba’t ibang lokal na puwersa upang pahinain ang Ottoman political unity. Sa ganitong paraan, ang mga bagong umuusbong na political actors sa Arabia ay naging mahalagang bahagi ng mas malawak na strategic landscape ng imperyal na pulitika.

From a political science perspective, this relationship was not necessarily ideological but strategic. The British government was primarily concerned with maintaining control over trade routes, protecting access to oil resources, and ensuring the stability of territories surrounding the Persian Gulf. According to historian Eugene Rogan (2011), Britain often supported local rulers who could maintain order and align with British interests, even if those alliances involved religious movements or tribal coalitions.

Gayunpaman, sa diskurso ng ilang kritikal na Muslim intellectuals, ang ganitong relasyon ay nagkaroon ng malalim na epekto sa pagkakaisa ng Muslim world. Kapag ang isang relihiyosong kilusan ay nagiging bahagi ng geopolitikal na alyansa sa isang imperyal na kapangyarihan, maaaring magkaroon ito ng implikasyon sa kung paano ginagamit ang relihiyon sa pulitika. Para sa kanila, ang ganitong historical alliances ay nag-ambag sa paghina ng mas malawak na Islamic political unity at sa paglitaw ng mga ideolohikal na hidwaan sa loob ng ummah.

Some modern scholars connect these historical dynamics to the later geopolitical developments of the twentieth century, including the emergence of the Zionism and the establishment of the Israel in 1948. According to Edward Said (1979), Zionism developed within a broader framework of European colonial expansion in the Middle East. While Wahhabism and Zionism emerged from very different historical origins, critics argue that the fragmentation of Muslim political authority during the colonial period indirectly facilitated the geopolitical conditions in which Zionism succeeded.

Sa huli, mahalagang kilalanin na ang relasyon sa pagitan ng Wahhabism, British imperial policy, at modern Middle Eastern politics ay isang komplikadong usapin na patuloy na pinag-aaralan ng mga historian. Hindi lahat ng iskolar ay sumasang-ayon sa ideya na ang Wahhabi movement ay simpleng instrumento ng imperyal na kapangyarihan. Ngunit malinaw na ang pag-usbong ng mga relihiyosong kilusan at ang estratehiya ng mga imperyo ay madalas na nagtatagpo sa kasaysayan, na nagreresulta sa mga pangyayaring may pangmatagalang epekto sa pulitika at lipunan ng rehiyon.

Ultimately, the study of these historical interactions reminds us that religious movements do not exist in isolation. They evolve within complex political environments shaped by alliances, conflicts, and geopolitical interests. Understanding these dynamics is essential for analyzing the continuing debates over authority, legitimacy, and unity in the contemporary Muslim world.

References:

1. DeLong-Bas, N. J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From revival and reform to global jihad. Oxford University Press.
2. Fromkin, D. (1989). A peace to end all peace: The fall of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the modern Middle East. Holt.
3. Rogan, E. (2011). The Arabs: A history. Basic Books.
4. Said, E. (1979). The question of Palestine. Vintage Books.

14/03/2026

Ideological Alignment and Geopolitical Power: Wahhabi Establishments, Zionism, and the Fragmentation of the Muslim World

Ang kasaysayan ng Muslim world sa modernong panahon ay hindi maihihiwalay sa dalawang malalaking puwersa: ang paglitaw ng mga bagong relihiyosong ideolohiya at ang impluwensiya ng geopolitika ng Kanluran sa Middle East. Sa loob ng diskursong ito, madalas na tinatalakay ng mga iskolar ang papel ng Wahhabi religious establishment sa Saudi Arabia at ang mas malawak na geopolitikal na konteksto kung saan lumakas ang Zionist project sa Palestine. Para sa ilang kritikal na iskolar, ang relasyon ng ilang Wahhabi-aligned political elites sa Western powers ay nagresulta sa mga polisiya na, direkta man o hindi, ay nakatulong sa pagpapanatili ng geopolitical status quo na nakikinabang ang Israel.

Sa tradisyon ng Islam, ang relihiyon ay hindi lamang espirituwal na sistema kundi isang moral at political framework na naglalayong itaguyod ang katarungan. Ang Qur’an at ang halimbawa ng Propeta Muhammad (peace be upon him) ay nagbigay diin sa pagkakaisa ng ummah at sa paglaban sa pang-aapi. Maraming Muslim scholars ang nagsasabing ang moral na pamana ng Islam ay ipinagpatuloy ng Ahlulbayt, ang pamilya ng Propeta, na kinabibilangan nina Ali ibn Abi Talib, Hasan, at Husayn. Ayon kay Vali Nasr (2006), ang pag-aalis sa politikal na papel ng Ahlulbayt sa maagang kasaysayan ng Islam ay nagbukas ng matagal na tunggalian sa loob ng Muslim community tungkol sa awtoridad at interpretasyon ng relihiyon.

However, the emergence of Wahhabism in the eighteenth century introduced a new theological orientation that emphasized strict doctrinal purity and a rejection of many established Islamic practices. Founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the movement formed a strategic alliance with the Saudi ruling family, a partnership that transformed a theological reform movement into the ideological foundation of a state. According to Natana J. DeLong-Bas (2004), Wahhabism developed as a puritanical interpretation of Islam centered on uncompromising monotheism (tawhid), but critics have argued that its rigid exclusivism contributed to sectarian tensions within the Muslim world.

Sa perspektibo ng ilang kritikal na iskolar, ang problema ay hindi lamang teolohikal kundi politikal. Habang lumalakas ang Saudi-Wahhabi alliance noong ika-20 siglo, naging mahalagang kaalyado ito ng mga Western powers sa Middle East. Sa panahon ng Cold War, sinuportahan ng Estados Unidos ang Saudi Arabia bilang pangunahing partner sa rehiyon laban sa mga nationalist at socialist movements. Ayon kay Hamid Dabashi (2011), ang ganitong alliance ay nagbigay-daan sa paglawak ng impluwensiya ng Wahhabi ideology sa buong Muslim world sa pamamagitan ng petro-dollar funding sa mga moske, madrasa, at Islamic institutions.

Ang epekto nito ay nagkaroon ng malaking pagbabago sa relihiyosong diskurso sa maraming Muslim societies. Sa halip na pluralistic na tradisyon ng Islamic scholarship na umiral sa loob ng maraming siglo, lumaganap ang mas mahigpit at literal na interpretasyon ng relihiyon. Para sa ilang kritiko, ang ideolohiyang ito ay nakatulong sa paglikha ng matinding sekta-sekta at ideolohikal na paghahati sa loob ng ummah. Kapag ang Muslim world ay nahahati sa doktrina at sekta, mas nahihirapan itong bumuo ng kolektibong political response sa mga isyung tulad ng Palestine.

From a geopolitical perspective, scholars of Middle Eastern politics have long argued that fragmentation within the Muslim world has had profound consequences for the Palestinian struggle. Edward Said (1979) famously described Zionism as a colonial project that relied not only on military power but also on the political weakness of the surrounding Arab and Muslim states. In this context, the inability of Muslim governments to form a unified political front has been a crucial factor in the persistence of Israeli dominance in the region.

Sa puntong ito, lumilitaw ang kritikal na argumento ng ilang political analysts: ang ilang Wahhabi-aligned religious establishments ay naging bahagi ng political order sa Middle East na nakikipag-alyansa sa Western powers na siyang pangunahing tagasuporta ng Israel. Hindi ito nangangahulugan na ang lahat ng Wahhabi scholars ay may ganitong intensyon. Gayunpaman, ang institutional alliance ng ilang religious elites sa state power ay nagresulta sa mga polisiya na kadalasang nakatuon sa internal ideological conflicts sa halip na sa kolektibong paglaban sa kolonyalismo.

Rashid Khalidi (2020) notes that Arab political fragmentation has been one of the most decisive factors enabling the continuation of Israeli occupation in Palestine. Without regional unity, resistance movements struggle to achieve meaningful political change. Sa ganitong konteksto, ang ideolohikal na paghahati sa loob ng Muslim world—maging ito man ay sekta, doktrina, o political allegiance—ay nagiging mahalagang salik sa geopolitika ng rehiyon.

Sa kabila ng mga kontrobersiyang ito, maraming Muslim intellectuals ang naniniwala na ang solusyon ay hindi sa mas malalim na hidwaan kundi sa pagbabalik sa mas malawak na tradisyon ng Islam na nakaugat sa katarungan at pagkakaisa. Ang moral na halimbawa ng Propeta Muhammad (peace be upon him) at ng kanyang Ahlulbayt ay patuloy na nagsisilbing inspirasyon para sa mga Muslim na naghahangad ng isang mas makatarungan at nagkakaisang ummah.

Ultimately, the debate over Wahhabism, Zionism, and Muslim political fragmentation reflects a broader struggle over the future of Islamic civilization. The challenge is not merely theological but also political and intellectual. Whether the Muslim world can overcome internal divisions and rediscover a shared moral and political vision remains one of the most important questions of the twenty-first century.

References:

1. Dabashi, H. (2011). The Arab Spring: The end of postcolonialism. Zed Books.
2. DeLong-Bas, N. J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From revival and reform to global jihad. Oxford University Press.
3. Khalidi, R. (2020). The hundred years’ war on Palestine. Metropolitan Books.
4. Nasr, V. (2006). The Shia revival: How conflicts within Islam will shape the future. W. W. Norton.
5. Said, E. (1979). The question of Palestine. Vintage Books.

12/03/2026

FROM THE RECOGNITION AND CREATION OF THE SAUDI WAHHABI STATE TO THE RECOGNITION AND CREATION OF THE I*RAELI Z*ONIST STATE

January 1915 -
Battle of Jarrab, Ibn Saud had entered the war on the side of the British, but was quickly defeated and his British handler, William Shakespear was k*lled by Ibn Rashid an ally of the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate.
This defeat greatly hampered Ibn Saud’s utility to the British Empire and left him militarily hamstrung for a year.

December 1915 -
Ibn Saud and The British entered into a treaty (the “Treaty of Darin”) which made the lands of the House of Saud a British protectorate.
In exchange Ibn Saud pledged to again make war on behalf of the British.

Thus the blessed land of Arab became part of British Empire

16 May 1916 -
Sykes–Picot Agreement signed, a secret Agreement between the British and French to divide up the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate and Middle East.

02 November 1917 -
Balfour Declaration announced by the British Government guaranteeing ‘a national home for the J*wish people’ in P*lestine which was at the time under the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate.

09 December 1917 -
The British under the command of General Edmund Allenby capture Jerusalem, P*lestine.

By the end of 1920, the British were showering Ibn Saud with a monthly ‘grant’ of £10,000 in gold, on top of his monthly subsidy.
He also received abundant arms supplies, totaling more than 10,000 rifles, 200,000 rounds of ammunition and four field guns added to this was a subsidy of £5,000 per month(this subsidy continued till 1924).
Sir Percy Cox, Captain Prideaux, Gertrude Bell, and Harry Saint John Philby (the so-called “Abdullah”) were among the many British officials and advisors who constantly surrounded lbn Saud to help him with everything he needed.

1920 -
British Mandate of P*lestine, for the first time since the Crusades, P*lestine was to be governed by a Christian power. And, also for the first time since then, its seat of local administration was to be Jerusalem.

March 1921 -
The Cairo Conference, Winston Churchill agreed with Imperial officer, Sir Percy Cox, that Ibn Saud should be given the opportunity to occupy Ha’il.

After the Cairo Conference in March 1921, where the new Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill met with all the British operatives in the Middle East, T.E. Lawrence (i.e. ‘of Arabia’) was dispatched to meet the Sharif to bribe and bully him to accept Britain’s Z*onist colonial project in P*lestine.
Initially, Lawrence and the British Empire offered 80,000 rupees.
The Sharif rejected it outright.
Lawrence then offered him an annual payment of £100,000.
The Sharif refused to compromise and sell P*lestine to British Z*onism.
When financial bribery failed to persuade the Sharif, Lawrence threatened him with an Ibn Saud takeover.
Lawrence claimed that “politically and militarily, the survival of Hijaz as a viable independent Hashemite kingdom was wholly dependent on the political will of Britain, who had the means to protect and maintain his rule in the region.”

September 1921, the British unleashed Ibn Saud on the ruler of Ha’il, Ibn Rashid.
Ha’il was captured in November 1921.
It was after this victory the British bestowed a new title on Ibn Saud.
He was no longer to be “Emir of Najd and Chief of its Tribes” but “Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies”.
Ha’il had dissolved into a dependency of the Empire’s Sultan of Najd.

1922 -
League of Nations Mandate vested in Britain cements the British continued control of P*lestine.
Britain was to remain in control until 14 May 1948 when the State of I*rael was proclaimed.

02 December 1922 -
Ibn Saud and Sir Percy Cox (British High Commissioner) in Iraq sign the Uqair Protocol which sees the British gift most of Kuwait which was originally part of Iraq under the Sunni Ottoman Caliphate to the Saudis, a deal in which the Kuwaiti people had no say.

If the Empire thought that the Sharif, with Ibn Saud now on his border and armed to the teeth by the British, would finally become more amenable to the division of Arabia and the British Z*onist colonial project in P*lestine, they were mistaken.

After further attempts by the British to make Sharif Hussain agree it dawned on the British Empire that Sharif Hussain will never relinquish P*lestine to Great Britain’s Z*onist project, or accept the new divisions in Arab lands.

March 1924 -
The British Empire announced that it had terminated all discussions with Sharif Hussain to reach an agreement.
Within weeks the forces of Ibn Saud and his Wahhabi followers began to administer what the British foreign secretary Lord Curzon called the “final kick” to Sharif Hussain and attacked Hijazi territory.

September 1924 -
Ibn Saud had overrun Ta’if, Ibn Saud’s Wahhabis committed their customary massacres, s*aughtering women and children as well as going into mosques and k*lling traditional Sunni Islamic scholars.

October 1924 -
Ibn Sauds Wahhabis captured the Holiest place in Islam, Makkah tul Mukarramah.

January 1925 -
Ibn Saud had begun his siege of Jeddah and the city finally fell in December 1925, bringing to an end over 1,000 years of rule by the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ descendants.

February 1926 -
The British officially recognized Ibn Saud as the new King of Hijaz with other European powers following suit within weeks

1927 -
Saudi King Abdul Aziz and the British sign the Treaty of Jeddah.

18 September 1932 -
“King” Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud proclaimed the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism, the religion of the Saud tribe, became the official state religion of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
With British weapons, money, and advisors, Ibn Saud was able to gradually conquer most of the Arabian Peninsula in a ruthless manner to create the Third Saudi-Wahhabi State, known today as Saudi Arabia.
The new unified Wahhabi state was rebranded by the Empire in 1932 as the “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” (KSA).
A certain George Rendel, an officer working at the Middle East desk at the Foreign Office in London, claimed credit for the new name.

14 May 1948 -
The Chairman of the J*wish Agency declared the establishment of the State of I*rael.