16/09/2025
Democracy in Peril
If the Philippine government were to collapse — as it nearly did during the 1986 People Power Revolution — which group would be most prepared to seize power and form a new government? The answer lies in identifying which faction possesses the ideological consistency, organizational discipline, and extensive networks needed to fill the resulting power vacuum.
History offers a clue. After the 1986 revolution, when the 1987 Constitution was drafted and a new system of government was put in place, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) made a calculated effort to embed itself within the political system. Through the party-list system, it secured representation in Congress,. Then having gained political power in the legislative branch, continued expanding its influence over key government agencies — including the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor, and Department of Social Welfare and Development. The CPP also brought the Philippine government into peace negotiations with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), with third-party facilitators involved. The repeal of RA 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law) further allowed open membership in the CPP, and the law weakening the ROTC also weakened AFPs source of manpower and strengthened radicalization of the Filipino youth.
At the grassroots level, the CPP consolidated power by turning several barangays into Barangay Revolutionary Committees (BRCs) and municipalities into Komiteng Rebolusyonaryo sa Munisipalidad (KRMs). These structures were reinforced by a nationwide web of legal and underground front organizations advancing the CPP’s “protracted people’s war,” following Jose Maria Sison’s blueprint for establishing a communist state through armed struggle.
The death of Sison was initially viewed as a potential blow to the movement. Yet, rather than disintegrating, the CPP appears to have pivoted toward a more internationalist, Trotskyist-style “vanguard party” approach — forging alliances with local and foreign actors to sustain its ideological struggle.
This shift helps explain the surprising rise of the so-called “liberal-communist alliance” in the 2025 midterm elections, and framed former President Rodrigo Duterte’s drug war as a crime against humanity. The swift coordination between the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) prosecution team under Karim Khan supported Atty. Kristina Conti — a nominee of the Bayan Muna party-list — resulted in Duterte’s indictment and kidnapping and delivering him to The Hague. This sequence of events suggests not a coincidence, but a coordinated effort by a well-organized network.
Why Duterte? Among modern Philippine presidents, Duterte was the only one who nearly dealt a decisive blow to the CPP’s armed insurgency, through his NTF ELCAC pushing the conflict closer to resolution than ever before. However, the revival of previously terminated agreements and renewed alliances between CPP-linked party-lists and the Romualdez-led Congress have allowed the movement to recover lost ground, albeit politically.
Today, the CPP appears more determined — and potentially more ruthless — than ever. Its strategy is clear: divide the nation, exploit political and social fractures, and create chaos before a broad-based coalition can emerge to resist its advance. Corruption, as always, serves as the rallying cry — but this time, the fight is not merely about good governance. The deeper threat lies in the systematic use of division to weaken the Filipino nation from within.
Filipinos are again rising against corruption, but the battlefield is far more complex. Corruption is no longer the sole enemy. The sharper danger comes from groups that claim to speak for the “Taumbayan” while pursuing radical ideological agendas. Among these groups, none are more disciplined or persistent than the CPP. Unlike traditional political parties — which largely function as vehicles for oligarchs and power-hungry politicians — the CPP has stayed true to its ideological goals for over five decades. While most politicians flit from party to party like “political butterflies,” chasing power and patronage, the CPP plays the long game. Its operatives have perfected the art of forging alliances with ruling coalitions, leveraging Congress’ power of the purse to channel pork-barrel funds toward future campaigns and revolutionary objectives.
Recent events suggest that CPP influence is no longer confined to the countryside or university campuses. The arrest of Duterte — allegedly orchestrated with the help of urban operatives, international allies, and propaganda machinery — demonstrates the movement’s reach into the very heart of state power. Some analysts even argue that the CPP indirectly aided the Marcos-Romualdez coalition’s campaign to neutralize the Duterte bloc, long considered its most formidable rival.
This should serve as a wake-up call. The Filipino people remain vulnerable because no unified, pro-people democratic front exists to counter the CPP’s united front strategy. Should the CPP gain sufficient control over state institutions, the need for armed struggle would vanish — the AFP and PNP, bound by professional obedience to civilian authority, would be compelled to follow orders regardless of ideology.
The creation of a genuine democratic front is therefore not just desirable — it is urgent. Without it, the machinery of government could one day be turned toward enforcing a radical agenda that the Filipino majority never consented to.
Meanwhile, the public continues to suffer. Substandard or “ghost” infrastructure projects — such as the much-criticized flood control scandal — remain commonplace, as political factions focus more on power struggles than governance.
Democracy in the Philippines is at a crossroads. The question is no longer whether corruption must be fought — but whether we can prevent our nation’s future from being decided by those who are the most organized, rather than those who truly represent the will of the people.
