NexDef Int'l

16/10/2025

16/10/2025

has agreed to purchase £350 million (approximately $468 million) worth of -manufactured Lightweight Multirole (LMM) and launchers for the Army. These missiles will be produced by at a facility in Belfast, Northern , and are the same variant currently supplied to .

16/10/2025

NexDef Analysis | Europe’s Defence-Tech Surge: Capital, Code & Capabilities

Defence tech is Europe’s fastest-growing strategic industry. VC investment in deep-tech defence, security, and resilience startups has exploded from $159 million (2014) to $5.2 billion (2024)—a 32× rise.

The EU’s €800 billion ReArm Europe Plan (2025) and NATO’s new 5% GDP goal anchor this surge. Startups like XRF AI (Spain, €2.3 m seed) and Helsing (€600 m round) are symbols of the new dual-use race—AI, autonomy, quantum, and ISR.

Trends.
Software-defined defence: replacing hardware dependence with adaptive AI & data-driven systems.

Dual-use doctrine: EU & NATO funds (EDF €8 bn + NATO Innovation Fund €1 bn) require civil-military applicability.

VC shift: institutional investors relaxing “no-defence” clauses; Europe now leads in quantum cryptography & grid-tech startups.

Industrial pull-through: Germany’s €500 bn infra fund + national R&D pipelines bridging labs → procurement.

Challenges.
1️⃣ Long approval loops & protectionist tendencies delay scaling.
2️⃣ AI/quantum engineers & ISR devs are in short supply; there is a talent drain to the U.S. & UK.
3️⃣ 80% import dependency on China risks supply shocks for sensors & propulsion tech.
4️⃣ Funding volatility: defence budgets revised every autumn → boom-bust cycles.

Europe is mid-pivot—from hardware industrialism to deep-tech deterrence. The next decade will hinge on ex*****on: aligning VC velocity with state procurement inertia. If Europe can turn capital into capability, it could field a “software-first arsenal” to rival the U.S. & Asia by 2035.

16/10/2025

NexDef Analysis | Europe’s Artillery Program: Lessons from Ukraine

The Ukraine war has recentered artillery and long-range fires at the heart of modern warfare. For NATO Europe, it’s exposed a gap: decades of cuts left many armies without credible rocket artillery. Most had assumed airpower supremacy would offset massed fires; Ukraine proved otherwise. Since 2022, capitals from Warsaw to Oslo have raced to rebuild what they’d dismantled.

Procurement surge.
Poland: largest artillery buyer in Europe; 288 × K239 Chunmoo (South Korea) + 486 × Krab SPH + HIMARS deal for 500 launchers—total > €13 billion.
Germany: new €1.3 billion program to refurbish PzH 2000s and expand stockpiles.
UK: ordering L119 replacements & M270 upgrades for Deep Recce Strike Brigades by 2030.
Finland/Norway/Estonia: collective €1 billion artillery-munitions framework.
Czechia / Slovakia: Caesar 8×8 SPH + Slovak Zuzana 2 entering service.
Turkey: the only European producer of exportable MRLS systems (T-122 Sakarya, TRG-230/300), now marketing across EU and NATO flanks.

Europe’s industrial base for artillery collapsed after 1991; only France, Germany, and Türkiye retain scalable design/manufacturing lines. As a result, NATO Europe has become dependent on non-European suppliers, particularly U.S., Israeli, and South Korean systems. This fragmentation risks supply bottlenecks in a high-intensity conflict.

The “return of mass fires” is forcing Europe to relearn volume warfare. Stockpile depth, domestic production, and cross-border ammunition sharing (like the EU’s 1 million-shell plan) are now strategic metrics. In effect, artillery is Europe’s new currency of deterrence, and rebuilding that currency will take the rest of the decade.

16/10/2025

NexDef Analysis | U.S.–Venezuela: Caribbean force build-up, explained

Washington is quietly but steadily stacking combat power around Venezuela. Since late Aug, 3 U.S. warships surged into the Caribbean; in Sep a Marine Expeditionary Unit (~2,200 Marines + organic air/ground) deployed; F-35s, C-17s, P-8A Poseidons, and MQ-9 Reapers (>24h endurance) have appeared across Puerto Rico as NS Roosevelt Roads reactivates for ops.

Order of battle & enablers
Air: F-35s (stealth ISR/strike), P-8A (maritime ISR/ASW, long on-station), MQ-9 ER (armed ISR, multi-weapon), C-17 airlift (≈77t payload) ferrying kit/personnel—dozens of flights to St. Croix (USVI).

Sea: Amphibious shipping to host the MEU (helo/tilt-rotor assault, fast crisis response), plus reports of a SOF support ship in theater (for clandestine insertion/ISR/logistics).

Basing arc: Guantánamo Bay (Cuba), Puerto Rico/USVI, potential access via Status of Forces Agreement with Trinidad & Tobago, and friendly hubs (Barbados, Grenada). The geometry shortens tanker/airbridge demands and speeds sortie rates.

Signals & scenarios.
Deterrence + options: The mix (stealth fighters, ISR, amphibious Marines) advertises scalable packages—from maritime interdiction and counter-narco strikes to limited precision raids on regime targets or network nodes. Admin rhetoric labels Maduro a narco-trafficker (a $50M reward cited) and has already publicized strikes on “drug boats.” The force picture gives the White House graduated rungs if it chooses to escalate.

What this means for Caracas.
Persistent ISR (P-8/MQ-9) + fast movers (F-35) complicate coastal traffic, deny sanctuary, and enable time-sensitive targeting. A MEU afloat adds hours-notice raid/evac/combat rescue capacity.

Maduro seeks Russia/China/Iran cover, but no firm mutual-defense pledges are evident; regional states hosting U.S. access (PR/USVI/Trinidad) shift the logistical balance.

The U.S. has moved from signaling to credible options: ISR blanket, precision punch, and amphibious agility inside a tight Caribbean basing ring. That doesn’t make a large war inevitable—but it shortens the decision-to-action timeline and puts graduated coercive power within easy reac

16/10/2025

NexDef Analysis | Turkey's HAKİM System, or Steel Dome System

Türkiye is moving from siloed point-defences to a layered, networked national air-defense architecture: short-range guns/SHORAD, mobile point-defence, medium- and long-range SAMs, linked by tactical datalinks (RADNET/T-LINK) and national C2. The goal is to detect early, pass tracks to the right shooter, and keep reloads & sustainment local.

Pieces

• Short-range / gun systems: KORKUT / GÜRZ class SPAAGs (35 mm, ~1,100 rpm combined) and multi-sensor turrets for point defence against UAS and cruise threats—ideal for shoot-down density around maneuver units.

• SHORAD & CAMM-style elements (ALP / İHTAR / ŞAHİN): mobile launchers to give brigade/formation level coverage and quick relocation. These fill the “defeat inbound swarms / MANPADS gaps” role.

• Medium-range: HİSAR family. HİSAR-A (short/point) and HİSAR-O (medium) provide beyond-visual-range intercepts for aircraft & cruise missiles—key to protecting airbases and localized defense bubbles. (The program is publicly fielded with iterative capability increases.)

• Long-range: SİPER, Turkey’s strategic, long-range surface-to-air missile to contest high-altitude, long-range threats and complicate adversary strike corridors (public reporting cites long-range engagement ambitions of the >100 km class).

• Unmanned vessels / UUVs & naval sensors: It ties maritime sensors and unmanned effectors into the same RADNET—a sign of cross-domain sensing/sharing (air/sea under a common picture).

Numbers & industrial context

• ASELSAN / Turkish firms have accelerated sensor, turret, and CUAS production lines; KORKUT’s 35 mm twin barrels can sustain ~1,100 rpm and use programmable airburst rounds for UAS defeat.

• Roketsan’s SİPER and the HİSAR family are domestic missile efforts intended to reduce foreign dependence and give Turkey sovereign reload/manufacture options at multiple ranges. Public reporting puts SİPER in the >100 km class ambition, while HİSAR variants cover the short→medium bands needed for layered defence.

Operational Adv

Kill-chain compression. A combined RADNET + T-LINK picture forces attackers to achieve longer detection denials (EW,

11/10/2025

09/10/2025

NexDef Analysis | Spain’s Military Modernization—Land, Sea, Air: the plan

Spain has long been among NATO’s lowest spenders, at just 1.24% of GDP in 2024 (~€17.2 billion) by alliance estimates. But in 2025, Madrid unveiled a €10.5 billion boost to raise its total security & defence budget to €33.123 billion, hitting the 2% of GDP target it pledged to achieve ahead of schedule. Spain also secured an exemption from NATO’s proposed 5% target, opting instead for a more gradual scaling approach.

Land. Spain is launching seven new modernization programs for its army, with a focus on upgrading its Leopard 2E fleet to “2EM” standard (armor, mine protection, active protection systems, and C4I upgrades). Its armoured vehicle plan includes 394 ASCOD 2 platforms in a €2 billion contract signed in late 2023, with multiple variants (infantry, mortar, recovery, and command) already in development. The army is also purchasing 84 EIMOS 81 mm mortars (contract ~€150 million) to mount on 4×4s for flexible deployment by 2027. The land modernisation program is being phased: benchmark years are set for 2026, 2030, and 2035 under its new concept of brigade types (heavy, medium, and rapid reaction).

Air. Spain has ruled out ordering F-35s, choosing instead to double down on Eurofighter Typhoon upgrades and the Franco-German FCAS project as its future combat air strategy. In December 2024, Spain ordered 25 additional Typhoon jets, bringing its total to 115, with deliveries slated between 2030 and 2035. The expanded fleet will support integration of advanced sensors (e-scan radar), connectivity, and compatibility with Meteor, Brimstone, and Full Meteor missiles.

Sea & Naval. Spain is reshaping its navy around the F110 (Bonifaz) class frigate, a domestically built Aegis/SCOMBA combat system frigate. The first unit was launched on 11 September 2025. The F110s integrate SPY-7 radar and Aegis, and Spanish firms have supplied 10,000+ components for radar masts. Over the next eight years, the Navy plans to build eleven new ships under its Vision 2050 plan, emphasizing unmanned systems, AI, and quantum technologies.
Spain is also modernising air defence: in 2025 it ordered modernisation of NASAMS systems (to NASAMS 2+), a deal valued at ~€410 million, scheduled to be delivered by 2027.

Spain’s reset is ambitious but cautious. Its renewed financial commitment and retooling of land, naval, and air domains show a real shift. However, deep risks remain: Spain’s armed forces will need to scale training, logistics, and spare parts fast. Many major deliveries won’t arrive until the 2030s; the capability gap remains. The government is walking a tightrope with defense increases in a country historically wary of militarism. If Madrid can deliver steadily through 2030, Spain could transform from NATO’s laggard to a credible European contributor. If not, it risks overpromising with hollow results.

09/10/2025

The U.S. Army has selected L3Harris Technologies to deliver their software-defined AN/PRC-158C Gateway Manpack devices as part of the Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) program. This contract, valued at $24 million, involves supplying these high-data throughput data devices to the Army’s 4th Infantry Division ahead of their participation in Project Convergence 2026.

09/10/2025

Indonesia's state-owned shipbuilder has unveiled its autonomous submarine, known as Kapal Selam Otonom (KSOT), to the public for the first time. The KSOT is being developed for the Navy in response to defense requirements by the Indonesian Ministry of Defence and

09/10/2025

, a major defense company, has reported a significant increase in the number of unidentified drones flying over its classified facilities, particularly at its factory located at Évegnée Fort in the Liège region. This site is crucial as it is licensed for assembling and storing explosives for 70 mm rockets, mainly used against and supplied to European countries and .