The Kurdistan Tribune

26/06/2025

By A***n Mufid:

When Allied forces expelled Iraq from Kuwait in January 1991, President George H. W. Bush called for regime change and encouraged the Iraqi people from the North and South of the country to rise up against Saddam Hussein. In response, uprisings erupted in the south and north of Iraq. However, these uprisings were brutally suppressed by Saddam’s regime. The United States abandoned the Iraqi people in their moment of need, leaving them at the mercy of dictator Saddam Hussein. This betrayal resulted in a mass exodus from Iraqi Kurdistan to the mountains. Over a million Kurdish people fled to the mountains in the cold spring to flee the violence.

In response, the U.S. administration sent Secretary of State James Baker to assess the situation. Observing the suffering from a helicopter, Baker concluded that the United States had a moral obligation to assist. Eventually, the U.S. provided humanitarian aid by airlifting food and blankets through Turkey, dropping large supply boxes from military aircraft. This wasn’t the first time the United States had betrayed the Kurds. In 1974 a similar betrayal took place when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger withdrew support for the Kurdish rebellion led by Barzani against Saddam. This took place after Iran and Iraq reached an agreement whereby Iran agreed to stop arming the Kurdish resistance in 1975.

The betrayal of the Kurds goes back even further, the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916, in which Britain and France redrew the map of the Middle East. As part of this imperialist scheme to divide the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish homeland was carved into parts of what would become Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The Kurds were left stateless divided among British, French, and Russian spheres of influence. The agreement ignored Kurdish national aspirations entirely. Fearing Allied retribution for their perceived role in the Armenian genocide, and with no political allies, the Kurds found themselves isolated and vulnerable. For Britain, the Kurdish cause was not a priority especially in the face of appeasing central governments like those of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

Despite this, the Kurdish struggle for self-determination continued. On August 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres acknowledged the desirability of a Kurdish homeland. Britain and France promised the full and final liberation of peoples oppressed by the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurds. Article 62 of Section III on Kurdistan empowered a commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian, and Kurdish representatives to determine changes to Ottoman boundaries. However, this promise was never fulfilled. The Allied powers, especially Britain, abandoned Kurdish self-determination after World War I, prioritizing their colonial interests and the strategic value of the region.

When Iraq became an official state in 1932 under British mandate, the Kurds were again used as pawns in regional politics. The British deliberately maintained a complex stance: on one hand, acknowledging Kurdish concerns, but on the other, consistently favoring Iraq’s territorial integrity under British influence. This position continues on. In the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum, Britain refused to support full Kurdish independence, reaffirming its commitment to a federal Iraq.

Historically, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) even bombed Kurdish regions to suppress uprisings on Christmas Day December 25, 1920, when the Kurds were being led by Sheikh Mahmoud who opposed British colonial rule in Kurdistan. The British who divided Kurdistan have a moral obligation to ensure the protection and survival of the Kurdish people whose struggle against oppression and state violence continues at the hands of the states the British annexed their homeland into.

Citations:

• Randal, Jonathan. After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan. New York.1989

• Kissinger, Henry. World Order. (“Extraordinary, truly staggering…an unambiguous masterpiece.” — Tom Rogan, Washington Post, p. 326)

• Luqman Radpey. The Sèvres Centennial: Self-Determination and the Kurds, Volume 24, Issue 20, August 10, 2020.

By A***n Mufid: When Allied forces expelled Iraq from Kuwait in January 1991, President George H. W. Bush called for regime change and encouraged the Iraqi people from the North and South of the country to rise up against Saddam Hussein. In response, uprisings erupted in the south and north of Ir

12/06/2025

نەمانی سیاسەتی نەختی لە هەرێمى کوردستان و عێراق

د. موفید محمد نوورى

د.موفید محمد نوورى

05/06/2025

https://kurdistantribune.com/silent-deals-the-geopolitics-behind-trump-erdogan-and-al-sharaa/

By Dr. Muhamad Sabir Kareem: Amid Trump's trip to the Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) which includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE - on May 13th, the groundwork was prepared for Trump's Al-Sharaa meeting in Riyadh. A meeting which came under the impact of an offering by Prince Mohammed bin Sal

02/06/2025

By Suare B:

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s political career is a clear example of this idea—a story of smart partnerships, betrayed partners, and a brilliant for blindsiding opponents with predatory precision.

Like a leopard in the wild, Erdoğan thrives on the element of surprise, turning friends into foes and foes into scapegoats, all while navigating Turkey’s foggy political landscape with ruthless adaptability. Let’s explore his journey, from a street-smart underdog to a prominent leader who reshapes allies and adversaries with equal ease.

The Rise: A Chameleon’s Ascent
Erdoğan’s story begins in 1954, born to a coastguard’s family in Istanbul’s gritty Kasımpaşa district. His rise from these humble roots to Istanbul’s mayor in 1994 under the Welfare Party was fueled by an everyman charm that resonated with conservative Muslims, urban underdogs, and those exhausted of Turkey’s secular elite. He wasn’t just a politician; he was a symbol of defiance against the Kemalist old guard.

By 2001, as co-founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Erdoğan reinvented himself. Gone was the fiery Islamist; in his place stood a “conservative democrat” promising EU-friendly reforms and economic prosperity. His coalition was a broad tent: devout Sunnis, Kurds eyeing peace, liberals craving modernization, and even the Gülen movement, a powerful Islamic network that bolstered his fight against the military’s stranglehold on politics. The results were undeniable—poverty plummeted from 42% to 13.8% by 2013, and a flourishing middle class hailed him as their champion. Yet, beneath this success, the seeds of betrayal were already sown.

The Pivot: From Allies to Enemies
Erdoğan’s loyalty to allies is short-lived, like a shadow in an Istanbul storm. By the late 2000s, his democratic mask began to crack. The 2013 Gezi Park protests, sparked by plans to raze a green space for a mall, exposed his intolerance for dissent. The same urban liberals who once backed his reforms were now labeled “thugs” and met with tear gas. The Gülenists, instrumental in curbing the military, faced an even harsher fate. After the 2016 coup attempt—blamed on Fethullah Gülen’s followers—Erdoğan launched a purge of staggering scale. Over 100,000 people, from academics to soldiers, were jailed or sacked, often on evidence as thin as a rumor. The irony? The Gülenists, once his battering ram, became his new “terrorist” obsession.

Even AKP backbones weren’t safe. Figures like former President Abdullah Gül and ex-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who helped build the party’s empire, were sidelined as Erdoğan tightened his grip, especially after the 2017 shift to a presidential system. Loyalty, it seems, is a one-way street in Erdoğan’s world.

The Adversaries: A Sledgehammer Approach
Erdoğan’s approach to political rivals combines razor-sharp calculation with raw displays of power. The judiciary became his weapon of choice, orchestrated to crush threats like Ekrem İmamoğlu, the charismatic Istanbul mayor who defeated the AKP in 2019. By 2025, İmamoğlu was jailed on fishy corruption charges, conveniently timed to derail his presidential candidacy. The Kurds, too, tasted betrayal. Early peace talks with the PKK won Erdoğan votes, but when political tides turned, he embraced nationalism, branding Kurds as terrorists and launching military campaigns. His 2023 election leaned heavily on anti-Kurdish rhetoric, torching bridges he’d once built.

The media, once a lively arena, became a graveyard of dissent. Independent outlets were shut down, journalists jailed, and loyalists installed to ensure Erdoğan’s narrative—heroic “reis” versus treacherous enemies—reigned supreme. By 2025, Turkey’s media was a chorus of pro-Erdoğan voices, with nary a whisper of opposition.

The Global Game: Friends, Foes, and Flip-Flops
Erdoğan’s foreign policy is a study in contradictions. His “zero problems with neighbors” slogan gave way to conflicts with Syria, Greece, Israel, and even NATO allies. He’s backed Syrian rebels, clashed with Kurds, and sparred with Greece over Mediterranean resources. Yet, when pragmatism calls, he pivots—brokering grain deals between Russia and Ukraine or warming ties with Saudi Arabia for economic relief. His ability to shift from firebrand to dealmaker keeps adversaries guessing, but it’s less about principle and more about survival.

The Grand Irony
Erdoğan’s career is a paradox wrapped in ambition. He rose as a liberator, vowing to dismantle Turkey’s elitist shackles, yet became the elite enforcer of his own system. His playbook—charm, betrayal, judicial strong-arming, and nationalist pivots—has kept him in power for over two decades. Allies like the Gülenists, liberals, and Kurds, once his stepping stones, now bear the scars of his betrayal, while rivals like İmamoğlu face his unrelenting machine. Loved by loyalists, loathed by critics, Erdoğan remains Turkey’s “reis,” proving that in politics, irony is the only constant.

By Suare B: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's political career is a clear example of this idea—a story of smart partnerships, betrayed partners, and a brilliant for blindsiding opponents with predatory precision. Like a leopard in the wild, Erdoğan thrives on the element of surprise, turning friends int

12/05/2025

https://kurdistantribune.com/why-do-kurds-lack-a-free-kurdistan/

By Suare B: Internal Fragmentation and KDP’s Complicity with Regional Powers Undermine Kurdish Aspirations The dream of a free and independent Kurdistan remains elusive, despite the Kurds’ enduring struggle across generations and borders. While external forces—particularly the hostility of reg

02/05/2025

https://kurdistantribune.com/syrias-new-authority-and-jihadist-extremist-groups/

By Dr. Muhamad Sabir Kareem: There is no doubt that the current transitional authority in Syria, along with its affiliated organisation, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, represent jihadist ideologies. It is clear that these jihadist forces do not believe in the rights of other groups, particularly those wit

29/04/2025

https://kurdistantribune.com/trumps-imposed-tariffs-is-not-a-panacea-for-the-ailing-american-economy/

By Rauf Naqishbendi:
The time for America to put its house in order is past.

By Rauf Naqishbendi: A trade war is an economic confrontation between two countries. It can occur when one country retaliates against another, citing unfair trading practices with restrictions, such as tariffs, on imports. Trade wars have been going on for as long as nations have conducted trad

23/04/2025

Kurds Need Filmmakers Like Halime Aktürk

By Nick Kossovan:

"Despite our suffering, nobody cares about us. We have shared our stories, but even then, they have not done anything for us." - Leyla Telo, a survivor of the Yazidi genocide.

Some films make you "realize." Ezda, a short documentary film by emerging Kurdish-Canadian filmmaker Halime Aktürk, in which Ezda, a survivor of the Yazidi genocide carried out by ISIS between 2014 and 2017, opens up about her life while in captivity and her efforts to start a new life for herself and her children in Canada, is such a film.
Through Ezda, Halime does a brilliant job of bringing to life the central defining element of Kurdish cinema—presenting the hardships and traumas experienced by Kurds, being honest about what many Kurds are feeling and thinking without being overly guarded or curated.

Additionally impressive is how Ezda touches on the Kurdish geopolitical dichotomy, a topic hardly discussed in the West. You'd be hard-pressed to find someone outside of the Middle East who knows Kurds are the world's largest ethnic group—thought to number between 36 million and 46 million—without a country. Kurds have no place to call "home." As a result of persecution, they've been forced to settle, such as Ezda did, wherever they could, resulting in Kurds becoming a diasporan international community that stretches across the globe.As a Yazidi, Ezda's story has an additional geopolitical layer. There's a long-running debate about Yazidi identity among Yazidi communities and scholars. Yazidis are generally considered a Kurdish-speaking, endogamous religious group indigenous to Kurdistan. Therefore, Yazidis are regarded as Kurds and, consequently, experience the same geopolitical circumstances as other Kurdish groups in Iraq.

As a result of my upbringing— a father having experienced the post-World War II geopolitical tensions that created the Cold War, which gradually morphed into détente, and the Western media encouraging an "us versus them" divide with the term "Eastern Europe"—I view the world through its many divides, West vs. East, Political Left vs. Political Right, He vs. Her, War Mongering vs. Peace Loving... you get the picture. I look for and, predictably, see the ongoing power struggles over individual and collective (read: governments) self-interests that keep the world in constant disharmony. Therefore, as I watched Ezda, the geopolitical divisiveness that forced Ezda to be part of the Kurdish global diaspora jumped out at me while also triggering a question—again, thanks to my upbringing—I've been thinking about for years...
https://kurdistantribune.com/kurds-need-filmmakers-like-halime-akturk/

By Nick Kossovan: "Despite our suffering, nobody cares about us. We have shared our stories, but even then, they have not done anything for us." - Leyla Telo, a survivor of the Yazidi genocide. Some films make you "realize." Ezda, a short documentary film by emerging Kurdish-Canadian filmmaker

03/04/2025

By Dr. Muhamad Sabir Kareem:

If we begin with the truth that one of the basic elements in defining the concept of peace includes the maintenance of justice and the reduction of violence, as well as identifying the factors behind war, violence, and organized oppression, then we can say that the peace process between the PKK and the Turkish state is far from being judged according to these elements of peace. Based on these principles, we must acknowledge that, while resisting military threats is necessary to maintain national security, on the opposing side, ending colonial oppression and supporting the liberation movement is essential to achieving real peace between both sides of the conflict.

In response to what we discussed in Part 1 regarding the shortcomings and inconsistencies related to the main subject of this essay, and in light of the truth mentioned above, we observe the following shortcomings in this peace attempt:

1. First of all, this attempt began with only one side: the Kurdish members of the DEM Party, followed by the imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan. After several trips and communications between them and Öcalan in his place of imprisonment on Imrali Island, as well as their visits to the Kurdistan Region, they announced their declaration in a hotel in Istanbul on February 27, 2025. No members of the Turkish government nor any representatives from the Bahçeli party were present at the announcement.

2. In any peace process between two or more sides, there should be numerous direct or indirect meetings to discuss the main points and conditions of the conflict. It is important to involve a third party, preferably a representative of the UN or the EU, to ensure international oversight. This is especially important for the side that has faced a more tragic historical experience. Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that the history of the Kurds is filled with damage and failure in this regard. However, this peace attempt, to this point, has been marked by significant shortcomings.

3. Although the peace message was intended to be read by Öcalan (the imprisoned leader) at the Turkish Parliament, it was later supposed to be read at his place of imprisonment. However, none of this actually took place. Instead, the message was read by some members of the DEM Party at a hotel in Istanbul.

4. No government media, opposition channels, or press attended the announcement. Furthermore, the declaration was not broadcast by any official government media.

5. The message read at the conference was not the original copy. It appeared to be an altered version. This can be inferred from several pieces of evidence: first, when Ahmet Türk read the Kurdish version, there were problems with some unclear or mistranslated words. Second, at the beginning of the announcement, the person who started the conference claimed the message was about three and a half pages long, yet the version read was only about one and a half pages. Moreover, the content of the text seemed to have been prepared by Turkish intelligence officials.

By Dr. Muhamad Sabir Kareem: If we begin with the truth that one of the basic elements in defining the concept of peace includes the maintenance of justice and the reduction of violence, as well as identifying the factors behind war, violence, and organized oppression, then we can say that the pe

25/03/2025

https://kurdistantribune.com/hopes-and-concerns-syrias-new-government-strikes-deal-with-syrian-kurds/

By Rauf Naqishbendi: After the revolt against the Assad government began in 2011, the Kurds took advantage of the opportunity created by the withdrawal of government forces from vast areas of Syria’s northeast. The main Kurdish-led force now controls about 25% of Syria. An autonomous authority ru

18/03/2025

By Dr. Muhamad Sabir Kareem:

Part 1
History suggests that any peace process must include basic rules and conditions that are essential for the process to succeed. In studying the message delivered by Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdish leader of North Kurdistan, in the final days of February 2025, we found significant shortcomings and incompatible elements in relation to the subject of our essay. These issues will be discussed below. However, before we proceed, it is important to address some key points related to this case.

Firstly, there is a crucial issue that needs correction in both academic and cultural discussions. The main identity of the PKK, or generally the Northern Kurdish movement for liberty, is not that of a terrorist organization, but rather a national liberation movement. Based on this fact, the peace process involves two sides that have been engaged in a difficult and protracted war for more than four decades. There is no doubt that the Kurdish side in this conflict has proposed several attempts to find a peaceful solution to end the war, especially since the 1990s. For example, on December 15, 1998, in a communication with Med TV, Öcalan called for PKK guerillas to lay down their arms in an effort to make peace with the Turkish state. The peace attempts in 2012 also failed to reach any conclusion, largely because the Turkish side, particularly the party of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, did not genuinely believe in ending the war. In contrast, the Kurdish side (PKK leaders) had offered many concessions, including the surrendering of heavy weapons.

The region has experienced significant and deep changes, particularly with the emergence of the ISIS war in 2014, the Hamas terror attack on Israel in October 2023, and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria by December 2024. In response, the Turkish state, led by Erdoğan and his main ally, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), has sought to maintain Turkish rule and interests in the region. This has involved preventing the Kurdish issue from evolving into an independent political force, as regional political changes pose a direct challenge to their control. These attempts by the Kurdish side led to the emergence of Öcalan’s peace message, which was announced on February 27.

By Dr. Muhamad Sabir Kareem: Part 1 History suggests that any peace process must include basic rules and conditions that are essential for the process to succeed. In studying the message delivered by Abdullah Öcalan, the Kurdish leader of North Kurdistan, in the final days of February 2025, we fou

12/03/2025

https://kurdistantribune.com/the-kurdish-turkish-peace-process-a-historic-turning-point-or-another-cycle-of-deception/
The Kurdish-Turkish Peace Process: A Historic Turning Point or Another Cycle of Deception?

By A***n Mufid:

On October 2024, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), shocked the Turkish Parliament by declaring that Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), should be freed. Bahçeli also took an unprecedented step by shaking hands with members of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party, many of whom hail from northern Kurdistan in Turkey. This dramatic shift came after Turkish intelligence (MIT) informed him that negotiations with the PKK had reached an advanced stage. In response, Öcalan sent a historic message from his jail cell on February 27, 2025, calling for an end to violence and urging the PKK to lay down their arms and prepare for a party conference to dissolve the organization.The announcement, read in both Kurdish and Turkish, was met with mixed reactions. In Diyarbakır, a massive hall was prepared for the statement’s public reading, attended by nearly 300 journalists and representatives from 149 media outlets. Outside, nearly 100,000 Kurds watched the broadcast on large screens. Among the crowd, emotions varied: some expressed joy at the prospect of peace, while others were devastated, believing that Öcalan had conceded too much without securing any guarantees for Kurdish rights.

Political leaders and analysts also interpreted the statement in different ways. Some saw it as a surrender, while others viewed it as a futile effort unlikely to change Turkey’s hardline policies. The international community, however, welcomed the move. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called it a “positive step in the right direction.” Governments in Germany, France, and the United States also endorsed the peace process as an opportunity to reshape Turkey’s policies toward its Kurdish population, which has long been subjected to state violence.

Salih Muslim, co-chair of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, remarked, “It is now Turkey’s turn to step up the peace process.” Similarly, Ramzy Cartel, leader of the People’s Congress, noted that had the 2013-2015 peace process not collapsed, the PKK could have already decommissioned its armed forces. Over the last four decades, nearly 39,000 people have died in the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, making the stakes for peace higher than ever.

Despite the optimism, deep mistrust remains between the Kurdish people and the Turkish state. Historically, peace processes have failed due to Turkey’s repeated suppression of Kurdish aspirations. Öcalan himself was captured in 1999 with the help of U.S., Israeli, and Turkish intelligence, and many Kurds fear that his latest statement might have been altered by Turkish authorities. DEM Party MP Sırrı Süreyya Önder suggested that Öcalan’s words do not fully reflect his genuine views, citing her own visit to him, during which he emphasized the need for a legal and political framework for negotiations.

The PKK has declared a ceasefire, yet in the six days following Öcalan’s statement, Turkey carried out 822 attacks on Kurdish targets. This underscores a fundamental problem: peace cannot be achieved while Turkish drones and military operations continue to strike Kurdish regions. International mediation, akin to the process used in Northern Ireland with independent monitors like Martti Ahtisaari and Cyril Ramaphosa, would be necessary to ensure the credibility and security of the disarmament process.

Ozgür Özel, leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), urged the Turkish government to respond to Öcalan’s message with courage, warning that ignoring it would only prolong the conflict. “The Kurdish issue is now visible throughout Turkey,” he stated, criticizing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for downplaying the matter.

Many believe that Erdoğan is manipulating the situation for political gain, using the promise of peace to deceive both Turkish and Kurdish citizens. Meanwhile, the Turkish deep state and military continue to employ brutal tactics reminiscent of Sri Lanka’s elimination of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and Colombia’s crackdown on the FARC. Yet, despite decades of attempts to crush the PKK, the organization remains resilient.

As former French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau famously said in 1919, “Making peace is harder than waging war.” Achieving a sustainable peace requires commitment, compromise, and a willingness to confront painful truths. The involvement of international powers has often been crucial in ending long-term conflicts, such as in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East.

Notably, past Turkish-PKK negotiations failed partly due to the absence of international mediators. The first attempt, backed by Turkish President Turgut Özal and Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, collapsed following Özal’s suspicious death in 1994. The second, which took place between 2012 and 2015, also fell apart, leading to renewed violence. Without guarantees of legal protection and an end to military aggression, the PKK is unlikely to fully disarm.

For over 40 years, the PKK has fought against what it sees as one of the most brutal regimes in the world. The organization’s financial backbone comes from taxation of Kurdish businesses globally, rather than foreign assistance. Its resilience is deeply tied to grassroots support, with millions of Kurds viewing it as their only hope for self-determination. While the PKK has evolved in its strategies, it has consistently refused to surrender to Turkish pressure.

Turkey has enjoyed military and intelligence support from global powers, yet it has failed to eliminate the PKK. The organization’s leadership remains steadfast, believing that their cause is just and their struggle necessary. Even in captivity, Öcalan’s strategic foresight continues to shape Kurdish resistance. Many in the Kurdish movement argue that without genuine concessions from Turkey—including legal guarantees, constitutional reforms, and an end to state violence—the peace process is meaningless.

Ultimately, the success of the peace process depends on Turkey’s willingness to commit to real democratic reforms. The Turkish government must move beyond military repression and engage in sincere dialogue. Kurdish leaders, in turn, must ensure that their demands are met with concrete guarantees before taking irreversible steps toward disarmament.

If history is any guide, peace will not come easily. However, if both sides are genuinely committed to ending the bloodshed, a lasting resolution could finally emerge. Is Turkey ready to embrace peace, or will it once again allow an opportunity for reconciliation to slip away?