30/08/2026
🇲🇲 On Myanmar, ASEAN should brace for the long road ahead
Implementation of the Five-Point Consensus may depend less on high-level diplomacy and more on a convoluted domestic negotiation process now coming into view.
✍🏻 By Morgan Michaels | Aug. 27, 2026
On 12 July 2026, the foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met informally in Bangkok with their new Myanmar counterpart, Tin Maung Swe, marking an arguable deviation from the bloc’s standing prohibition on Naypyidaw’s representation at the senior political level. The meeting was first proposed by Thailand as a form of ‘calibrated re-engagement’. This term appears to suggest a process in which ASEAN offers incremental re-engagement with Myanmar’s foreign minister (or even president) in exchange for ‘demonstrable progress’ towards implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) – the group’s diplomatic road map for addressing the post-coup crisis in Myanmar. First agreed in April 2021, the 5PC calls for a cessation of hostilities, inclusive dialogue and access for humanitarian aid, among other points. Yet statements from Myanmar’s parliament, and more recently the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have made clear Naypyidaw’s enduring rejection of the 5PC. With some ASEAN members unwilling to move forward until Naypyidaw complies, Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs Theresa Lazaro conceded in mid-July that Myanmar’s full political re-invitation to ASEAN remains a long way off.
⭕ Diplomatic disconnect
Naypyidaw’s non-compliance with the 5PC reflects its confidence and priorities. Having anointed himself president via tightly controlled elections, Min Aung Hlaing has now secured recognition from Belarus, Cambodia, China, India, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Russia. His diplomatic revival is hardly challenged by Western countries, which have not maintained serious pressure via sanctions or other means. Rather than pining for normalisation with ASEAN, his focus is domestic: consolidating power and dealing with armed and political opposition. As such, the regime is unlikely to reduce airstrikes, release high-profile political prisoners or allow aid to opposition-held areas – actions that would demonstrate progress towards implementing the 5PC but constitute major domestic concessions – in exchange for a political re-invitation to ASEAN.
Even if there are regime officials open to constructive diplomatic relations with ASEAN, they have very little room to manoeuvre under Min Aung Hlaing and his idiosyncratic rule. At best, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears mandated to act as a messenger between external stakeholders (including ASEAN) and the Office of the President. Regional interlocutors will find it difficult to negotiate effectively without a direct line to senior officials in Min Aung Hlaing’s office.
Beyond Min Aung Hlaing’s personal interests, the Tatmadaw’s primary concern remains the threat posed by ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and Aung San Suu Kyi, whose enduring political weight provides Naypyidaw sufficient reason to keep her locked away. For the regime, restored ties with ASEAN is not worth it making non-reciprocal concessions to domestic adversaries that would mean forfeiting the coercive leverage it currently wields. To make concessions, the Tatmadaw will demand something in return from the EAOs, which necessitates negotiations and ceasefires as a first step.
⭕ Ground realities
Meaningful progress in Myanmar – whether political, economic or humanitarian – would need to start with a broad conflict de-escalation, which at a minimum would require ceasefires between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs. Unfortunately, the path to de-escalation is likely to be long and fraught with dilemmas.
Both the Tatmadaw and some EAOs employ a ‘fight and talk’ model, in which armed operations and negotiations take place simultaneously, allowing opponents to maintain coercive leverage over one another while they bargain. This matters for the 5PC because even if ceasefire talks commence, high-intensity violence may continue between the parties for some time until an agreement is reached. ASEAN should not anticipate that belligerents will immediately reduce attacks as a confidence-building measure ahead of initial negotiations.
After losing large territories to EAOs, the Tatmadaw has turned to airstrikes to maintain pressure on areas it cannot reach directly. The Tatmadaw’s denial of humanitarian aid is another deliberate pressure tactic deployed against its opponents and their civilian supporters. In this vein, the Tatmadaw is unlikely to end airstrikes or allow aid delivery to opposition-held areas without a ceasefire deal. This was the case in 2020, when the Tatmadaw paused remote strikes and allowed an international third party to deliver rice to the Arakan Army as part of a ceasefire arrangement in Rakhine.
Further complicating a de-escalation process is the fact that the Tatmadaw is likely – at first – to separate the issue of ceasefire negotiations from that of broader political dialogue. From 2011–21, the Tatmadaw pursued bilateral ceasefires with EAOs before inviting them to join a political dialogue process under the framework of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The Tatmadaw appears to be adhering to this model in the current context: as part of its post-election strategy, it launched an ongoing dialogue process with 13 groups, all of which have new or pre-existing bilateral ceasefire agreements, at least informally.
Among the key groups that remain outside this process are those organised loosely under the banner of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), which was created as a vehicle for collective bargaining vis-à-vis the regime. The SCEF includes the EAOs fighting along the Myanmar–Thailand border, as well as the National Unity Government (NUG) and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH). Recently, the SCEF publicly acknowledged an openness to negotiation with the regime.
Substantive negotiations between the Tatmadaw and SCEF members are likely to prove challenging. The Tatmadaw states that it does not negotiate military ceasefires with unarmed political groups or actors that do not directly control their forces, meaning it will not negotiate with the CRPH or the NUG. Furthermore, despite its eagerness to talk with EAOs, it currently insists that ceasefire negotiations are bilateral. This position conflicts with the SCEF’s insistence on collective negotiations with all its members from the outset.
Accordingly, the Tatmadaw might aim to force the SCEF’s EAO members into bilateral negotiations through ongoing military offensives. The EAOs could potentially avert this outcome, but not without political cost. During the NCA era, the Tatmadaw allowed the Brotherhood Alliance’s three members to negotiate collectively for a ceasefire with the stipulation that final agreements be signed separately. Afterwards they would be invited to join the NCA, where they could resume collective bargaining over a political settlement. Although such a deal was never reached, the precedent suggests that the SCEF EAOs could negotiate collectively for ceasefire, but only if they drop their demand to include the NUG and the CRPH.
The bifurcation of ceasefire negotiation tracks or dialogue processes could pose a major challenge in Myanmar. As a part of initial ceasefire negotiations, SCEF members would likely demand that a ceasefire agreement include some reference to the political process that could follow. Such a framework could potentially cover the ways other unarmed or political stakeholders would be included in the subsequent dialogue. However, a bottleneck could emerge if the ongoing process between Naypyidaw and the 13 groups produces agreements on political issues, like constitutional reform or federalism. If any of these agreements were to conflict with the political framework envisioned by the SCEF, then progress in the current dialogue process might complicate ceasefire negotiations involving the SCEF or its individual members.
⭕ Outlook
Naypyidaw is unlikely to offer ASEAN genuine progress towards the 5PC in exchange for a political re-invitation to ASEAN. Instead, a solution in Myanmar must first begin with broad conflict de-escalation on the ground, which requires at a minimum ceasefire between the Tatmadaw and its strongest EAO opponents. However, given the prevailing conflict dynamics and number of stakeholders involved, the path to de-escalation is unlikely to be immediately inclusive or linear. Violence will continue in some areas even if overall levels decline, and the country could see a proliferation of different negotiation tracks or political processes.
In its search for a way forward, ASEAN has tasked itself with setting ‘benchmarks’ to measure Naypyidaw’s compliance with the 5PC. It will need to consider which benchmarks are most meaningful and should be prioritised. If its emphasis remains on the inclusive nature of dialogue, then that benchmark is unlikely to be met until ceasefire negotiations have concluded and a broader political process begins. The most expedient route to a cessation of violence, even if only partial, is more likely to emerge from non-inclusive ceasefire negotiations and agreements.
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