26/11/2025
【軍傳媒/軍事專欄】100%國艦國造時代, #韓國能, #台灣不能?(下)
In the Era of 100% Indigenous Warship Production—Why Can South Korea Do It, but Taiwan Can’t? (Part 2)
上篇文章闡述 #韓國造船業的進程,韓國各種對造船業打雞血的政策在1980年代結出了果實,以反快艇作戰為目標,揉合德國與日本風格,自主製造的4艘東海級巡邏艦與9艘蔚山級巡防艦陸續下水服役,取代原本從美國接收來的老舊護衛驅逐艦(DE)。
1980年代, #韓國實戰經驗走向藍水海軍
1988年韓國舉行首次民主選舉結束軍政府獨裁統治,其次1991年蘇聯解體對朝鮮半島的安全環境產生了深遠影響。首先是1986年全斗煥政府廢止了《 #造船業促進法》,不再無條件向造船財閥提供資金。1988年同時舉辦了奧運會和第一次總統民主選舉,正式宣告南韓在軍事和經濟實力上均已超越朝鮮,成為世界上不可忽視的中等強國。
1991年蘇聯解體對半島安全勢態產生深遠影響,朝鮮失去了蘇聯提供的安全保障,同時因為蘇聯不再威脅海上航運,歐美國家也減少了造船業投資,加拿大與澳洲都在90年代結束國內造船工業。低成本、高技術含量的韓國造船業在90年代快速崛起。2000年韓國造船業外銷船隻金額已佔製造業出口額4.8%,是世界上最大商船製造國。
1970年代末期以來常規軍事能力差距使兩韓間陸上衝突不斷減少,但海上不對稱作戰卻不斷增加。朝鮮岸防部隊屢屢砲擊北方界線附近南韓軍事目標與船艦,朝鮮海軍水面與水下部隊多次攻擊韓國海軍(第一次/第二次延坪島海戰、天安艦事件、大青島海戰),更利用潛艇載運特戰部隊滲透南韓,甚至刺殺韓國總統(東草潛艇事件/江陵潛艦滲透事件)。整個60年代南朝鮮雙方僅發生22次海上武裝衝突,80年代變成61次、90年代增加到107次,廿一世紀前10年更大幅上升到180次。
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圖片來源:DVIDS
【 Military Media / Defense Column 】
In the Era of 100% Indigenous Warship Production—Why Can South Korea Do It, but Taiwan Can’t? (Part 2)
The previous article outlined the development of South Korea’s shipbuilding industry. Throughout the 1980s, Seoul’s aggressive pro-shipbuilding policies finally bore fruit. With anti–fast-attack-craft warfare as the design objective and blending German and Japanese influences, South Korea successfully launched four Donghae-class patrol ships and nine Ulsan-class frigates—indigenously built vessels that gradually replaced the aging destroyer es**rts (DEs) previously transferred from the United States.
1980s: South Korea’s Real Combat Experience Shifted Toward a Blue-Water Navy
In 1988, South Korea held its first democratic presidential election, ending decades of military dictatorship. Meanwhile, the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union had a profound impact on the security landscape of the Korean Peninsula.
The Chun Doo-hwan administration repealed the Shipbuilding Industry Promotion Act in 1986, ending unconditional financial support to major shipbuilding conglomerates. By 1988, South Korea hosted both the Olympic Games and its first democratic presidential election—events symbolizing that the Republic of Korea had surpassed North Korea in both military and economic strength, emerging as a mid-tier power that the world could no longer overlook.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 reshaped the peninsula’s strategic dynamics. North Korea lost its Soviet security umbrella, while the reduction of Soviet naval pressure eased maritime threats. Western nations subsequently scaled back investment in shipbuilding—Canada and Australia even terminated their domestic shipbuilding industries in the 1990s. During this period, South Korea’s low-cost, high-technology shipbuilding sector rose rapidly. By 2000, South Korea had become the world’s largest commercial-ship producer, with exported vessels accounting for 4.8% of its total manufacturing exports.
Escalation of Maritime Asymmetric Conflict
Since the late 1970s, the conventional military gap between the two Koreas had widened, reducing land-based clashes. At sea, however, asymmetric confrontations surged. North Korean coastal artillery repeatedly shelled South Korean military targets and ships near the Northern Limit Line (NLL). North Korea’s surface and submarine forces conducted multiple attacks on the Republic of Korea Navy—including the First and Second Battles of Yeonpyeong, the sinking of ROKS Cheonan, and the Daecheong naval skirmish. Pyongyang also used submarines to infiltrate South Korean territory with special-operations forces, even attempting to assassinate the South Korean president (e.g., the Dongch’o submarine incident and the Gangneung submarine infiltration incident).
Maritime armed confrontations grew dramatically: only 22 incidents occurred in the 1960s, rising to 61 in the 1980s, 107 in the 1990s, and surging to 180 in the first decade of the 21st century.
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Image Source: DVIDS
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