Privacy and Human Safety

07/09/2026

Russia is testing Europe not only with missiles. It is testing its political will, its ability to protect infrastructure, the information space, elections and democratic institutions.
Therefore, the response must be collective.
Ukraine has already spent four years proving that an aggressor can be stopped. Now Europe must prove that its security shield is not a declaration, but a real system of collective defense.
Europe must be ready. Ukraine already is.

EURO-TERROR AFTER THE CIA CHIEF'S VISIT: EUROPE TESTS THE STRENGTH OF ITS SHIELD
Russia is increasingly moving the war beyond Ukraine — into the European Union. Following the recent visit of CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow and amid diplomatic contacts with the Kremlin, Europe is facing a new wave of hybrid threats: sabotage, attempted disruption, intelligence operations, cyberattacks and influence operations. The timing alone does not prove a direct connection between Ratcliffe's visit and specific operations in the EU, but the strategic context is clear: Russia continues to test Europe's security system.
The most serious recent episode is Germany's official accusation that Moscow was behind an attempted drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport. According to the German version, on August 4 a drone carrying explosives was discovered near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft. Berlin linked the incident to a broader Russian hybrid warfare campaign against Europe. Moscow denies the accusations.
Germany responded politically: Berlin decided to close the Russian Consulate General in Bonn and terminate the agreement concerning the Russian House in Berlin. The European Union expressed solidarity with Germany, while NATO confirmed its support for the ally.
Today, Moscow has taken the next step.
Russia announced the closure of the German Consulate General in St. Petersburg. It is required to cease operations by September 18. Moscow also confirmed the closure of German Goethe-Institut cultural centers in Russia, with their staff required to leave the country. This is no longer simply a diplomatic dispute — it is the further destruction of communication channels between Russia and one of the EU's key states.
At the same time, Germany is facing a major domestic political shock: in the Saxony-Anhalt election, the far-right AfD won around 44% of the vote — a historic result for a party of this type in Germany since the Second World War. Its success has more than a domestic dimension. The AfD advocates a much softer policy toward Moscow, meaning that the growth of pro-Russian sentiment in Europe's largest economy creates an additional challenge to European unity.
And this is where the key question arises: can Europe provide its own security shield?
The European Union is increasing defense spending, but dependence on American capabilities remains significant. The European Court of Auditors warns that the EU's ability to be prepared for a major war by 2030 is still not guaranteed: fragmentation of defense systems, insufficient coordination, industrial constraints and dependence on American technologies remain major problems.
And this is where Ukraine is no longer merely a recipient of security.
According to Alona Getmanchuk, Head of Ukraine's Mission to NATO, in the long term Ukraine may not only strengthen the Alliance's defense capabilities but also replace some capabilities currently provided by the United States. The reason is clear: Ukraine has unique combat experience, an advanced drone technology ecosystem, battlefield intelligence, air defense and practical experience confronting the Russian military.
Therefore, the European shield of the future is not only American weapons.
It is Europe + Ukraine + NATO + its own defense industry + joint intelligence + readiness to respond to hybrid attacks.
Russia is testing Europe not only with missiles. It is testing its political will, its ability to protect infrastructure, the information space, elections and democratic institutions.
Therefore, the response must be collective.
Ukraine has already spent four years proving that an aggressor can be stopped. Now Europe must prove that its security shield is not a declaration, but a real system of collective defense.
Europe must be ready. Ukraine already is.

07/09/2026

FROM DEPORTATION TO INDOCTRINATION: HOW UKRAINE SHOULD RESPOND TO NORTH KOREA'S INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMES AGAINST UKRAINIAN CHILDREN
Russia's deportation of Ukrainian children is not only Russia's crime. If citizens, institutions or state structures of other countries knowingly receive unlawfully transferred Ukrainian children, facilitate their ideological indoctrination, Russification or militarisation, the question of responsibility moves to the international level.
That is why reports about the transfer of Ukrainian children to North Korea should be treated by Ukraine not as a “children's exchange” or an isolated episode, but as a possible element of a broader system of unlawful transfer and indoctrination.
The European Union has already officially recognised the systemic nature of the crime: in May 2026, the EU imposed sanctions on 16 individuals and seven entities responsible for the unlawful deportation, forced transfer, assimilation, indoctrination and militarised education of Ukrainian children. According to the EU, Russia has deported or forcibly transferred nearly 20,500 Ukrainian children.
Ukraine's next step should be clear: expand the circle of responsibility beyond Russia.
If it is proven that North Korean structures systematically received Ukrainian children, participated in programmes of their ideological indoctrination, or helped sever their connection with Ukraine and their families, these facts must be included in international evidence files.
Ukraine should initiate a separate international mechanism to document North Korea's involvement. It is necessary to identify specific officials, institutions, routes used to transfer children, dates, documents, programme organisers, sources of funding, and the nature of educational and propaganda activities.
Not the state in general, but specific people and specific organisations must become the subjects of accountability.
The second direction is diplomatic.
Kyiv should raise North Korea's involvement in the unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children at the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, international human rights mechanisms and the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children.
Ukraine should seek a principle whereby any state or organisation that helps Russia transfer Ukrainian children is treated as a potential participant in the criminal system — provided that the necessary evidence is established.
The third direction is sanctions.
Ukraine should submit proposals to its partners for targeted sanctions against North Korean officials and organisations whose involvement is documented. These measures should include asset freezes, travel bans, financial restrictions and other targeted instruments.
The fourth direction is the return of the children.
Any negotiations concerning Ukrainian children must be separated from political bargaining. A child cannot be treated as an object of exchange between states. A permanent international mechanism is needed to locate, identify, return and reintegrate every child.
And finally — the information response.
The world must know the stories of these children, while fully respecting their privacy and safety. The goal should not be to reproduce propaganda materials produced by occupiers, but to document each unlawful transfer: where the child was taken from, who organised the transfer, where the child was taken, who controlled the programme, and how the child was eventually returned home.
Ukraine must act not through emotion, but through evidence.
Russia created the system. If other states have joined that system, accountability cannot stop at Russia's border.
North Korea must not be allowed to hide behind the language of “cultural exchange” if its deliberate participation in the unlawful transfer or indoctrination of Ukrainian children is proven.
Ukrainian children are not military trophies, propaganda tools or resources for re-education.
They must be returned. The crimes must be documented. The organisers must be named. The accomplices must be held accountable.
PHS Global — Human Rights • International Law • Security • Accountability.

03/09/2026

Russia wanted to export fear and terror to Europe.
Europe and Ukraine can respond not with fear.
With technology. With production. With joint defense. And with the ability to deprive the aggressor of confidence that its attacks will remain without consequences.

The Danger to Europe Is Changing in Time and Format
Europe is entering a new phase of confrontation with Russia. The Kremlin’s hybrid operations are no longer limited to cyberattacks, disinformation, election interference, or attempts to damage critical infrastructure. Russian methods tested against Ukraine are increasingly turning into sabotage and terrorist tools directly on European territory.
The incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport was particularly telling. On August 4, a drone system with an explosive device was discovered in a security zone, between Ukrainian cargo aircraft. Following the investigation, German federal authorities stated on September 1 that they considered Russia responsible for this hybrid attack, referring to the results of the criminal investigation, the nature of the means used, and intelligence data.
This is no longer simply an “infrastructure disruption.” It is an attempt to create a real threat to human life, civil aviation, and strategic logistics. German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt directly described the situation as a new quality of threat and, more broadly, called Germany a daily target of hybrid warfare.
And Berlin responded.
Germany announced a package of measures: the closure of the Russian General Consulate in Bonn from September 18, the termination of the agreement concerning the “Russian House” in Berlin, the summoning of the Russian ambassador, tighter controls on the entry of Russian citizens, increased pressure on Russia’s “shadow fleet,” and efforts to include additional individuals on EU sanctions lists.
This is an important signal: hybrid aggression is no longer being treated as a collection of isolated unpleasant incidents. It is increasingly being viewed as a systemic threat to European security.
Moreover, the problem is already extending far beyond Leipzig. Germany is simultaneously investigating other cases of sabotage targeting critical infrastructure. On September 3, a new incident near the defense company Rohde & Schwarz in Munich also became known. Against this background, Berlin is openly speaking about daily hybrid warfare coming from outside.
But this creates a fundamentally new situation.
Ukraine has been living for several years under conditions that Europe is only now beginning to understand. Russia uses drones not only as weapons on the battlefield, but also as instruments of terror against civilians, exhaustion of air defenses, and disruption of normal life. Analysts note that Moscow has moved toward virtually continuous waves of strikes, adapting its unmanned systems to pe*****te Ukrainian defenses.
And now this experience is being transferred to the European continent.
At the same time, Ukraine is demonstrating that the response to Russian air terror can be asymmetric. After warning foreign airlines and insurers about the danger of Russian airspace, Kyiv informed the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) about the risks to civil aviation. At the same time, Russian airspace is already facing major restrictions on the operation of Moscow’s aviation hub: on the night of September 3, according to Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, Russian air defenses claimed to have destroyed 103 drones approaching the capital. The result was numerous flight delays and cancellations.
Thus, terror with ballistic and missile strikes against Ukraine is gradually receiving a mirror response in the form of creating Russia’s own zone of aviation instability.
And this is where the main strategic conclusion emerges.
Europe can no longer merely defend itself against Russia’s hybrid warfare. It must develop its own instruments of deterrence.
Germany has taken an important step in precisely this direction. On September 3, it became known that mass production of long-range Ukrainian unmanned systems had begun in Germany as part of cooperation between Auterion and the Ukrainian company Airlogix. These are high-precision systems capable of operating over significant distances. Separately, the German government is financing the purchase of 50,000 Ukrainian Shrike drones for €90 million for the needs of Ukraine’s Defense Forces.
Thus, a new reality is emerging: Russia is exporting war to Europe — while Ukraine and Europe are beginning to move the production of deterrence capabilities into a common security space.
A common enemy is gradually creating a common response.
And perhaps most importantly, this is no longer simply about supplying weapons to Ukraine.
It is about creating a joint European-Ukrainian industrial shield capable of producing weapons of victory on the scale required by the new war.
Russia wanted to export fear and terror to Europe.
Europe and Ukraine can respond not with fear.
With technology. With production. With joint defense. And with the ability to deprive the aggressor of confidence that its attacks will remain without consequences.

02/09/2026

Germany has identified the source of the threat. Britain has identified where that threat is being contained.
Russia is a real threat to European security.
Ukraine is the front line containing that threat.
European security no longer begins beyond Ukraine’s border.
It begins with defending Ukraine.

A Shift in Security Priorities: Germany Recognizes Russia as a Threat to Europe, While Britain Sees Ukraine as the Front Line of Defence
Germany Names Russia as the Hybrid Threat. Britain’s PM: Ukraine Is Where Our Defence Begins.
European security is moving from assumptions to concrete conclusions. Russia’s war is no longer viewed simply as a conflict in Ukraine. Moscow is using hybrid operations against Europe — sabotage, intelligence activity, drones, attempts to attack critical infrastructure and destabilization.
Germany has taken a decisive step by officially stating that Russia was responsible for an attempted attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport.
On August 4, a drone carrying explosives was discovered near a Ukrainian An-124 cargo aircraft. German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said that police investigations, the nature of the crime and intelligence information together pointed to Russian responsibility. Berlin considers the incident part of a broader Russian hybrid campaign against Europe.
This is a fundamental change.
For Germany, Russia is no longer an abstract military risk somewhere far away. Moscow is officially regarded as a source of hybrid threats directly targeting European security.
Berlin’s response has also become concrete.
Germany will close the Russian Consulate General in Bonn and terminate the agreement concerning the construction and operation of the Russian House in Berlin. The Russian ambassador will be summoned to the Foreign Ministry. Berlin is also pushing for new EU sanctions against responsible Russian officials, tightening entry controls for Russian citizens and increasing pressure on Russia’s “shadow fleet.”
This is no longer a symbolic diplomatic response. It means restricting Russia’s presence, intelligence capabilities and financial and logistical instruments in Europe.
Another warning sign came from Brandenburg. Explosive and incendiary devices were discovered near the Jänschwalde energy facility. Authorities described the incident as a terrorist act, although the perpetrators and motives remain under investigation.
Europe is being forced to confront a new reality: hybrid warfare is no longer happening merely “nearby” — it is appearing inside European states.
And this is where Britain’s position complements Germany’s conclusion.
Ukraine is the front line of Europe’s defence.
British Prime Minister Andy Burnham said in Kyiv that Ukraine is a defender of Europe and confirmed that Britain will continue its support. London plans to strengthen Ukraine’s air defence, long-range capabilities and defence cooperation.
This is no longer simply a political formula.
The Ukrainian military is holding back the Russian war machine every day, destroying its equipment, logistics and weapons systems. Ukrainian air defence protects cities from missiles and drones. Ukrainian battlefield experience is becoming part of Europe’s new understanding of modern warfare.
Germany has identified the source of the threat. Britain has identified where that threat is being contained.
Russia is a real threat to European security.
Ukraine is the front line containing that threat.
European security no longer begins beyond Ukraine’s border.
It begins with defending Ukraine.

26/08/2026

Why the CIA director's Moscow visit should not be treated as an ordinary diplomatic episode.

23/08/2026

Ukraine today is a country at war, where diplomatic work is directly connected with threat assessment, crisis management, personnel protection, military and political risks, and coordination of international support. In this sense, Houston’s professional background is highly relevant.

Washington Changes the Format of Its Diplomatic Presence in Kyiv

On August 23, 2026, Paul R. Houston began his assignment in Kyiv as the United States Chargé d’Affaires ad interim. Houston himself described his mission as a long-term assignment. This is an important clarification: he is not an accidental diplomat or simply a “minister-counselor,” but a career diplomat in the Senior Foreign Service holding the rank of Minister Counselor.
His career path deserves particular attention. Before Kyiv, Houston served as the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Niamey, Niger. But even more important is the fact that he previously held senior positions in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. He served as Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and headed the Threat Investigations and Analysis portfolio, dealing with threat analysis, investigations, intelligence and crisis response.
His experience is not limited to Washington. Houston served at U.S. diplomatic missions in Germany, Jordan, Haiti and Serbia, as well as at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. He studied political science and international business and holds a master’s degree in national security policy and international economics.
That is why his arrival in Kyiv is particularly interesting from a security perspective. Ukraine today is a country at war, where diplomatic work is directly connected with threat assessment, crisis management, personnel protection, military and political risks, and coordination of international support. In this sense, Houston’s professional background is highly relevant.
At the same time, there is a question much broader than Houston’s own appointment: why has the United States still not appointed a new full ambassador to Ukraine?
After Bridget Brink’s departure, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv has operated without a permanent ambassador. Julie Davis left the post, and on July 17 Sandra Oudkirk became Chargé d’Affaires. Now, just over a month later, she has been replaced by Houston.
This is happening against the backdrop of a broader picture of American diplomacy. In May 2026, more than 100 U.S. ambassadorial positions remained vacant — 109 out of 195, according to figures cited from the American Foreign Service Association. Countries without a confirmed U.S. ambassador included Ukraine and Russia. In August, The Washington Post also reported 102 vacant ambassadorial positions and noted that a large share of sitting ambassadors under the current administration are political appointees rather than career diplomats.
Therefore, the statement that “more than 100 diplomatic missions are headed by chargé d’affaires” requires clarification. More accurately, the United States has more than 100 vacant ambassadorial positions; that does not automatically mean that all of those embassies are formally headed by chargés d’affaires.
It would also be an oversimplification to compare Ukraine with Niger simply because Houston arrived in Kyiv from Niamey. His previous position is only one element of his career. Much more significant is his years of experience in diplomatic security, crisis response and threat analysis.
However, the absence of a full U.S. ambassador in Kyiv after several changes of chargé d’affaires remains a politically significant signal.
This does not necessarily mean that Washington has lost interest in Ukraine. Rather, it may indicate a change in the format of the American diplomatic presence and that the Donald Trump administration is not currently demonstrating diplomatic investment in Ukraine at the level of a full ambassador.
And that is why the key question today is not “Why Paul Houston?”, but rather “Why has the United States still not appointed an ambassador to Ukraine?”
The answer may reveal far more about the current architecture of Washington–Kyiv relations than the appointment of yet another chargé d’affaires.

16/08/2026

Grain Front: Russia Attacks Ukraine on Land and at Sea
Russia is increasingly and unmistakably turning Ukrainian food production into one of the targets of its war — simultaneously attacking people and agricultural machinery in the fields, as well as ports and civilian shipping in the Black Sea. This is no longer merely a matter of Ukraine’s economy. When a country that has for decades been called one of the world’s breadbaskets comes under attack, the consequences can be felt by consumers far beyond Ukraine.
On August 15, in the Zaporizhzhia region, a Russian FPV drone attacked agricultural machinery during the harvest. A 32-year-old man was killed and another man was injured. The strike set a combine harvester, a vehicle, and wheat on fire.
This incident shows that Russian attacks are not aimed solely at military targets. During the harvest season, striking a combine harvester effectively means striking the food production process itself. A field becomes a high-risk zone, a farmer becomes a potential target, and destroyed grain becomes part of the broader cost of the war.
At the same time, Russia is also putting pressure on Ukraine’s agricultural sector from the sea. In August, attacks on civilian cargo vessels and Black Sea port infrastructure intensified sharply. According to reports, Russian strikes caused Ukrainian grain exports to fall by approximately 75% during the first two weeks of August. Around 90% of Ukraine’s grain exports pass through the Black Sea.
This creates a risk that extends beyond Ukraine. On August 12, a Ukrainian strike on the Russian port of Novorossiysk led to the suspension of operations at major grain terminals, raising concerns about disruptions to the global wheat market. Russia is one of the world’s key wheat exporters, so instability in the Black Sea can affect global prices and food supply chains.
The International Maritime Organization has explicitly warned that attacks on civilian commercial vessels threaten the lives of seafarers, the safety of shipping, global supply chains, and international trade.
The formula of this war is therefore becoming increasingly clear: attacks on land — destroying crops and people; attacks at sea — blocking the path of grain to global markets.
Ukraine produces food not only for itself. Ukrainian grain has traditionally been an important component of the global food market. When Russia creates risks for Ukrainian fields, ports, and vessels, it creates risks for the entire food supply system.
That is why protecting Ukraine’s agricultural production and ensuring safe shipping in the Black Sea is not only a matter of Ukrainian security. It is a matter of global food security.
Russia is trying to turn Ukrainian grain into a weapon of war. The world must do everything possible to ensure that it remains a weapon of peace — food for people.

16/08/2026

There is something much bigger in this story than a single international rescue mission.
The world has come to know Ukrainians as warriors, defenders and people fighting for freedom. But this mission reveals another dimension of Ukrainian strength — the ability to save others.
A Ukrainian warrior is not only a person carrying a weapon. It is also a firefighter, a medic, a volunteer, a rescuer, a driver, an engineer and every person who places another human being’s life above personal comfort.
Today, Ukraine is protecting the world not only on the battlefield. It is protecting it through humanity.
The Ukrainian rescuers did not come to France demanding something in return. They came to give — their experience, their strength, their time and their courage.
This is what true warriors of goodness and light look like.
From Ukraine to France — from the heart of one nation to the hearts of others.
Goodness has no borders. Light has no frontiers.

16/08/2026

A war that could have been viewed as a short operation is turning into a test of the American military system. One aircraft carrier has spent more than eight months at sea, its crew is reporting exhaustion, another ship is being moved from the Pacific to the Middle East, while the future design of the American fleet is simultaneously being changed by a political decision.
“Victory in three days” did not happen. Now the pause in the war increasingly looks like a forced breather before the next stage of the conflict.

15/08/2026

Peace cannot be sustainable if its conditions are determined without the country against which aggression is being waged. The protection of civilians, the return of people unlawfully detained, the security of territories and accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law must not be secondary issues. They must form the foundation of any future settlement.
Peace is needed not simply to make the shooting stop. It is needed so that civilians no longer become the price of political decisions. Europe must have a seat at the negotiating table — for the security of the continent, for international law and for the right of people to live without fear.

Civilian Casualties, International Humanitarian Law and the Path to Peace: Why Europe Must Have a Seat at the Table
Russia’s war against Ukraine has a daily human cost that cannot be measured only by military maps or changes along the front line. Civilians continue to pay the highest price. According to the United Nations, at least 437 civilians were killed and 2,610 injured in Ukraine in July 2026. It was the highest monthly civilian casualty toll since May 2022. Particularly alarming is the fact that many victims were killed by long-range missile and drone attacks far from the immediate front line.
Under these circumstances, international humanitarian law is no longer an abstract set of legal rules. Its fundamental purpose is to protect people who are not directly participating in hostilities and to limit the methods and means of warfare. Every new attack on civilian areas, residential buildings, energy facilities and other critical infrastructure reminds the world that the protection of civilians must remain one of the central criteria of any future peace process.
The question of ending the war is becoming increasingly connected to another question: what kind of peace will it be? A ceasefire alone cannot guarantee security if it is not accompanied by monitoring mechanisms, guarantees for civilians, respect for international law and accountability for its violations.
Against this background, Europe’s role is becoming particularly important. According to The New York Times, France, Germany and the United Kingdom are working on their own format for future negotiations aimed at ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. European diplomats fear that the United States could make key decisions without sufficient European participation, even though Europe itself will have to live directly with the consequences of any peace agreement.
The initiative is being developed within what is known as the E3 format — coordination between France, Germany and the United Kingdom. No specific negotiation model has yet been determined. But the very fact that such a format is being discussed demonstrates the European states’ intention to have a meaningful voice in a process that will shape the future security of the continent.
For Europe, this is not simply a matter of diplomatic prestige. Russia’s war against Ukraine has already transformed the European security architecture, created a major humanitarian crisis and generated long-term risks for neighbouring countries. A peace agreement reached without meaningful European participation could therefore leave outside the negotiations those who will bear a substantial part of the responsibility for its implementation and consequences.
At the same time, Ukraine itself must remain at the centre of any negotiations. Peace cannot be sustainable if its conditions are determined without the country against which aggression is being waged. The protection of civilians, the return of people unlawfully detained, the security of territories and accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law must not be secondary issues. They must form the foundation of any future settlement.
Peace is needed not simply to make the shooting stop. It is needed so that civilians no longer become the price of political decisions. Europe must have a seat at the negotiating table — for the security of the continent, for international law and for the right of people to live without fear.