12/31/2025
Why Patton Wanted to Attack the Soviets in 1945 - The Warning Eisenhower Refused to Hear
On May 7th, 1945, while church bells rang across Europe and American soldiers poured into the streets to celebrate the end of the most devastating war in human history, one man sat in silence, his mind already fixed on the next catastrophe he believed was coming. General George S. Patton was not celebrating Germany’s surrender. He was preparing to issue a warning that would cost him his command, his reputation, and perhaps even his life.
Across from him sat Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower, calm, composed, already thinking about peace, demobilization, and a grateful nation ready to move on. The two men were in a commandeered German mansion outside Frankfurt, surrounded by the ruins of the Third Reich. The war in Europe had officially ended only hours earlier. For Eisenhower, it was the culmination of years of coalition-building and careful diplomacy. For Patton, it was merely the end of the opening act.
Patton broke the silence first.
“We’re going to have to fight them eventually,” he said. “Let’s do it now—while our army is intact and we can win.”
He wasn’t talking about the Germans.
He was talking about the Soviet Union.
Eisenhower stared at him in disbelief. For three years, he had worked tirelessly to hold together an uneasy alliance with the Soviets, an alliance that had been absolutely essential to defeating Hi**er. The American public adored “Uncle Joe” Stalin. Newspapers praised the Red Army as heroic liberators who had borne the heaviest cost of the war. And now Patton was proposing that the United States turn its guns on its ally—immediately.
“George,” Eisenhower replied carefully, “you don’t understand politics. The war is over. We’re going home.”
In that moment, Patton realized something chilling. Eisenhower understood exactly what he was saying. Eisenhower knew there was truth in it. But Eisenhower also knew that nothing would be done.
That silence—measured, calculated, and final—would echo for decades.
Patton had identified the Soviet threat before Washington would admit it existed. He had proposed a military solution at the one moment when it might have been feasible. And he was ignored by leaders who valued public opinion, political survival, and diplomatic optimism over brutal strategic reality.
Patton’s Third Army had driven deeper into Germany than any other Allied force. His tanks had crossed into Czechoslovakia. His forward units were within striking distance of Berlin. And everywhere his army went, Patton saw something that filled him with dread: the Red Army.
American officers who encountered Soviet forces in Eastern Europe were shocked by what they witnessed. Patton’s intelligence briefings described mass rapes, systematic looting, and summary executions of civilians suspected of anti-communist sympathies. Entire communities vanished overnight, loaded onto trains bound for Soviet labor camps. Resistance fighters who had battled the N***s for years were arrested and shot once the Soviets arrived.
In April 1945, Patton wrote to his wife Beatrice with a frankness that stunned even those who knew his temperament. He admitted he had no desire to understand the Russians except to determine “how much lead or iron it takes to kill them.” They gave him, he said, “the impression of something that is to be feared in future world political reorganization.”
What Patton was seeing on the ground contradicted everything American diplomats wanted to believe. The Soviet Union was not a temporary ally fighting for shared ideals. It was a totalitarian empire expanding westward under the cover of victory.
Patton met American prisoners of war liberated from Soviet custody, men who said they had been treated worse than they were under the Germans. Soviet soldiers stripped them of watches, boots, and food. Officers who protested were beaten. Some were shot. Reports piled up: factories dismantled and shipped to Russia, communist puppet governments installed in Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, anti-communist leaders arrested and executed.
By May 1945, Patton was no longer venting frustration. He had developed a coherent military plan.
His assessment was cold and analytical. The Red Army had lost an estimated 27 million people defeating Germany. Its forces in Eastern Europe were exhausted, spread thin, and dependent on captured supplies. Their supply lines stretched thousands of miles back into the Soviet Union. American forces, by contrast, were at peak strength, fully supplied, and enjoyed overwhelming air superiority.
“We could beat the Russians in six weeks,” Patton told Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson.
The Soviet Union had no strategic bombing capability. Its anti-aircraft defenses were minimal. American air power could devastate Soviet logistics almost at will. Soviet tanks were numerous but worn down by years of relentless combat. American M4 Shermans, though less heavily armored, were reliable and available in enormous numbers.
Most importantly, Patton believed Soviet morale was brittle. Red Army soldiers had been told they were liberating their homeland—not conquering Eastern Europe. Many, he believed, would surrender or desert if faced with American forces.
Then came the most controversial part of his proposal.
“We can arm the Germans,” Patton argued. Hundreds of thousands of Wehrmacht soldiers would rather fight the Soviets than rot in prison camps. To Patton, it was a ruthless but logical calculation.
Washington was horrified.....Don’t stop here — full text is in the first comment! 👇
