03/11/2026
"They Did Things We'd Never Authorize" — What US Special Forces Said About Australian SAS
Kandahar Airfield, Southern Afghanistan, August 2002. Captain David Morurell, Third Special Forces Group, United States Army, had been running joint operations out of the same forward operating base for 11 weeks. He had worked alongside Canadians, British, and D and Dutch. He understood Allied forces.
He understood how they were trained, what constraints they operated under, how they reported up up their chains of command, and crucially what they would and would not do when the situation deteriorated past the point where the manual remained useful. He thought he understood them all. Then the Australians arrived. What followed over the next several months was, according to official US Army afteraction reviews obtained under Freedom of Information requests, an experience that multiple American special forces officers described in terms suggesting not merely
professional admiration, but something closer to ontological disturbance, a recalibration of what they had assumed was possible inside a sanctioned military operation. One captain quoted in a joint doctrine assessment compiled by US Special Operations Command in 2003 [music] put it with a precision that had probably been carefully considered before it was committed to paper.