02/07/2025
Letsoalo v Road Accident Fund and Another (086260/2025) [2025] ZAGPPHC 663
Summary: The Board of the Road Accident Fund (Board) is contractually empowered to place the Chief Executive Officer of the Road Accident Fund on a precautionary suspension. The Board is a statutory body and once cited as a decision maker, it is entitled to oppose any application seeking to impugn its decision. Where rule 7(1) of the Uniform Rules is invoked, a person acting on behalf of a party, whose authority is disputed is only required to satisfy the Court that he or she is authorised so to act. The fact that the resolution seeking to prove authorisation has errors regarding dates is of no moment. As such, an application contemplated in rule 6(5)(e) is not necessary. What is required is an interpretation of the document to establish the intentions of the author.
When the Board took a decision to suspend, it exercised contractual power. A suspension does not amount to an administrative action within the contemplation of section 33(1) of the Constitution read with the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), thus the requirements of reasonableness do not find application. Similarly, a suspension in the context of the present application is not an exercise of public power, thus the requirement of rationality finds no application.
The Disciplinary Policy approved by the applicant in his capacity as the Chief Executive Officer of the Road Accident Fund (RAF) does not apply to him as part of his conditions of employment as determined by the Board of the RAF. What finds application is the provisions of clause 21 of the Fixed Term Contract of employment. There is no dispute that the provisions of clause 21 has been complied with, as such, there is no basis in law to demonstrate unlawfulness. Accordingly, this Court cannot declare the suspension to be unlawful.
The applicant has no legal right to be appointed as the Chief Executive Officer of the RAF. Speculative evidence that the Board resolved to re-appoint him, is not sufficient to establish a prima facie right even one open to doubt. Absent prima facie right, an interim interdict cannot be issued. Speculative evidence that the position is about to be advertised is not sufficient to establish an apprehension of harm.
Regarding costs, the principle in Biowatch finds no application. The applicant is not seeking to enforce a constitutional right. This is purely a contractual dispute where the applicant is seeking to protect his pecuniary interests, which were contractually acquired. Held: (1) The application is heard as one of urgency. Held: (2) The application is dismissed. Held: (3) The applicant must pay the costs of this application on a party and party scale to be settled or taxed at scale C, which costs include the costs of employment of two counsel and the costs occasioned on 17 June 2025.
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ROAD ACCIDENT FUND First Respondent