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IF 7 MONTHS BEFORE THE 2016 GENERAL ELECTIONS, it was lawful for Former President Dr EDGAR CHAGWA LUNGU (Blessed Memory)...
14/12/2025

IF 7 MONTHS BEFORE THE 2016 GENERAL ELECTIONS, it was lawful for Former President Dr EDGAR CHAGWA LUNGU (Blessed Memory) Signed The Amended Constitution, then based on that merit, President Hakainde Hichilema stands on good ground to proceed with similar action.

We are keely following the proceedings at Parliament.

15:33 Hours - ZAMBIAN CONSTITUTION AMENDED.

REMEMBER US LORD
14/12/2025

REMEMBER US LORD

MOMENT OF PRAYER
..REMEMBER, LORD, that I have served you faithfully and loyally, and that I have always tried to do what you wanted me to..."

ISAIAH 38 V 3.

(OPINION)EASTERN CONGO AND THE LIMITS OF BROKERED PEACE When the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda affixed their s...
14/12/2025

(OPINION)

EASTERN CONGO AND THE LIMITS OF BROKERED PEACE

When the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda affixed their signatures to a U.S.-facilitated peace accord in Washington, the promise was deliberately ambitious.

It sought to close one of Africa’s most enduring fault lines by trading restraint for security, diplomacy for proxy war, and instability for a tangible peace dividend. Yet scarcely weeks later, the advance of the M23 rebel movement in eastern Congo has exposed how fragile that promise was, and how easily it can unravel.

At its core, the accord rested on a simple but demanding premise: that neither state would pursue its interests through armed surrogates, and that sovereignty would again become the organising principle of regional relations.

For the United States, which positioned itself as guarantor, this was not merely a regional arrangement but a test case for great-power mediation in a fractured world. Peace, the deal implied, could be engineered through reciprocity and oversight rather than force.

The security bargain was central. Kinshasa undertook to intensify efforts against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a group Kigali regards as an existential threat rooted in the legacy of the 1994 genocide. In parallel, Rwanda was expected to withdraw troops and military support from Congolese territory. Each commitment was designed to unlock the other, creating a virtuous cycle in which mistrust would gradually give way to verification.

Alongside this security logic sat a humanitarian and economic vision. Refugees and internally displaced persons were to return home under safer conditions, aid agencies were to regain access to contested areas, and cross-border trade and investment were to replace smuggling and armed taxation. Peace, in this formulation, would pay.

That vision now looks compromised. Reports of continued advances by the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group, coming barely weeks after the signing of the Washington Accord on December 4, 2025, have prompted an unusually direct response from Washington.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that “Rwanda’s actions in eastern DRC are a clear violation of the Washington Accords signed by President Trump, and the United States will take action to ensure promises made to the President are kept.” The language marks a decisive shift—from guarded diplomatic concern to an explicit assertion that commitments made under U.S. brokerage carry enforceable expectations.

Rwanda denies backing M23, but the rebels’ battlefield momentum sits uneasily with any claim of regional de-escalation. For communities in North Kivu, the distinction between direct intervention and proxy influence is academic. What matters is that violence continues to spread, humanitarian access remains constrained, and displacement deepens.

The agreement’s most glaring weakness has become unavoidable. M23 itself was not a signatory.

While the Washington process focused on inter-state behaviour, the conflict’s most potent armed actor remained outside its legal and political constraints. Separate talks involving M23, including those hosted by Qatar, created parallel tracks rather than a single binding framework. The result has been predictable. Diplomacy is in slow motion and fighters are advancing.

Mutual suspicion has filled the gap. Kigali continues to frame its posture as defensive, citing the unresolved FDLR threat. Kinshasa, reinforced by Washington’s sharper rhetoric, sees a violation of sovereignty and demands accountability.

The carefully sequenced security exchange has hardened into a blame loop, with each side arguing that it cannot move until the other does. Meanwhile, neighbouring states warn that the conflict risks drawing them in, turning a local war into a regional one.

For President Donald J. Trump, who has styled himself as a deal-maker capable of delivering peace where others have failed, the reputational cost is real.

The damage lies less in the collapse of goodwill than in the perception of incomplete craftsmanship. A peace accord that fails to bind the principal belligerent, and that lacks automatic enforcement when violations occur, looks less like bold statecraft and more like work under progress being outrun by reality.

Secretary Rubio’s warning raises the stakes further. If the promise of “action” is not translated into credible, proportionate consequences—or into a recalibrated process that restores compliance—the mediator’s leverage risks erosion.

Yet the moment is not beyond repair. Durable peace in eastern Congo has always required a settlement that reconciles Rwanda’s legitimate security concerns with Congo’s equally legitimate claim to territorial integrity, while placing civilian protection at the centre.

Restoring momentum will require folding all armed actors, including M23, into a single, sequenced framework with clear benchmarks and independent verification. It will require confronting the FDLR–M23 dilemma head-on, through simultaneous, monitored steps rather than rhetorical reciprocity. And it will require making the promised peace dividend visible not only in presidential palaces, but in border towns and villages where war has long been an economy.

In practical terms, the call to action is now unambiguous and collective.

The Democratic Republic of Congo must recommit to neutralising armed groups on its soil, including the FDLR, in line with international humanitarian law and under credible, verifiable monitoring.

Rwanda must match its security concerns with demonstrable restraint, severing any material or political ties to M23 and reaffirming respect for Congolese sovereignty as required under the UN Charter.

The United States, having assumed the role of broker, must now move from mediation to stewardship—ensuring enforcement mechanisms, consequences for breaches, and a unified negotiation track that binds all armed actors.

And the wider international community, acting through the United Nations, the African Union, and regional mechanisms, must provide the verification, humanitarian support, and economic guarantees that turn de-escalation into lived peace.

Only through this shared responsibility—anchored in the accord’s original parameters and consistent with the UN framework for cross-border conflict resolution—can peace and fraternity be restored in eastern Congo, not as an abstract aspiration, but as a durable reality for the communities who have waited longest, for it.

For President Donald J. Trump, the implications extend beyond the Great Lakes region. As the United States simultaneously positions itself as a potential broker in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, the eastern Congo accord has become part of a wider test of executive-anchored, state-led mediation as a tool of contemporary diplomacy.

A credible recovery of the agreement would strengthen the case that assertive statecraft, when aligned with enforcement and institutional backing, can still arrest protracted conflicts. Its failure would highlight the structural limits of state-centric diplomatic initiatives when political commitments are not matched by compliance mechanisms, inclusive sequencing, and sustained international coordination. In that sense, eastern Congo now sits on a broader foreign-policy ledger—linking Washington’s peacemaking ambitions across Africa and Europe to its capacity to translate negotiation into durable stability on the ground.

Notes:

Potential U.S. Actions Following Violations of the Washington Accords

In signalling that the United States “will take action to ensure promises made to the President are kept,” Washington has deliberately preserved strategic ambiguity while opening a defined enforcement spectrum. Historically and institutionally, such action would likely proceed in graduated form rather than through immediate coercion.

At the diplomatic level, this could include formal designation of Rwanda as a non-compliant party under the Washington Accords, accompanied by intensified shuttle diplomacy aimed at restoring adherence through revised timelines, clearer benchmarks, and independent verification.

The United States could also press for emergency deliberations at the UN Security Council, seeking strengthened mandates for monitoring mechanisms or reinforcing regional peacekeeping and observer missions.

Economically, U.S. action may involve recalibrating bilateral assistance, conditioning non-humanitarian support on demonstrable compliance, or coordinating with international financial institutions to align incentives with de-escalation.

Targeted measures—such as visa restrictions or financial sanctions against individuals credibly linked to violations—would allow Washington to impose costs without escalating state-to-state confrontation.

At the security level, the United States could increase technical and intelligence support for verification of cross-border movements, bolster humanitarian corridors, and enhance backing for UN and African Union-led stabilization efforts, while stopping short of direct military involvement.

Such steps would reinforce the principle that enforcement is multilateral and rules-based, rather than unilateral or punitive.

Taken together, these measures underscore a central point: U.S. “action” is less about coercion than about restoring credibility—of the accord, of mediation, and of executive-anchored, state-led diplomacy itself.

The effectiveness of this approach will ultimately hinge not on the severity of the response, but on its consistency, coordination with partners, and ability to translate diplomatic pressure into verifiable change on the ground.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this post are OURS and do not represent the overall views of the parties involved and associated with events in Eastern DRC.

FILE PHOTO:

U.S. President Donald J. Trump joined President Paul Kagame of Rwanda and President Ettiene Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as they signed, December, 2025, the Washington Accords, a major peace deal, at the Donald J. Trump Institute for Peace in Washington, D.C.

14/12/2025

TRAVEL

We enjoyed 16 hours of sheer power (Engine Alliance GP7270 x 4) & unparalleled excellence as the Airbus A380-800 A6-EON dominated it's flight path, embodying comfort, negligible turbulence and ultra stability. Safety in the skies.

IMAGE RIGHTS RESERVED (c) Richclass Connections.
Zambia Aviation Enthusiasts (ZAE)

ZIMBABWE’S INDIGENISATION REGULATIONS: EMPOWERMENT POLICY, FAMILY STRESS TEST, AND A REGIONAL STABILITY QUESTION(Analysi...
14/12/2025

ZIMBABWE’S INDIGENISATION REGULATIONS: EMPOWERMENT POLICY, FAMILY STRESS TEST, AND A REGIONAL STABILITY QUESTION

(Analysis By Bern Gordiano)

Zimbabwe’s renewed indigenisation posture is anchored in the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14:33] of the Laws of , operationalised through Statutory Instrument 215 of 2025, cited as the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations, 2025.

Together, these instruments provide the legal basis for reserving specified sectors of the economy for citizens and regulating foreign participation in those activities.

Framed by officials as a corrective intervention, the policy is presented as a means of protecting grassroots economic opportunities from displacement and ensuring that small-scale, labour-absorbing sectors remain accessible to ordinary Zimbabweans.

At the level of intent, the logic is distributive: empowerment as a mechanism for restoring citizen participation in everyday commerce, insulating fragile livelihoods from capital asymmetries, and preventing the hollowing-out of local enterprise.

The complexity arises not from the goal itself, but from how the laws and regulations intersect with enforcement discretion, regional , and the lived realities of families whose livelihoods cross borders.

Implementation under the regulations relies on licensing oversight, inspections, ownership verification, and regularisation or divestment plans for affected businesses.

This design places considerable interpretive authority in the hands of administrators tasked with determining compliance, beneficial ownership, and effective control.

Governance analysts have long observed that where discretion is broad and economic competition is intense, enforcement outcomes tend to diverge—often shaped by local pressures rather than uniform national standards.

In such environments, enforcement can drift from formal legal criteria toward subjective judgments about who “really benefits” from a business.

This is the point at which a technical economic framework begins to generate social consequences, particularly in a country and region where commerce is frequently organised through families rather than corporate structures, and where informal and semi-formal arrangements are integral to survival rather than deliberate evasion.

Southern Africa’s integration story is not written only in trade protocols and customs schedules; it is lived daily by small traders, transport operators, and family enterprises operating across borders.

These actors constitute the invisible infrastructure of regional integration, sustaining food security, retail supply chains, and household incomes across border towns and capital cities alike.

Regional trade analyses consistently show that a significant share of intra-regional commerce takes place in precisely the sectors now designated as reserved—retail trade, transport services, accommodation, and other small-scale activities. When these sectors are tightly regulated without clear and predictable application, the immediate effect is often displacement rather than exclusion.

Traders adapt through informal arrangements, proxy ownership structures proliferate, and regulatory certainty weakens. This raises transaction costs, expands grey markets, and undermines compliance incentives. Over time, it complicates the practical meaning of and integration commitments, even where those commitments remain formally intact. Integration, in practice, becomes conditional on discretion rather than rules.

Localisation and empowerment policies are not unique to Zimbabwe; they are common across the and are increasingly visible even in advanced economies.

What distinguishes stabilising approaches from destabilising ones is not the presence of regulation, but the confidence it inspires.

Trust is sustained where rules are clear, transitions are orderly, and enforcement is perceived as neutral and proportionate.

Where implementation appears abrupt, uneven, or selectively applied, perceptions of risk spread quickly among small investors and traders—even when official rhetoric emphasises , South–South cooperation, and intra-regional trade.

Confidence, once eroded, is slow to rebuild, particularly among actors whose capital is social and familial rather than financial.

Zimbabwe’s leadership has long linked economic recovery to the complete removal of Western sanctions.

Recent years, however, have seen a shift toward narrower, targeted measures rather than broad economic restrictions. In this context, the indigenisation framework does not directly determine policy, but it remains relevant through its signalling effect.

International re-engagement decisions—by creditors, , and development partners—are shaped less by statutory intent than by perceptions of rule predictability, non-discrimination, and institutional restraint.

Where empowerment enforcement appears to spill into social or identity-based targeting, it complicates the narrative of a stable, rules-based recovery environment and weakens arguments that remaining external measures are unjustified relics rather than responses to .

One of the most sensitive and under-analysed dimensions of the regulations is their interaction with mixed-citizenship marriages and family-run enterprises.

Across Zimbabwe and the wider region, cross-border marriages are common, particularly among communities.

businesses frequently pool capital, labour, and commercial networks across nationality lines.

These arrangements are not exceptional; they are the historical norm of Southern African commerce.

Although the framework targets foreign participation in reserved sectors rather than marriage itself, implementation can place mixed-nationality families under disproportionate scrutiny.

Even where a business is legally registered under a Zimbabwean and fully compliant on paper, ordinary family cooperation can be reinterpreted as evidence of prohibited foreign control—especially when a business is visibly successful or when competitors lodge complaints.

In practice, this dynamic risks turning marriage into a proxy compliance factor, where a citizen’s economic is assessed not only on conduct, but on household composition.

Discrimination in such settings rarely presents itself overtly. Instead, it manifests procedurally through repeated inspections, delayed licence renewals, shifting compliance demands, or heightened responsiveness to allegations that a business is a “front” for foreigners. Each action may be lawful in isolation, yet their cumulative effect can be unequal. Over time, this can normalise suspicion around and quietly embed a hierarchy of belonging within the economy.

The economic consequences for affected families are immediate, translating into income shocks that jeopardise school fees, housing stability, , and extended family obligations.

The social consequences are more corrosive, straining marriages and community relations and introducing subtle but persistent fault lines into social cohesion. In extreme cases, regulatory pressure can escalate into harassment and personal insecurity, particularly for small operators without legal buffers.

These pressures do not stop at national . Family-based enterprises are a cornerstone of regional trade, and when uncertainty rises in one jurisdiction, neighbouring states feel the effects through disrupted , increased informality, and growing consular caseloads.

For countries such as Zambia, where many nationals are married to Zimbabweans or operate joint family businesses, what begins as domestic regulation quickly becomes a diplomatic, economic, and social concern. It is in this context that the comparison with Zambia becomes instructive.

Zambia does have a citizen-economic-empowerment framework, but its design and application differ in ways that have limited regional friction.

Zambia’s approach has generally been narrower and more targeted, reserving clearly defined sub-sectors rather than re-ordering broad swathes of everyday commerce.

In Zambia, implementation has tended to be administrative and predictable, relying on licensing eligibility and procurement-linked compliance rather than active detection and retrospective regularisation of .

As a result, cross-border impacts have been concentrated rather than systemic and have not generated widespread perceptions of toward foreign nationals or mixed-citizenship households.

That contrast underscores a central lesson. Citizen-economic empowerment can coexist with regional integration when it is targeted, predictable, and administratively contained. When it reaches deeply into livelihood-level commerce and is enforced through broad discretion, it amplifies social and regional risk—even where the legal foundation is sound.

The question of reciprocal measures by neighbouring countries must therefore be approached with caution.

Tit-for-tat restrictions may satisfy domestic political pressure, but they carry high economic and costs, disproportionately harming the very citizens empowerment policies claim to protect. Escalation risks converting regulatory disputes into regional and undermining long-standing peace and mobility norms in .

The conclusion, therefore, is clear.

Zimbabwe can pursue the empowerment objectives of its laws and regulations without fuelling conflict or provoking regional retaliation, but only if implementation is treated as a governance and social-stability exercise rather than a signal. This requires uniform national guidance, reasonable transition periods, clear definitions of participation and control, and accessible review and appeal mechanisms so disputes are resolved institutionally rather than through informal pressure. Equally important is narrative discipline.

must be communicated as support for citizen enterprise—through finance, skills, and market access—rather than as resistance to outsiders. When economic rules are framed as contests of belonging, enforcement inevitably drifts into identity policing, with families and cross-border traders bearing the cost. In such environments, empowerment risks breeding tendencies that undermine regional peace, stability, and trust.

To prevent regional retaliation, Zimbabwe would benefit from proactive reassurance: quiet bilateral engagement with neighbours, structured channels for resolving cross-border cases, and an explicit administrative position that citizens do not become economically suspect by virtue of marriage to a foreign national.

That clarification alone would remove a major source of and help neighbouring governments resist domestic pressure to respond in kind.

For Zambians operating businesses in Zimbabwe—or married into households affected by the regulations—the prudent response is calm, documented .

Ownership and management records should be clear, roles capable of being explained in writing, and informal nominee arrangements avoided.

contacts should be readily available, and where issues arise, written guidance and formal review pathways should be insisted upon rather than verbal directives.

Disciplined engagement with the rules, early through recognised channels, and careful documentation remain the strongest safeguards for livelihoods—while also helping to prevent escalation dynamics that would ultimately harm both Zambians and Zimbabweans.

IMAGE CREDIT: Hakainde Hichilema


Zambia Daily Mail
Zambia Reports

06/12/2025

CONGRATULATIONS The White House for being supportive to your leader and the leader of your nation.

A WAKE-UP CALL FOR NGOs IN ZAMBIAThe sentence at the centre of this debate is no longer a fringe opinion. It now reflect...
06/12/2025

A WAKE-UP CALL FOR NGOs IN ZAMBIA

The sentence at the centre of this debate is no longer a fringe opinion. It now reflects the official U.S. line in Zambia.

The U.S. Embassy, in Zambia has repeatedly stated that “foreign assistance should bolster allies and advance American national interests — not pad the pockets of overpaid executives in the NGO complex…"Our new America First foreign assistance cuts out the middlemen and ensures that every dollar achieves direct impact saving lives and advancing strategic priorities.”

This is the localized expression of a codified shift in U.S. foreign-assistance policy, with direct consequences for NGOs that have long operated at the heart of Zambia’s development landscape.

This article distils what the United States has formally adopted as policy, how it is already being implemented elsewhere, and why Zambian NGOs — especially those heavily exposed to U.S. funding — should treat this as a structural wake-up call, not a passing diplomatic storm.

What the State Department’s new policy actually says

In September 2025, the U.S. Department of State released the America First Global Health Strategy i.e. the definitive framework guiding much of U.S. global health and development assistance. It does three things with striking clarity: it re-anchors all foreign aid around American security, American prosperity and American strategic advantage; it centralises foreign assistance inside the State Department; and, it sharply reduces reliance on large NGOs and multilateral initiatives.

The State Department’s own summaries underscore several themes now echoed almost verbatim in Lusaka. Foreign assistance must align with U.S. national security and economic interests, not operate as an open-ended solidarity project.

Fragmentation caused by multiple NGO contracts is to be pared back. Legacy USAID programmes — built on long chains of grants and sub-grants — are being replaced with consolidated, multi-year bilateral compacts negotiated directly with partner governments.

A complementary State Department note on implementing the President’s Executive Order on foreign-aid realignment goes further. Aid must be reevaluated and redeployed so it no longer “blindly doles out funds,” but channels resources where they produce measurable outcomes along the America First axis.

Senior U.S. officials have reinforced this direction publicly. Jeremy Lewin, a principal figure in the U.S. foreign assistance bureau, has stated that the new strategy is “moving a lot of our implementing mechanisms” away from the NGO-heavy model and toward government compacts, high-impact commodities and selected private-sector partners.

This is consistent with multiple reports — including Reuters and donor tracking platforms — showing USAID’s operational responsibilities being folded into the State Department, together with significant cuts to classic development work in favour of security-linked health, migration, and economic interests.

The embassy’s message to Zambia should therefore be read as an official restatement of a broader structural shift: consolidate aid under State, pivot to bilateral agreements, reduce the role of NGOs, and ensure every dollar serves a clearly defined American interest.

How the new model works in practice: cutting out “middlemen” NGOs

The clearest illustration is the new $1.6 billion, five-year health compact with Kenya — the first full operationalisation of the America First Global Health Strategy.

Instead of routing the bulk of funds through NGOs, the U.S. is channelling resources directly through Kenya’s national health system, tied to a Kenyan co-investment of $850 million. The emphasis has moved from NGO overheads and parallel structures to government systems, frontline workers and commodities.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s public remarks around this compact mirror the talking points now emerging from the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka. U.S. taxpayers, he said, will no longer bankroll an “NGO industrial complex.”

They will instead support governments that co-invest, assume responsibility for their populations’ health and share data on pathogens of epidemic potential as part of aid conditionality.

The Global Health Strategy itself criticises the legacy model of “fragmented NGO grants.” It argues for fewer intermediaries, fewer duplicating contracts and more direct negotiation with states.

The language used in Lusaka — cutting out middlemen, ending padding of NGO executive salaries — is a sharpened version of this policy shift. It is a clear statement of intent.

Paradigm shift in U.S.–Zambia relations

For Zambia, the implications are immediate and concrete.

First, the interface with Washington increasingly shifts from NGOs to the Zambian government. Whereas previous U.S. support flowed heavily through USAID, PEPFAR, PMI and NGO-implemented projects, the new model foresees direct government-to-government compacts, with NGOs relegated to supporting rather than leading roles.

Second, the rationale for aid has changed. U.S. strategic priorities now dominate.

Analysts of the new State Department strategy note a decisive move away from balancing humanitarian goals with global public goods, and toward narrowly defined American security and commercial interests — including pathogen surveillance, pharmaceutical supply chains and data access for health threats that might reach U.S. borders.

Third, conditionality is hardening. Draft bilateral agreements published in U.S. and Kenyan media indicate that access to U.S. health funding may require rapid sharing of biological samples and genomic data with U.S. agencies.

At the same time, broader foreign-policy restrictions are now tied to DEI, gender-policy and governance stances, determining who does — and does not — receive funding.

The paradigm shift Zambia faces is therefore structural and normative: a move from multilateral, NGO-driven systems to direct governmental compacts; and a move from solidarity-driven aid to transactional, interest-driven engagement.

What this implies for U.S.-financed NGOs in Zambia

The consequences for U.S.-funded NGOs in Zambia are profound and unavoidable.

The funding risk is real. Reuters has documented how U.S. malaria-programme suspensions in Cameroon led to serious consequences.

Similar uncertainty surrounds PEPFAR and other programmes where funding instability is eroding NGO capacity faster than governments can absorb or replace it.

NGOs that survive will be expected to deliver short-term, visibly attributable results that fit the “America safer, stronger, more prosperous” rubric.

Advocacy, governance reform, rights-based programming, community organising and DEI-focused work face the highest vulnerability because they directly clash with new political redlines.

The model now privileges governments and selected private actors as custodians of aid resources.

“Country ownership” is effectively government ownership — not civil society ownership. For Zambian NGOs that once operated as parallel service-delivery systems, this is a decisive break with the past.

Put simply: U.S.-financed NGOs are being pushed from the centre to the margins of Zambia’s aid ecosystem. Those that remain will do so as subcontractors delivering measurable outputs under strict government-aligned frameworks.

How Zambia and its NGOs should respond

The embassy’s message is not a diplomatic scolding. It is advance notice of a new operating environment. Zambia must prepare on three fronts.

For Government, the shift presents both risk and opportunity. Sudden programme cuts threaten public services, but the negotiating space now lies firmly within government-to-government channels.

Ministries must map where U.S. support remains essential, where alternative partners (EU, UK, multilaterals, private capital) can step in, and where Zambia can — or cannot — accept new conditionalities.

Strengthening public financial management, data integrity, transparency and anti-corruption systems is no longer just good governance; it is now part of foreign-policy strategy.

For NGOs, this must trigger disciplined internal restructuring. Organisations should quantify exposure to U.S. funding, model scenarios for reductions, diversify toward European, African, multilateral, private foundation, corporate or domestic sources, and reposition themselves as low-overhead, government-aligned delivery partners.

The NGOs that resemble lean technical contractors will survive; those resembling parallel bureaucracies will not.

For communities, the risk is invisibility. As funding shifts from NGOs to state treasuries, community-level oversight becomes essential. Faith-based institutions, watchdog groups and grassroots structures must reinforce transparency mechanisms to ensure that service delivery does not deteriorate, and that citizens retain agency in an increasingly government-centric model.

Why this matters now

The phrase paradigm shift is not a rhetorical flourish. It is a documented reality across U.S. foreign assistance.

The State Department’s strategy, the executive-order guidance and the Kenya compact all point in the same direction: Washington has moved from being a broad development donor with strong NGO engagement to being a selective, interest-driven actor operating through governments and a narrow band of aligned partners.

For Zambia, the embassy’s statement is effectively an early-warning system. It signals that the America First logic has arrived in Lusaka.

U.S.-funded NGOs, line ministries and community actors cannot afford complacency.

The call to action is straightforward. Understand the new rules. Protect citizens from unnecessary disruption. And reposition Zambia’s development and foreign-policy strategy so that, even in an era defined by America First, Zambia does not end up last in line.

(c) Richclass Connections

(NOTE: The image is AI generated for illustration, only)

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