09/08/2026
The Nuclear Paradox of the Iran War: How Iran Can Redefine Global Power
Trump's and Netanyahu's attacks on Iran, including the assassination of Ali Khamenei, who had publicly opposed nuclear weapons, may have damaged Iran's nuclear infrastructure while creating a potentially more dangerous proliferation problem. Before the attacks, the IAEA estimated that Iran possessed roughly 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, an amount that, if further enriched to weapons-grade, could theoretically provide material for roughly 10 nuclear weapons under the IAEA's standard calculation. The IAEA has since lost continuity of knowledge over that material and cannot currently account for its location.
That uncertainty raises a more unconventional risk: some of the material could potentially be moved to covert locations or, in the worst-case scenario, eventually transferred to an Iran-backed proxy such as Hezbollah. A crude nuclear explosive would not necessarily have to be a missile warhead; a sufficiently large device could potentially be transported by other means. There is no public evidence establishing that Iran has actually transferred nuclear material to a proxy, but the loss of international verification makes the possibility harder to exclude.
There is also a potentially more consequential escalation scenario. Iran could theoretically conduct an underground nuclear test deep beneath one of its mountains, demonstrating that it had crossed the nuclear threshold. A first test would not necessarily establish a durable deterrent. On the contrary, it could trigger an immediate effort by the United States and Israel to destroy whatever nuclear capability remained.
But a second test soon afterward would fundamentally change the strategic calculation. It would demonstrate that the first explosion was not an isolated event and create uncertainty over how much additional nuclear capability Iran retained. At that point, the question would no longer simply be whether Iran had acquired a nuclear capability, but whether continued attacks could risk further nuclear detonations whose number and location could not be confidently determined.
Combined with Iran's ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, that uncertainty could give Tehran substantially greater bargaining leverage. A second nuclear test would not necessarily end the conflict, but it could create conditions in which Washington and its allies concluded that continued military action carried unacceptable escalation risks and that negotiations were preferable. In that scenario, Iran could emerge with substantially greater leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and the terms of any ceasefire.
Satellite imagery provides unusually concrete evidence that Iran was moving material and equipment around its nuclear facilities immediately before the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli strikes. At Fordow, Maxar photographed 16 cargo trucks lined up along the access road to the underground facility on June 19, with most subsequently moving away from the site. At Isfahan, imagery taken on June 9 showed a flatbed truck carrying 18 large barrels entering an underground tunnel complex. The contents of those vehicles have not been independently established, but subsequent reporting that Iran moved much of its highly enriched uranium before the strikes, along with the IAEA's continuing inability to account for the stockpile, makes those images particularly significant.
The consequences of such a scenario would extend far beyond Iran and could substantially influence global politics. If Iran were able to demonstrate that it still had a nuclear capability after being attacked, it could weaken international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and encourage other countries to reconsider whether developing nuclear weapons is necessary for their security. Combined with Iran's ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, this could also give Tehran greater leverage over the United States, Israel, and other regional powers. The result could be a major shift in the balance of power, showing that the consequences of a nuclear Iran could reach far beyond the Middle East.
